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Abstract
The dispute settlement process established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994,
(the "DSU"), has drawn widespread attention. While the DSU is the most used international
dispute settlement process, it is geared to resolving complaints by one country against another
concerning enforcement of the WTO rules and obligations. This research has examined the WTO
in two dimensions: first, how does the DSU fit within a larger system of processes for resolving
policy making and implementation, as well as enforcement disputes. Secondly, how do those
processes measure up to the characteristics of effective dispute resolution.
In answer to the first question, I have categorized policy disputes into three orders: first-order
disputes in policymaking, second-order disputes in policy implementation, and third-order
disputes in policy enforcement. The same issues, e.g., agricultural subsidies or intellectual
property, emerge in all three dispute orders. First-order disputes are resolved by all WTO
members through consensus-based negotiation. The negotiation experience of the last four
multilateral trade negotiations -- the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round, the Uruguay Round and
the pending Doha Round -- are assessed. Second-order disputes are considered by all WTO
members through operating committees and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Third-order
disputes are resolved through the DSU; 304 cases were submitted from January 1, 1995 to
December 31, 2003.
More effective dispute resolution processes tend to exhibit a number of characteristics: they
involve lower transactions costs in terms of economics, time, bureaucracy, diplomacy and
opportunity; parties are satisfied with the outcome and the process; relationships among the
affected parties are not damaged; and recurrence of the problem among the same and other parties
is minimized.
This research suggests that the three dispute orders be considered as an integrated system of
dispute settlement. In doing so, the WTO - and other international institutions - can achieve
more effective resolution of policy problems by taking advantage of the relative strengths
available through each dispute order settlement process.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Ford Professor Urban Studies and Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Agriculture forms the heart of the economic policies of many nations-developed and developing
alike. The value of global agricultural trade now exceeds $583 billion per year.1 Differences in
countries' development stages, geography, and cultural norms influence trade in agricultural goods,
and conflicts among countries over agricultural trade practices are inevitable. The United States,
Europe, and the G-20 group of developing countries, for example, have struggled for years over
acceptable levels of agricultural protection.2 Their negotiators wrestle with whether and how to
reduce trade barriers on agricultural products and what transitional accommodations are appropriate
for differently situated countries.
But while agriculture dominates current international trade negotiations, it is only one of
many issues facing nations in the global trade arena. Each issue challenges countries to negotiate a
framework of rules, integrate those rules into domestic policy, and enforce those policies in practice.
Diverse cultures, resources, levels of access to information, norms, and priorities generate conflicts
among nations at every stage of negotiations. The global nature of trade demands a coherent and
time-efficient means to resolve these conflicts. This research examines one international institution-
the World Trade Organization (WTO)-and the processes it has developed to address trade-related
conflicts.
The WTO is a community of 146 nations that have come together in an effort to jointly
regulate international trade. Of the myriad disputes that arise among and between these nations, three
types bear close analysis. I have designated these types as first-order, second-order, and third-order
disputes, based on a narrowing scope of parties and targeted action.
First-order disputes, or "policy disputes," are disagreements among the universe of WTO
nations concerning what the international rules of the trade "game" should be. In these disputes,
I WTO, Annual Report 2002, International Trade Statistics, Table IV-01 (Geneva: WTO, 2002).
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members of the WTO decide, through multilateral negotiation, whether international trade rules
should apply to a particular situation, and, if so, what those rules should be. These disputes are
about whether countries should retain sovereignty on a given level or mode of protection, or
should support an international rule that binds all WTO members for the common benefit of the
trading community. For example, negotiators at WTO meetings in Doha, Qatar, and Cancun,
Mexico, engaged in first-order disputes when they disagreed over the substance of WTO rules
governing national agriculture subsidies to farmers.3
Second-order disputes, or "policy implementation disputes," are disputes among member
countries over how international policy is translated into national law. A second-order dispute
often takes the form of a review of an individual country's trade policies. Such a review takes
place in a multilateral forum in which any and all members of the WTO may participate,
depending on the issue's relevance to their own trade relations. The outcome is a concluding
report with comments and recommendations to guide the subsequent behavior of the targeted
country. For example, the WTO recently reviewed the United States' trade policies and raised
concerns that the United States' continuing subsidy of its agriculture sector (under the 2002 Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act) did not comply with the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. 4 Here, the dispute is between one WTO member country and the
others, due to an alleged failure to incorporate the internationally agreed-upon rules into domestic
2 "Protection" refers to the practice of protecting, or advantaging, one's domestic industry against competition
from foreign countries. Protection can take several forms, the most direct being to tax (or set a tariff on)
competing imports.
3 Scott Miller and Christopher Rhoads, "WTO Chief Sets Goals on Farm Issues," Wall Street Journal, January
16,2004.
4 Minutes of the Trade Policy Review of the United States on January 14-16, 2004, WTO Doc. WT/TPRM/126,
March 15, 2004, p. 31. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is part of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
January 1, 1995. The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is generally known as
the "WTO Agreement" and will be referred to as such in the remainder of this paper. The term includes the
agreements and associated legal instruments of Annexes 1, 2 and 3 comprising the Multilateral Trade
Agreements made by the signing member countries at Marrakesh, and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements signed
by certain countries. The full text of the WTO Agreement can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/
docse/legale/legale.htm#wtoagreement.
12
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trade policy. Second-order disputes can provide an early warning of problems that could develop
into third-order disputes.
Third-order disputes, or "policy enforcement disputes," are bilateral disputes between
individual countries over specific actions that allegedly violate WTO rules and cause harm to a
trading partner. These disputes, which involve a complaining country and a responding country,
are handled through a formal dispute resolution mechanism at the WTO. A three-person panel of
experts serves as arbitrator between the two sides and decides whether the responding country has
violated the WTO's rules, and, if so, the appropriate level of compensation if the violating
country does not agree to "cure" its violation. For example, Brazil filed a formal complaint
against the United States for violation of the WTO's subsidy rules, for giving American cotton
growers and agribusinesses $1.54 billion in annual subsidies. Brazil argued that the
overproduction of cotton caused by U.S. subsidies is destroying export markets and undermining
the livelihoods of Brazilian farmers. (Ironically, their complaint was based on data from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.)5
While the participants and resolution processes for each order of dispute vary, the issues are
similar. A single issue may be considered sequentially, or even simultaneously, as a first-order,
second-order, and third-order dispute. As mentioned above, for example, the general disagreement
and debate among all WTO nations over provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is a good
example of a first-order dispute. The criticism of the United States' farm subsidy policy during the
WTO's trade policy review of the United States is an example of a second-order dispute. And Brazil's
official complaint against the United States, which argued that U.S. cotton production subsidies
caused significant economic harm to Brazilian producers, is a third-order dispute.
I have analyzed the legal and administrative processes the WTO uses to resolve these three
distinct types of disputes. Collectively, these processes can be studied as an international system for
5 Elizabeth Becker, "Battle is Looming over Cotton Subsidies," New York Times, January 24, 2004. A WTO
panel issued a final ruling to the parties on June 18, 2004, that the subsidies granted to U.S. cotton farmers from
1999 to 2002 depressed world market prices and injured Brazil's trade interests. The United States has until July
1,2005, to withdraw the measures. Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R, forthcoming.
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dispute settlement. Dispute resolution theory offers guidance about how to characterize and evaluate
such systems. My research applies dispute resolution theory to the WTO's dispute-handling processes
and suggests how those processes might be improved.
The WTO's system is appealing as a topic of study for several reasons. First, since
international trade is of significant importance to the international community, it is reasonable to
assume that countries care a great deal about how the trading system works and how it applies to
them. Second, the WTO's large and diverse membership mirrors that of almost all other international
regimes, including, for example, the United Nations and the Framework Convention on Climate
Change.6 Third, the WTO system grew out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which was in existence for four decades and from which much was learned. Fourth, much of the
WTO's experience since its inception in 1995 is documented and accessible. And lastly, the WTO's
formal dispute settlement process (used for third-order disputes) is employed more frequently than
any other multilateral dispute settlement procedure.7
This introduction has four sections. First, I offer a brief overview of the WTO's institutional
history and operation. Second, I present three stories to illustrate further the three types of disputes
that arise at the WTO. Third, I analyze the WTO's system from the standpoint of dispute resolution
theory and introduce ideas about how it might be strengthened. And fourth, I outline the topics
covered in the five chapters that follow.
OVERVIEW OF THE WTO
The predecessor to the World Trade Organization was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which was enacted in 1947 (the "GATT 1947"), contemporaneously with the formation of the World
6 As of 2003, 146 nations were members of the WTO. In this paper, the terms "members," "countries,"
"contracting parties," and "trading partners" will be used interchangeably to refer to WTO member nations.
7 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Dispute Settlement Procedures of International Organizations at Geneva," Journal
of International Economic Law 2, no. 2 (1999): 186.
14
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The contracting parties under the GATT 1947 undertook
eight negotiating "rounds" between 1950 and 1994, each of which took one to eight years. 8 The last,
the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), was documented in 30,000 pages and resulted in the formation of
the WTO on January 1, 1995.
The World Trade Organization was formed to deal with the rules governing trade among
nations. Its objective is to help producers, exporters, and importers of goods and services by
eliminating trade barriers that might impede the free flow of international commerce. Trade barriers
include tariffs placed on imports, subsidies for producers and exporters, and nontariff barriers such as
regulatory restrictions that function as "zero quotas," or bans, on certain imports.
The WTO's membership stands at 146 countries, and the body is headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland. Each member country is entitled to have its exports treated "fairly and consistently" by
other member countries and commits to do the same for imports into its own market. The umbrella
agreement for the WTO-the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
which subsumed the GATT 1947-sets forth a complex set of negotiated trade concessions on
thousands of products, together with other agreements that govern trade in various goods, services,
and intellectual property rights. These agreements are all premised on fundamental trading principles,
namely, an obligation to: (1) avoid discrimination among countries (through the application of "most
favored nation" (MFN) treatment among all members)9; (2) limit tariffs10; (3) avoid discrimination
against goods imported from other member countries; and (4) avoid the use of quotas and other
nontariff restrictions on imports. 2
The explicit functions of the WTO are to:
8 A "round" designates a particular period of time devoted to negotiating a pre-negotiated agenda of issues.
Neither the duration nor frequency of a round is predetermined. Many years may pass before countries decide
that a new negotiating round should be launched. While the WTO Agreement provides that the member
countries will meet in Ministerial Conference at least every two years, there is no obligation to initiate new
negotiating rounds until the contracting parties so decide.
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article . (The full text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legale/legale.htm#wtoagreement.)
10 A tariff is a duty usually imposed on imports to protect a country's domestic products from price competition
from products produced outside the country.
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article 111.
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* Administer the WTO trade agreements and decisions (of which there are nearly 60);
* Provide a forum for trade negotiations;
* Handle trade disputes between countries;
* Monitor national trade policies;
* Provide technical assistance and training for developing countries; and
* Cooperate with other international organizations.13
The WTO's decisions are made by the entire 146-country membership, typically by
consensus.14 The WTO's top decision-making body is its Ministerial Conference, which meets at
least every two years. At the next level down is the General Council, whose representatives (usually
ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva, but sometimes officials sent from member capitals)
meet several times a year in the Geneva headquarters. The General Council also meets as the Trade
Policy Review Body to conduct trade policy reviews and as the Dispute Settlement Body to address
and manage the settlement of disputes. Subsidiary to the General Council are a number of councils
and numerous committees responsible for specific agreements.
THE THREE ORDERS OF DISPUTES
Each of the three orders of disputes involves different procedures for dispute diagnosis and dispute
resolution. Diagnosis is the procedure by which a dispute is acknowledged and assessed. Resolution
is the procedure by which a dispute is solved. Resolution can take place either through direct
negotiation by the relevant parties or via a decision by a professional neutral or arbitration panel.
Table 1.1 summarizes the diagnosis and resolution procedures used in conjunction with the three
orders of disputes at the WTO.
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XI.
13 WTO Agreement, Article III.
14 Article IX of the WTO Agreement provides that consensus is achieved if no member present at the meeting
formally objects to the proposed decision.
16
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Table 1.1: Dispute Diagnosis and Resolution Procedures
Dispute Type Dispute Diagnosis Process Dispute Resolution Process
First Order All member nations must decide by All member nations must agree by
consensus to consider or reconsider consensus to adopt or amend a
WTO policy. policy rule.
Second Order A nation (or nations) raises Resolution takes the form of
concerns about another nation's comments and recommendations-
trade policies within relevant WTO either informally in discussions or
councils and committee meetings, formally in Trade Policy Review
most notably in the Council for minutes and summaries-but does
Trade Policy Reviews. The issue not involve any binding action.
may also be raised by the WTO
Secretariat.
Third Order A nation makes a specific claim of The complaint is resolved through
violation against a trading partner. bilateral consultations (direct or
assisted by the Director-General); a
decision by a three-expert panel; or
legal review by an appellate body.
The diagnosis and resolution procedures for each order of dispute are described more fully in the
following sections. Detailed illustrations of actual cases are also included.
First-Order Disputes: Policy Disputes
First-order disputes among WTO member nations arise in the context of pre-negotiations (i.e.,
debates over what the agenda should be for each round of negotiations) and then in the negotiation of
each issue on the agenda. WTO members make decisions by consensus in both pre-negotiations and
negotiations. The 146 government delegations meet in multiple, simultaneous working groups with
professional staff support from the WTO Secretariat. 15 Conflict arises at several levels: Countries
dispute what issues, with what scope, should be included on the agenda. These disputes emerge over
some period, formally and informally, as countries explore whether a new negotiating round should
be launched, and if so, what problems warrant address. Hundreds of proposals may be floated among
the members, each seeking to frame a problem and a policy response and attract the support of a
winning coalition. To establish an agenda for negotiation and authorize the formation of negotiating
17
groups, members much reach consensus about the agenda at a Ministerial Conference (held once
every two years).
Once a preliminary agenda is established for a given negotiating round, the parties proceed to
negotiate trading rules. The rules are generally of two different types: agreements on specific
concessions for specific products (e.g., a 10 percent tariff reduction on manufactured computer chips)
and rules on how trade will be conducted (e.g., what dispute settlement procedures will be used or
what topical areas, such as services and intellectual property rights, will be covered). It is understood
that the agenda, and ultimately the agreement, must represent a package of tradeoffs that allows each
member to satisfy some of its interests.
Table 1.2 shows the negotiating rounds, the number of negotiating countries, and the issues
that have been addressed since the GATT was formed in 1947. Each negotiating round concluded
with agreement(s) among all the contracting parties on further reduced tariffs on traded products and
the terms by which the parties would conduct international trade. Select agreements at the conclusion
of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds were "plurilateral,"-that is, not all contracting parties agreed to
be bound by them.
Table 1.2: History of Trade Negotiating Rounds
Negotiating Time Period Number of Issues
Round Countries Negotiated
GATT 1: Geneva 1947 23 Tariffs
GATT 2: Annecy 1949 19 Tariffs
GATT 3: Torquay 1950 28 Tariffs
GATT 4: Geneva 1956 34 Tariffs
GATT 5: Dillon 1960-61 39 Tariffs
GATT 6: Kennedy 1962-67 74 Tariffs, agriculture, and nontariff
measures
GATT 7: Tokyo 1973-79 84 Tariffs and 9 new agreements
GATT 8: Uruguay 1986-94 128 Tariffs, 18 agreements, and 30
understandings
WTO 1: Doha 2001- 146 21 issues
18
15 Countries vary greatly in the size of their Geneva-based missions to the WTO. Some have no staff in Geneva
at all; others have staffs numbering more than 100.
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Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1 illustrate the dramatic increase over time in both the number of
contracting parties and the number of issues negotiated. This increasing complexity has extended the
time and expertise needed to complete each round of negotiation.
In resolving first-order disputes, problems of asymmetric participation and information access
are rampant. Countries with limited capacity to analyze and understand their own interests suffer a
knowledge deficit that ultimately results in a deficit of democracy, as they are unable to negotiate
fully in their individual or the collective interest. These problems are exacerbated by the number of
parties and the scope and complexity of the disputes. From 1947 to 1995, for example, international
trade rules governed only trade in goods. In 1995, the rules were extended to cover trade in services
as well. Many countries opposed the inclusion of services on the negotiating agenda because they
lacked sufficient information, as well as economic and political interest.
Political pressure to conclude policy disputes results in many disagreements being papered
over or ambiguously drafted and left for later clarification. For example, the Agreement on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), adopted in 1995, contemplated legal
capacity and infrastructure that was beyond many countries' understanding and means, thus
frustrating policymakers' intent and effect.
My hypothesis, described in Chapter 3, is that "enhanced management" of the consensus-
building process by which policy disputes are resolved-including the participation of a mediator,
structured and representative consultations, and better access to information-will increase the
likelihood that resulting agreements will improve the predictability of the trading system, and
therefore the willingness of parties to resolve their disputes more efficiently. A consultative board of
eminent persons set up by the WTO Director-General is considering such ideas. 16
The following story describes the WTO's 1999 effort to resolve first-order disputes over an
appropriate agenda for a new round of trade negotiations.
16 Laurence Tubiana, "Post-Cancun WTO: Focus on Objectives, Not the Means," Bridges Between Trade and
Sustainable Development, no. 7 (September-October 2003): 9.
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Seattle: The Dilemma ofAgenda-Setting
To the international public, "Seattle" evokes a vivid image of confrontation between international
trade diplomats and the opponents of globalization. One news headline blazed that the Seattle
ministerial meeting was "A Chaotic Intersection of Tear Gas and Trade Talks." 17 Another writer
gushed: "Battle in Seattle: Third Ministerial Meeting in Seattle collapsed in spectacular fashion, in the
face of unprecedented protest from people and governments around the world."18 The reality of the
Seattle ministerial was significantly more complex than the headlines indicated, however, and the
failure of the WTO countries to agree to an agenda for a new round of trade talks was due to far more
than anti-globalization activists' protests.
From 1996 to 1999, WTO parties exchanged information in anticipation of launching a new
round of trade negotiations. Two topics-agriculture and services-were specifically scheduled for
new negotiations by the beginning of 2000. The Agreement on Agriculture, adopted in 1994 as part of
the final Uruguay Round, provided a framework for the long-term reform of agricultural trade and
domestic policies through commitments in the areas of market access, domestic support, and export
competition. 19 The General Agreement on Services, also adopted in 1994, is a parallel counterpart to
the GATT's Multilateral Agreements on Goods. The services agreement essentially doubled the
economic value of trade covered by the WTO to include not only trade in products, but also trade in
services (e.g., banking, tourism, telecommunications, and transportation). The agreement established
a commitment to reduce the barriers to trade in such services over the successive rounds of
negotiations. Whether, and how many, additional issues would be placed on the agenda of a
17 David Sanger and Joseph Kahn, "A Chaotic Intersection of Tear Gas and Trade Talks," New York Times,
December 1, 1999.
18 Lori Wallach of Public Citizen posted online news coverage of the Seattle Ministerial on Public Citizen's
web site (www.citizen.org/trade/wto/seattle). Although the site is no longer active, the author has a print copy
on file.
19 "Market access" refers to the ability of agricultural producers to export to other countries. Some countries
discourage imports by imposing certain quality standards that may not be based on legitimate health and safety
measures and are protectionist in intent. "Domestic support" refers to a national policy to subsidize the
production of certain products, thus granting a production cost advantage to domestic producers over producers
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"Millennium Round" (slated to potentially begin at the Seattle meeting in 1999) was open for
discussion.
From March to November 1999, more than 800 proposals for items to be negotiated by
member nations were submitted by member countries and coalitions to the WTO. The General
Council worked to put the various ideas together in a draft declaration, to be debated and then issued
in Seattle, that would constitute an agenda for subsequent negotiation. The topics identified for
consideration included not only the agriculture and services agenda agreed upon in 1994, but tariffs,
antidumping, subsidies, safeguards, investment measures, trade facilitation, electronic commerce,
competition policy, fisheries, transparency in government procurement, technical assistance, capacity
building and other development issues, and intellectual property protection. Ultimately, the 800
proposals were categorized into a potential agenda that spanned nearly 20 topical areas.
Three main strategic camps emerged with regard to the proposed negotiating agenda. The
first was made up of those who felt that negotiations should focus solely on a comprehensive review
of existing WTO agreements. These parties wanted to "catch up" and stabilize the almost
overwhelming range of new obligations agreed to in the Uruguay Round. As the Chair of the Group
of 77 expressed it, "The next stage of the WTO negotiations should be about the three Rs, to review,
repair, and reform the WTO agreements and system."20 Developing countries generally fell into this
camp.2 1Their demand was a deferred reaction to the requirement that the Uruguay Round be
executed as a "single undertaking." (The term single undertaking refers to the fact that, in the
Uruguay Round, the contracting parties had to consent to all 20 agreements as a package, rather than
pick and choose specific agreements to adopt.) Many smaller countries did not fully understand the
in other countries. Conversely, a country might subsidize the costs associated with the export of certain
products, to make them more competitive in the world market.
20 The Honourable William Harrington, Minister of Commerce, Trade, and Industry, Zambia, statement made at
the Third Session (Ministerial Conference, Seattle, December 2, 1999), WTO Doc. WT/MIN(99)/ST/I 17. The
Group of 77 is actually a group of 134 developing countries that often negotiate as a block to represent the
developing countries' interests.
21 Of these, developing countries particularly wanted to examine how the Uruguay Round agreements adopted
in 1995 (e.g., agreements on antidumping measures, subsidies, textiles and clothing, intellectual property,
investments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to trade) had been implemented over
the previous five years.
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legal or practical ramifications of some of the agreements, but felt unable to oppose their adoption.
Their recourse was to defer compliance and demand re-negotiation in Seattle.
The second strategic camp was made up of those who believed that negotiations should be
limited to the "built-in agenda"-the agriculture and services issues already scheduled for
negotiation. The third and final camp included those who wanted to expand the WTO's purview to
include all 20 topical areas, including seeking specific agreements on investments, competition
policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade and environment.
The Seattle Ministerial was scheduled for November 30-December 3, 1999. At the opening
session, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, host Chair for the meeting, exhorted
delegations to meet in working groups (each open to all member countries) to reach agreement on text
for consideration by the Committee of the Whole, the plenary body that was equivalent to the General
Council. While she stated a preference for this inclusive approach, she reserved the right to hold
"green room" discussions-informal meetings with smaller numbers of delegations selected at her
discretion. 2 2
Traditionally, the most important talks take place in green room discussions. Green room
deliberations typically involve a relatively small number of representatives from developed and
developing countries. A "full" green room can have up to 30 participants, typically including: "the
Quad" (the United States, European Union, Canada, and Japan), Australia, New Zealand,
Switzerland, Norway, possibly one or two transitional economies, and a number of developing
countries, often Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, China, India, South Korea,
Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and a country from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) bloc. Most smaller developing countries stay on the sidelines for lack of adequate resources
and capacity.2 3
In Seattle, after informal working group discussions through the night of December 2 and into
December 3, the main discussions were in green room meetings in which some 20-40 ministers took
22 The "green room" reference comes from a particular green conference room at the WTO offices in Geneva.
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part. At the same time, the working group chairpersons did "their utmost to ensure that participants
represented a cross-section of the members' positions on the relevant subjects."24 Nevertheless, an
agreed-upon text was elusive, and the negotiations over a new negotiating agenda ultimately failed.
Ambassador Barshefsky explained:
The issues before us are diverse, complex, and often novel. And together with this, we found
that the WTO has outgrown the processes appropriate to an earlier time. An increasing and
necessary view, generally shared among the members, was that we needed a process which
had a greater degree of internal transparency and inclusion to accommodate a larger and more
diverse membership. 25
Jeffrey Schott, in his retrospective, WTO After Seattle, commented:
Tens of thousands of people, concerned about environmental protection, human rights, labor
standards, and other more parochial concerns, demanded that WTO members give greater
priority to their causes and restructure trade policies to promote their objectives....
Ultimately, [however,] the WTO meeting fell victim not to protests outside in the streets, but
rather to serious substantive disagreements inside the convention center among both
developed and developing countries over the prospective agenda for new trade talks.26
Two themes from the Seattle experience bear mentioning. The first is the importance of a
balanced, participatory process during pre-negotiations-negotiations over an appropriate agenda of
policy questions. As Schott notes, the desired "agreement on the agenda for a new WTO Round is an
agreement on the problems that negotiators will try to resolve in new trade talks; it is not a
commitment to particular solutions to those problems."27 Effective pre-negotiation of the agenda
itself is critical. It must include the participation of all parties-including developed and developing
countries-to ensure that the agenda for negotiations captures issues of importance to all participants.
While all member countries were formally present in Seattle, the informal green room process failed.
23 Jeffrey Schott, The WTO After Seattle (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000) p. 285.
24 WTO Briefing Note, December 3, 1999. This briefing note was posted on the WTO website to help journalists
and the public understand developments at the Seattle Ministerial Conference. It was not archived nor preserved
as a document; however, the author retains a print copy in her files.
25 Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, remarks at the Closing Plenary (Ministerial Conference, Seattle,
December 3, 1999).
26 Schott, WTO After Seattle, p. 5.
2 7 Ibid., p. 18.
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Many countries did not view the green room negotiations as representative or transparent enough. The
result of the distrust of members in the process was the ultimate failure of the Seattle Ministerial to
reach agreement on a negotiating agenda.
A second theme relates to the disagreement between developed and developing countries
over the agenda items themselves. Many developing countries took the view that they had been
coerced into some of the 1994 agreements from the Uruguay Round and that they were unable to
implement those agreements. Their incapacity blurs the distinction between first-order and second-
and third-order disputes: diminished capacity to resolve first-order (policymaking) disputes can
contribute to the occurrence of second-order (policy implementation) and third-order (policy
enforcement) disputes. The consequences that flow from omitting implementation discussions from
first-order disputing processes (as was done in the Uruguay Round) are threefold: (1) countries may
demand to renegotiate the terms of previously adopted agreements, (2) countries with insufficient
national capacity (institutional, economic, or political) may simply not implement the agreements
domestically, and (3) countries may file specific, formal performance complaints for lack of any
alternative resolution process. Part of my thesis is that meaningful discussion of both first- and
second-order issues in meetings of the WTO member countries is necessary, but having meaningful
discussions would require much more education, facilitation, and structuring than is currently
contemplated by the WTO.
Second-Order Disputes: Policy Implementation Disputes
Once a trade agreement is signed and ratified, each country needs to interpret the new rules in
domestic law and regulations, to make its domestic trade policies consistent with the new
requirements. Problems with policy implementation can be addressed in a number of ways in the
WTO, including via informal discussions among members during WTO committee and council
meetings and through the WTO's formal, periodic trade policy review process known as the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).
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WTO committees and councils are open to all member countries and meet periodically to
discuss particular issues. For example, the Committee on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
discusses intellectual property issues, and the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
addresses subsidies issues. In committee and council meetings, any country's experience may be
raised within the relevant, specific topical context.
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism, by contrast, is a formal process through which WTO
Secretariat staff members periodically examine each country's trade policies on the full range of
issues covered by the WTO agreements and, with the input of all WTO members, make
recommendations on what adjustments that country should pursue. The TPRM's origins date back to
1985, when the GATT's Wisemen's Report called for regular monitoring of its members' trade
activities and recommended that, "Governments should be required regularly to explain and defend
their overall trade policies." 28 In 1988, a special working group proposed a blueprint for the TPRM
on a trial basis. 29 The TPRM was then formally adopted as part of the Uruguay Round in 1995. Its
purpose was described as follows:
The objectives of the TPRM are to contribute to improved adherence by all WTO Members
to rules, disciplines, and commitments...by achieving greater transparency in, and
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.... It is not intended to serve as
a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute
settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members."3 0
While the trade policy review process is explicitly not to be used to "enforce" particular
behaviors, the problems it surfaces are second-order disputes, as defined in this paper, which have the
potential to become the third-order disputes subject to the WTO's more formal dispute-settlement
28 F. Leutwiler et al., Trade Policies for a Better Future (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
1985) p. 4 2 .
29 The Functioning of the GATT System group, or "FOGS," was organized in 1987-88 to examine the GATT
operation.
30 WTO Agreement, Annex 3.
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process. In his 1998 assessment of the TPRM, economist Donald Keesing describes the TPRM's
essential function as that of an "external audit. 3 1
The WTO Secretariat has 17 professional staff who manage TPRM country reviews, a
process that takes about 10 months for each country and occurs every two to six years. (Larger
trading economies are reviewed more frequently.) As part of a TPRM review, a country completes an
extensive written questionnaire about its economy and trade policies, presents a policy statement by
its government (the "country report"), and is subject to an independent assessment prepared by the
Secretariat (the "Secretariat report"). The Secretariat report highlights successes as well as
deficiencies in a country's trade policies relative to WTO obligations, and includes recommendations
for rectifying the deficiencies. The General Council of the WTO then meets for two days as the Trade
Policy Review Body to review and discuss these reports with the country under review. All WTO
member countries form the Trade Policy Review Body and can attend all reviews. 3 2 Approximately
16 reviews are conducted each year.
While TPRM reviews are explicitly prohibited from functioning as enforcement mechanisms,
the issues raised in them foreshadow the kinds of third-order disputes likely to arise, as they reveal
actions that could provoke one trading partner to file a formal complaint against another. Thus, a
second-order dispute in the TPRM context is expressed as a concern by a particular trading partner or
by the WTO as a collective body about a country's failure to properly interpret the WTO's
international rules in its national policy.
While many countries commend the TPRM for providing an opportunity to engage trading
partners in a highly productive interchange, the nature of the forum is not geared to problem-solving,
but rather to diplomatic consciousness-raising. Also, while all WTO countries are members of the
TPRM Council, a country's participation in a given TPRM review depends on that country's other
obligations and the importance of the target country to its trade volume. And, most notably, the value
31 Donald Keesing, Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization (Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics, 1998).
32 As noted earlier, actual participation varies with the WTO schedule of meetings and the importance of the
reviewed country to other trading partners.
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of the TPRM is limited by the absence of a process by which alternative options for achieving TPRM
recommendations can be debated and considered. Barriers to the national adoption of internationally
agreed-upon policies are domestic in nature and may stem from political, economic, or legal causes.
The various operating committees and TPRM reviews are useful in diagnosing whether national
policies are consistent with international trade obligations, but the processes involve no opportunity
for considering alternative policy options that would cure any noted inconsistencies. Often, a country
is aware of its shortcomings-such as, say, an agricultural policy that advantages domestic tomatoes
relative to imports. But due to political pressures (from farmer constituencies) or economic reasons
(revenue enjoyed from a tariff on imports), the country cannot initiate the necessary policy change. In
short, existing second-order dispute resolution processes highlight whether an implementation
problem exists, but they do not foster the identification of feasible solutions.
The following is an example of a second-order dispute.
Uruguay's Specific Internal Tax: Reforming a Discriminatory Trade Measure
This story involves the second trade policy review of Uruguay, which was held in November 1998.
At that time, more than 50 percent of Uruguay's foreign trade in goods was within Latin America. Its
economic reforms had reduced inflation and its GDP had grown at a cumulative rate of 3.5 percent
per annum. Its major exports were agricultural-beef, wool, rice, hides, leather, dairy products, and
fish. The main objectives of Uruguay's macroeconomic program had been to slow the upward trend
in costs, ease the tax burden on labor, improve the administration of its retirement and pension
systems, and reform its educational and tax systems. The WTO's 1998 trade policy review of
Uruguay noted a reduction of the state's involvement in the economy, including the removal of
monopolies in certain production sectors, as well as a steady growth in its foreign trade flows.
Uruguay was commended for improving its integration into the world economy, removing barriers
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and restrictions, and reducing import duties through unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral
measures. 33
Uruguay's main trade policy instrument through the years has been the tariff. Members of
Mercosur-a regional trading group comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay-began
a tariff-reduction program and defined a common external tariff in 1995. 34 Nevertheless, some
countries expressed concern that Uruguay's effective protection level was higher than indicated by its
nominal tariff. One problem was that Uruguay provided significant assistance to its export sector
through a tariff concession policy; raw materials, parts, and other inputs entered the country duty-free,
as did capital goods for industries deemed to be in the "national interest." Other countries saw the
tariff concession policy as a way for Uruguay to provide unfair protection to its manufacturers
without actually raising tariffs on imports.
Many issues were discussed during Uruguay's trade policy review. In addition to the tariff
concession policy, the Uruguay representative was asked about its excise tax-the specific internal
tax on wholesale levels of certain domestic goods and equivalent imported goods. This excise tax was
known as "IMESI" and was adopted in Uruguay by decree in 1995.35 Industry was concerned that the
formula used to calculate the IMESI discriminated against imported alcoholic beverages, because
each product category was assigned a fixed price per liter, which did not accurately reflect real
market value. For example, wines are assessed at 20 percent of their tax base, but the tax base varies
with the origin of the wine. Chilean wines were assessed at a base of nearly twice that of Uruguayan
wines, resulting in a sale price for Chilean wines that is uncompetitive at least, and an effective
import ban at worst.3 6 The IMESI measure placed an additional burden on imported distilled spirits
by requiring that 100 percent of the value-added tax and 60 percent of the excise tax be prepaid. The
33 Minutes of the Trade Policy Review of Uruguay on November 23-25, 1998, WTO Doc. WT/TPRIM/50,
January 13, 1999, pp. 4-5.
34 Mercosur is a "common market" in trade terms. Members agree to function as a common trading area and tax
imports into any of their nations at the same, or common, level.
35 The fiscal framework for the IMESI was contained in the 1996 Texto Ordenado, Decree 96/990 of February
1990 from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and bimonthly resolutions of the Director General for
Taxation.
36 Request for Consultation by Chile, WTO Doc. WT/DS261/1, June 26, 2002, p. 2.
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tax scheme appeared to afford protection to domestic production in a manner inconsistent with GATT
Article IlI. 3 7
Uruguay responded that rules of origin were country-specific due to existing bilateral
agreements and that technical groups were currently working on the matter. The representative of
Uruguay said: "Uruguay is currently preparing rules which will ensure equal treatment for all
products, regardless of their origin. A decree on the IMESI applied to alcoholic beverages should be
approved over the next few days."3 8 This interchange reflected a second-order dispute.
A few days passed, and then a few years. Finally, on June 18, 2002 (nearly four years after
Uruguay's trade policy review), Chile requested consultations with Uruguay with regard to IMESI
and the resulting tax treatment of certain imported goods, including alcoholic beverages, juices,
mineral water, tobacco and cigarettes, automobiles, lubricants, and fuels. Thus what was a second-
order dispute evolved into a third-order dispute.
Chile claimed that the IMESI violated Articles I and III of GATT 1994, because it established
a tax system based on the use of fictitious, rather than real, prices. Chile considered that the system
discriminated between national and imported products, and in some cases between imported products
depending on their origin. This alleged discrimination constituted a de facto import prohibition as
regards certain products. In its request for consultations, Chile recalled that in the trade policy review
for Uruguay in 1998, the IMESI system was subject to some discussion and that Uruguay indicated,
at the time, that they were in the process of elaborating norms that ensured equal treatment of all
products regardless of their origin. The European Communities, 3 9 Mexico, and the United States
joined Chile in the complaint against Uruguay in July 2002.
In short, then, a specific tax measure adopted by Uruguay in 1990 was addressed and
acknowledged as a potential trade violation in 1998 during Uruguay's trade policy review-a second-
37 Article III of the GATT provides that internal taxes should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to afford protection to domestic production.
38 Minutes of the Trade Policy Review of Uruguay on November, 23-25, 1998, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/40,
January 13, 1999, p. 18.
39 The European Union is, for legal reasons, officially referred to as the "European Communities" in WTO
matters. Both terms are used in this paper, depending on the practice in the particular context.
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order dispute-but the measure was still in effect in 2002, unresolved. Despite Uruguay's recognition
of the potential violation, the country was unable or unwilling to bring the IMESI into compliance
through domestic legislation or other policy reforms. Thus, Uruguay's trading partners (the United
States, Chile, the European Communities, and Mexico) were forced to pursue a third-order dispute
resolution enforcement action in 2002. Ultimately, a panel was established to consider the dispute, but
the parties reached a mutual solution in January 2004.40
Given the widespread economic pressures in Latin America, it can be surmised that it would
have been politically difficult, if not impossible, for Uruguay to amend the IMESI to make it
consistent with the country's WTO obligations. Such reform would involve issues of reduced
government revenue and increased competition for Uruguay's domestic alcoholic beverage industry.
Uruguayan legislators' priorities would be to balance the government's budget and support industry
profits and employment. Since few domestic constituents would rally for IMESI tax reform (except
perhaps consumers and Uruguayan distributors of foreign alcohol products), a legal mandate from an
international body like the WTO may have been necessary to induce such a change.
A senior trade official once said to me, "Never say 'no' [to a domestic constituency] if you
can get someone else to say it." Here, Uruguay shifted the burden of provoking legislative policy
reform to a trading partner (Chile) to force the point and relied on an international arbiter to require
reform. In the meantime, Uruguay enjoyed nearly 14 years of political and economic benefit since
adopting the IMESI measure, a delay that cost the country nothing, since the WTO's policy
enforcement process precludes retroactive damages.
Every trading nation has similar stories of balancing the demands of domestic constituencies
against international trading rules. From the perspective of one country, delayed compliance may be
an acceptable outcome; but multiplied by 146 countries it raises concerns about the integrity and
efficiency of the WTO's power to ensure policy implementation. The WTO's diagnostic process
flushes out numerous policy implementation disputes, but its dispute resolution mechanisms lack an
effective, structured means of facilitating resolution short of formal enforcement. The incentives of
40 Uruguay: Tax Treatment on Certain Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS261/7, January 14, 2004.
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the current system make it in the offending country's interest to delay as long as possible and submit
to the WTO rules only when forced to do so. To improve the system, the WTO would have to alter
and strengthen the incentives for the resolution of second-order disputes.
Third-Order Disputes: Policy Enforcement Disputes
The goal of policy enforcement is to achieve consistency between a member country's actions (not
just their stated policies) and the WTO's system of rules. Under the WTO system, the enforcement of
trade policy is not centralized. That is, neither the WTO Secretariat nor any other centralized body
directly enforces WTO policy. Rather, such policy is enforced through the resolution of complaints
by one trading partner against another.
The resolution of policy enforcement, or third-order, disputes at the WTO follows a
prescribed sequence set forth in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU).41 Members of the
WTO are obligated to use these procedures to resolve covered trade disputes. Under the DSU process,
an individual country first determines whether a sufficient political, legal, and economic basis exists
to pursue a complaint against a trading partner. This is the diagnosis phase.
The next step is for the two countries to seek to resolve their dispute through informal means (e.g.,
direct negotiation by the affected parties, before filing a formal complaint) or, if that fails, formal
consultations (negotiation by the parties after formal notice, with or without facilitation by the
WTO's Director-General). As Gary Horlick explains:
"A request for consultations is a possible indication that the requesting country is willing to
proceed through dispute resolution if its problem is not resolved satisfactorily. At that point-
if not sooner-all sides evaluate their legal positions, gauging the chances of winning and
pondering the prospect of losing. To the extent that both sides coincide on the likelihood of
success or failure, there is room for negotiation."4 2
41 WTO Agreement, Annex 2.
4 2 Gary Horlick, WTO and NAFTA Rules and Dispute Resolution (London: Cameron, May 2003), p. 355.
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If consultations fail, the dispute is submitted to an arbitration panel of three experts named by the
Director-General. This arbitration panel hears both sides of the case and issues a decision. Either side
may appeal the decision.
As an example, say that Country A notifies Country B that A's rights under a WTO
agreement have been impaired by B, because B is subjecting A's apple exports to different
requirements than B's own domestically grown applies, thus creating a barrier to the sale of A's
apples in B's market. If informal discussions between the two countries fail, Country A will then
request mutual consultations with Country B (with notice to the WTO), optionally aided by the
WTO's Director-General. If the dispute is not resolved in these consultations, a panel of three
arbitrators-who are independent trade experts 4 3-will be appointed to determine if B's apple import
measure is consistent with the WTO's rules. The panel hears the arguments on each side and renders
a decision. Either A or B can appeal the panel's decision to the Appellate Body. If Country A
ultimately prevails, Country B will be given some time to "cure" its apple measure-that is, to bring
its policies and actions into compliance. (Sufficient time is often needed, for example, if new
legislation is required). If Country B does not comply with the decision, then Country A can request a
determination on a level of compensation for the trade injury. If the compensation goes unpaid,
Country A can be authorized to withhold comparable benefits on B's exports to A.
Between 25 and 50 disputes like this hypothetical one have been handled through the DSU
process each year since 1995. Each case represents a claim of noncompliance with one or more of the
WTO's trade agreements. It can take up to ten months for a case to progress from the initial filing of a
request for consultation through an adopted panel report. Review by the Appellate Body takes up to
60 days, and implementation of the decision can take one or more years. The WTO's Legal Division
has a professional staff of 17 to support the panelists. The complaining and responding countries
retain counsel, often from the United States and Europe, at a very high cost. The Appellate Body has
7 standing members and a professional staff of 14.
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The DSU process has evolved over the past 50 years from a diplomatic approach to dispute
resolution to the current highly formal, legal system. Generally, scholars and participants have
commended the DSU process in terms of its usage by both developed and developing countries and
the quality of its decision-making. More developing countries participate in the DSU process, both as
complainants and respondents, under the WTO than in the system associated with the GATT. The
process has become more formal, and the quality of the reasoning in panel and appellate reports
reflects that orientation. Nonetheless, some WTO member countries complain about the lack of
transparency of the arbitrations and the difficulty of enforcement, and they have offered proposals on
how to improve the DSU decision-making process. I hypothesize that a system that encourages the
earlier consideration of disputes-i.e., that addresses issues as they become clear in the TPRM review
process-and explicitly includes more creative alternative dispute resolution options, will lead to
quicker, more effective resolution.
Three former GATT/WTO Directors-General issued ajoint statement that reflects how the
WTO struggles with the interplay of disputes arising within the three policy phases I have described:
We are struck by the very high level of trade dispute settlement cases being handled in the
WTO. In one sense, this is a sign of the success and effectiveness of the new system which
emerged from the Uruguay Round. It is notable that developing countries are making
increased use of the system as complainants. Our concern is that the dispute settlement
system is being used as a means of filling out gaps in the WTO system; first, where rules and
disciplines have not been put in place by a member government or, second, are the subject of
differences of interpretation. In other words, there is an excessive resort to litigation as a
substitute for negotiation (emphasis added). This trend is dangerous in itself. The obligations
which WTO members assume are properly for the member governments themselves to
negotiate. The issue is still more concerning given certain public perceptions that the process
of dispute settlement in the WTO is over-secret and over-powerful. 4 4
43 "Independent" means that each trade expert (nominated by his or her country) is not associated with either
the complaining or the responding country. The person must be an expert in trade matters, but need not be a
lawyer.
44 WTO, "Joint Statement on the Multilateral Trading System," WTO News, February 1, 2001.
www.wto .org/english/newse/news01 e/jointstatdavosj anO I_e.htm.
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The preceding quote highlights the mixed blessings of the existing system: an enforcement
process that is increasingly used by its members, but a perverse trend to utilize the institution's third-
order enforcement mechanism rather than first-order (policymaking) and second-order (policy
implementation) mechanisms, which by design are more participatory in nature.
The following story describes an extended dispute among 28 members of the WTO that
involved a market protection problem relating to bananas. This was not a complicated legal question,
and the fact that 28 countries were involved suggests that a more systemic policy problem was at
stake, which could have been resolved as a first-order or second-order dispute. In fact, the bananas
question was discussed during the Uruguay Round negotiation and more than one trade policy review
of the European Union. The importance of internal political factors, and the difficulty in resolving
disputes in which those internal political factors dominate, challenges the dispute settlement scholar
to consider whether alternative forms of resolution might be developed.
Bananas: Policy Enforcement under the Shadow of Law and Politics
The United States' case against the European Communities' banana regime was to a large extent
considered a favor to Carl Lindner of Chiquita Bananas for his extensive campaign contributions to
both U.S. political parties. There may not be a better example of a trade dispute brought because of
domestic political pressure 4 5 (except perhaps the recent U.S. imposition of tariffs on steel imports,
which were ruled to be a violation of WTO policy).
Historically, the European Union and the United States have comprised the two largest
markets for bananas. Almost 60 percent of Europe's imports originate in Latin America (the main
suppliers being Ecuador, Costa Rica, Panama, and Honduras), while around 15 percent each come
from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and domestic producers. The "banana war" that
erupted between the EU and the U.S. raised eyebrows around the trade world; many "free traders"
saw it as a power fight between two stubborn antagonists, neither of which grows bananas. Both
45 James Durling, "Rights of Access to WTO Dispute Settlement," in Philippe Ruttley, lain MacVay, and Marc
Weisberger, Due Process in WTO Dispute Settlement (London: Cameron May, 2001), p. 146. See also Donald
L. Barlett and James B. Steele, "How to Become a Top Banana," Time, February 7, 2000.
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sides, critics said, were defending the worst of their systems: colonial pretension on the part of the
Europeans and the power of political campaign donations in the U.S.46
In the late 1980s, Chiquita invested heavily to break into the European market, and then, in
the 1990s, expanded production in Latin America. Because Chiquita wanted to sell more Latin
American bananas to EU countries, the company sought help from Washington officials to formally
complain about the EU's preferential imports from ACP producers. Public financing records show
substantial contributions by Chiquita CEO Lindner to both Republicans and Democrats.47 The EU did
indeed treat ACP bananas more favorably than Latin American bananas, in an effort to support the
economies of its former ACP colonies. However, Chiquita was already selling more bananas in
Europe than any other company, and three of the top four companies in the European market were
American: Chiquita, Dole, and Del Monte. So what was the real issue? "The EU is the only profitable
banana market in the world, because it's protected," said Paul Meade, an industry analyst. "It's
somewhat of a fallacy that the Americans want the regime disbanded.... Chiquita simply wants a
bigger quota." 48
Before 1993, imports of bananas into European countries were not subject to a common
policy. This network of disparate national policies was challenged in 1993 by Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, and Venezuela in a complaint brought before the GATT. The GATT arbitration panel
report found the regime inconsistent with GATT law, but the panel report was never formally
accepted, and so it had no binding legal effect. (Under the old GATT rules, adoption of a panel report
required full consensus of the contracting parties, including the unsuccessful party under the panel
ruling. Since the European Union did not accept the panel ruling, the panel report was not formally
adopted or binding.)
46 Helen Cooper, "Chiquita Imports to Climb in Return for Lifting Tariffs on Europe Goods," Wall Street
Journal via Dow Jones, April 12,2001.
47 Anthony DePalma, "Citing European Banana Quotas, Chiquita Says Bankruptcy Looms," New York Times,
January 17, 2001
48 Brian Lavery, "Trade Feud on Bananas Not as Clear as It Looks," New York Times, February 7, 2001.
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In July 1993, the European Commission enacted a new common market organization for
bananas to replace the various national import systems.49 In 1994, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela filed a second complaint against the EC. Again, the panel found certain
inconsistencies, but again the report was never adopted. That year, the EC concluded an agreement
(the Banana Framework Agreement, or BFA) with four of five complainants (Colombia, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela). The BFA was incorporated into the Uruguay Round's schedule of trade
concessions, and came into force on January 1, 1995, with a waiver that "grandfathered" preferential
treatment for products originating in ACP states.
In February 1996, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States requested
consultations with the European Community regarding the continued preferential treatment of ACP
bananas, but no mutual solution could be agreed upon. A panel of arbitrators was appointed to
consider the complaint in May 1996.50 As a case, it was exceedingly complicated: 6 parties (one
representing 15 member countries), and 22 third parties, meaning that almost one-third of WTO
members were involved. Claims were made under the GATT 1994 (the agreement governing trade in
goods), the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services. 51
Despite the legal complexity, observers note that "the complicated import regime was nothing
but the juridical fagade of a more delicate economic and political reality: the historic commercial
links with former colonies that the EC wished to preserve through the import system.... Both the
Panel and the Appellate Body passed over this highly political contest and analyzed the case from a
49 Council Regulation, European Council, July 1993, Doc. EEC 404/93.
50 Constitution of the Panel, Dispute Settlement Body meeting of May 8, 1996, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/7, June 7,
1996.
51 Elisabetta Righini and Peter Morrison, "European Communities: Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas," in James Cameron and Karen Campbell, Dispute Resolution in the WTO (London:
Cameron May, 1998) pp. 361-378.
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strictly legal point of view."52 The question addressed through the DSU was: did the European Union
violate its trade obligations under the WTO agreements to treat all banana imports equally?
Four WTO panel reports were issued in 1997 finding the EC's regime inconsistent with a
number of WTO provisions.53 (Note that one significant change in the WTO's dispute settlement
procedures, as adopted in 1995, was that panel reports would be deemed "accepted" unless there was
a consensus by all WTO members against doing do.) The WTO Appellate Body upheld most of the
panel's findings.54 The WTO arbitrators determined that the reasonable period for the EU to bring
their import regime into conformity with WTO agreements would expire on January 1, 1999.55 The
United States and Ecuador each received an arbitrator's decision to uphold the suspension of GATT
concessions on European exports:56 $191.4 million per year for the United States and $201 million
per year for Ecuador.57 Of particular importance was Ecuador's ability to pursue "cross-sector
retaliation" against the EU, i.e. retaliation by withdrawing tariff concessions on nonagricultural
products.
In November 1999, the European Commission informed the Dispute Settlement Body of its
proposed banana regime reform, which would transition from a licensing scheme to tariffs only and
would be in place no later than January 1, 2006.58 Finally, in April 2001, the European Union and the
United States came to agreement. In ajoint statement, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick,
U.S. Commerce Secretary Don Evans, European Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler, and
European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said that "the deal is evidence both sides want a more
52 Righini and Morrison, "European Communities," p. 368. In fact, a number of key legal issues were
determined in this case: third-party participatory rights (the opportunity to be heard and make written
submissions to the panel), the presence of private lawyers (the right of Santa Lucia to be represented by private
counsel of choice), the requirement of a party's legal interest (U.S. not a banana grower), the effect of the Lome
waiver, and substantive issues under four new WTO agreements.
53 Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R, May 22, 1 997.
54 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R, September 9, 1997.
55 Arbitration under Art. 21.3(c) WTO Doc. WT/DS27/15, January 7, 1998.
56 "Concessions" are the value of the tariff reduction granted to a trading partner who exports into your country.
So if Ecuador suspends concessions on European exports to Ecuador, it will raise a tariff on a product at a value
equivalent to the loss it suffers on bananas in order to achieve compensation for its injury.
57 The U.S. had sought $720 million per year. Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Art.
22.6 - Decision by Arbitrators, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB, April 9, 1999.
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harmonious trading relationship.... Both parties agreed the time had come to end a dispute which had
led to prolonged conflict in the world trading system."5 9 According to one commentator:
While the economic stakes have been relatively small, the banana issue had been highly
symbolic for the U.S.-EU trade relationship. On the U.S. side, the EU's refusal to open its
banana market in compliance with the WTO ruling called the whole WTO dispute settlement
system into question. On the European side, a question of resisting pressure from a powerful
U.S. company while preserving benefits for small economies in Africa and the Caribbean that
depend heavily on banana exports to the protected EU market. 60
Why and how did the dispute get resolved in April 2001 ? One journalist wrote: "Pressed to
explain why the parties at this time were able to resolve a dispute after so many years of fruitless
negotiations, the U.S. trade official pointed to no specific breakthrough. 'Sometimes you have to get
to the brink on an issue before you find a way to reach accommodation,' he said." 6 1 Others suggested
that the interpersonal dynamic between U.S. and EC trade officials was the key obstacle to earlier
resolution.
Much of the deterioration in transatlantic trade relations since the mid-l 990s was due to
personal frictions between Sir Leon Brittan and Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade
Representative. Messrs. Pascal Lamy and Robert Zoellick have had the maturity and good
sense to rise above petty squabbling in the interest of bigger shared goals. That bodes well for
the handling of future disputes.... The U.S. and EU may be learning how to settle trade
conflicts. The real trick is to stop them arising in the first place. 62
From an institutional design perspective, a number of features make the bananas case
interesting. Topically, agriculture continues to be one of the most disputed issues among WTO
5 8
"U.S. and EU End Decade-Long Dispute Over EU's Banana Import Regime," Bureau of National Affairs'
WTO Reporter, April 12, 2001, p. 1.
59 Barry James, "U.S. and EU Resolve Banana Dispute," Financial Times, April 12,2001.
6 0 Edward Alden and Deborah Hargreaves, "Zoellick and Lamy's friendship bears fruit," Financial Times,
April 12, 2001.
61 Nathaniel Harrison, "US, EU Overcome Contentious Banana Row But Remain Divided on Other Trade
Issues," Agence France-Presse, April 11, 2001. (The "other trade issues" referred to in the article title included
U.S. hormone-treated beef, government support of the European aeronautics industry, and EU restrictions on
airplane noise.) Of interest is the fact that Chiquita complained in January 2001 that it was near bankruptcy, due
to the Clinton Administration's inability to force the EU to trade fairly. DePalma, "Chiquita Says Bankruptcy
Looms." At the same time, Chiquita sued the EU for $525 million in damages in the European Court of Justice.
Anthony DePalma, "Chiquita Sues Europeans, Citing Banana Quota Losses," New York Times, January 26,
2001.
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member countries. Almost every country is involved in an agricultural dispute involving export
subsidies or import restrictions. The number of parties in the bananas case (28) proved that the issues
had broad relevance for countries beyond just the United States and the European Union. Given the
importance of agriculture to nearly all WTO members, existing substantive and procedural provisions
in the Agreement on Agriculture might be examined for ways to better anticipate and resolve
disputes. (This, in fact, is part of the built-in agenda for negotiations scheduled for the WTO.)
Secondly, this case may have had a high-profile political driver, but the prominence of
internal politics is not unusual in disputes among WTO members. According to a number of
diplomats, most claims are brought under pressure from domestic industry, and many disputes cannot
be resolved because of pressure from domestic constituencies within the offending country.63 The
GATT and the WTO were designed as rules-based systems, in part, to neutralize such political
pressures, but politics cannot be stripped away entirely in practice.
If dispute settlement is the measure of an institution's effectiveness, as many suggest it is,
was the outcome (a reformed banana-import regime) by way of a six-year enforcement process a
satisfactory one?64 The answer is not obvious. Dispute resolution theory offers a way to think about
the WTO's experiences within a framework of effective process design and recommend
improvements. Five criteria will be used to evaluate the process: transaction costs (in time and
money); satisfaction with outcome; effect on relationships; recurrence of disputes; and procedural
justice.6 5 Table 1.3 expands upon Table 1.1 and describes the problems encountered in each order of
dispute. This research will attempt to draw upon available literature to offer possible improvements.
62 "Banana Deal," Financial Times, April 12, 2001.
63 One senior trade official commented that a basic rule of thumb for domestic officials is not to say "no" to an
industry sector if you can get someone else to say it.
64 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Alternative Dispute Resolution - Lessons for the WTO?" in Friedl Weiss,
Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of Other International
Courts and Tribunals (London: Cameron May, 2000) pp. 33-38. Petersmann expressed concern about the
jurisdictional necessity and procedural efficiency of multiple proceedings at the international, national, and
local levels. For example, he noted that many proceedings were brought before the EC Court of Justice that did
not take note of WTO law or proceedings, which resulted in continuing trade rule violations and increased costs
to EC consumers worth billions of Euros per year.
65 These criteria are drawn from William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett, and Stephen B. Goldberg, Getting Disputes
Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988) pp. 11-13.
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Table 1.3: Summary of Disputes
THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
A distinguishing characteristic of the WTO is that it is a rule-based institution, as compared to one
based solely on ad hoc diplomatic negotiations in which relative power often determines outcomes. 66
Interestingly, both smaller countries and the superpowers prefer that the trading system exert restraint
based on rules agreed to in advance and resolve individual problems through neutral and objective
adjudication. Robert Hudec summarizes the several advantages of using rule-based systems in the
realm of international relations.
A rule-based system is the most resource-efficient way to resolve conflicts with other
countries. A rule-based system creates the most predictable conditions for business decisions.
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Dispute Dispute Diagnosis Process Dispute Resolution Problems
Type Process
First All member nations must All member nations must * Uneven access to essential
Order decide by consensus to agree by consensus to information by negotiators
consider or reconsider adopt or amend a policy * Countries that dominate
WTO policy. rule. negotiation not
representative of diverse
membership
* Limited attention to
implementation capacity
Second A nation (or nations) raises Resolution takes the form * No structured review of
Order concerns about another of comments and options by which a target
nation's trade policies recommendations--either country could feasibly
within relevant WTO informally in discussions (economically and
councils and committee or formally in Trade Policy politically) bring its domestic
meetings, most notably in Review minutes and policy into consistency with
the Council for Trade summaries-but does not international trade rules
Policy Reviews. The issue involve any binding action.
may also be raised by the
WTO Secretariat.
Third Order A nation makes a specific The complaint is resolved * Too expensive for smaller
claim of violation against a through bilateral countries to participate
trading partner. consultations (direct or * Concern about
assisted by the Director- professionalism of panelists
General); a decision by a * Limited transparency to
three-expert panel; or legal panel and appellate processes
review by an appellate * Internal politics a significant
body. barrier to compliance
· No retroactive damages
--- I-
And, a rule-based system helps to cement one's own liberal trade policies against the internal
political pressures of protectionism that large countries invariably generate.67
Scholars have used several means to examine the effectiveness of international institutions in
resolving disputes. One approach is to focus on principles of negotiation; these theories are especially
relevant for first-order disputes and are discussed in Chapter 3.68 Another is to examine the incidence
of treaty compliance.69 Another is to measure the achievement of a policy objective; in the case of the
WTO, the policy objective is to reduce trade barriers that impede economic prosperity.70 Still another
approach is to assess the quality of an enforcement process to legitimize a rule-based system such as
the WTO's; this will be the focus in the discussion of third-order disputes in Chapter 5.71 And yet
another is to examine the quality of the process and outcome from the perspective of all
stakeholders. 7 2
66 The reader may reasonably note, of course, based on the discussion of first-order disputes, that the more
economically powerful trading countries carry more weight in establishing those rules.
67 Robert Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure," Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 8
(1999): 1.
68 Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Fen Osler Hampson,
Multilateral Negotiations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and I. William Zartman and
Jeffrey Rubin, Eds., Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
69 Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law (Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1991);
Heather Hazard, "Resolving Disputes in International Trade" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1988); and
Christina Sevilla (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1998). Eric Reinhardt's extensive work in building a database
on GATT and WTO disputes reviews how the request for panel review leverages concessions from the
defending party. Eric Reinhardt, "Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 45, no. 2 (2001): 174-95; and Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes," Fordham International Law Journal 24 (November-
December 2000): 158-172.
70 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Hague Lecture IV: Reforming Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization
(from the series of millennial lectures presented by Professor Slaughter, Hague Academy of International Law,
August 2000). International economics literature focuses extensively on the effect of international policy on
actual trade flows, but that focus is not included here.
71 Lawrence Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,"
Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 273; Robert Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 1995-98," Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 8 (1999): 1; James Cameron
and Kevin Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body," International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 50 (2001): 248-298; John Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (Washington, DC: Brookings Trade Forum, 2000); and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
"Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law," Journal of International Economic Law 2, no. 2 (1999).
72 G. Richard Shell, "The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade
Organization," U Pa. Journal of International Economic Law 17 (1996): 359.
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An emerging field of study-called conflict management system design-draws upon all of
the approaches above.7 3 This relatively new discipline has been applied to organizations and firms in
a domestic setting, but it can be usefully extended to the international context as well and will form
the umbrella literature for this research. Generally, a conflict management system designer helps an
organization to develop coordinated stages of conflict diagnosis, resolution, implementation, and
evaluation.
Since the GATT's origins 50 years ago, the objective of the GATT/WTO regime has shifted
from one of practical, diplomacy-based problem solving among a fairly homogenous club of
members to a highly legal, rule-based enforcement process. This relatively new approach (adopted as
the DSU as of 1995) represents a high-profile and financially and politically expensive means of
resolving disputes between individual countries, but it has the advantage of setting clear institutional
precedents that are observable by others and thus reinforce the system's rule-based integrity. Among
those scholars who examined the WTO (and GATT) in terms of outcome and process,74 the
assumption was that by tightening and "judicializing" the process, the process would gain legitimacy
among the members and strengthen the underlying rule system. In fact, use of the WTO's DSU has
increased, in terms of both caseload and developing-country access. Thus the DSU, which many
consider the "Cadillac" of enforcement processes, has become the dominant dispute resolution option,
in large part because it allows the most autonomy and national control for the largest traders. This
research asks whether first- and second-order disputes are too often ending up in the DSU, handled as
third-order disputes.
73 Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved. See also Cathy Costantino and Christina Sickles
Merchant, Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating Productive and Healthy
Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); Karl Slaikeu and Ralph Hasson, Controlling the Costs of
Conflict: How to Design a System for Your Organization (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998); Mary Rowe,
"Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment," in Sandra Gleason, ed., Frontiers in Dispute Resolution
in Labor Relations and Human Resources (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997); J. Lynch,
CCRA: Contemporary Conflict Resolution Approaches (Ottawa: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 1998);
and John P. Conbere, "Theory Building for Conflict Management System Design," Conflict Resolution
Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2001): 215-236.
74 Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law; Busch and Reinhardt, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law;"
and Reinhardt, "Adjudication without Enforcement."
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Throughout this paper I will draw on a theory of dispute resolution that sketches out three
ways in which disputes are resolved: according to the parties' interests, their rights, or their power.75
Interests encompass whatever the parties care about, including economic, political, and social values.
Disputes resolved according to interests are usually negotiated among the affected parties directly and
tend to produce the highest satisfaction with outcomes. This approach, however, requires significant
investment of time, may lead to conflicting results between different parties, and would be
exceedingly complex with upwards of 150 parties involved. Resolving disputes on the basis of rights
calls for the application of agreed-upon rules to a set of facts to determine who prevails. Rights-based
processes value procedural justice, but they may not capture more subtle substantive interests that are
not reflected in the general rules. Disputes resolved according to power weight the outcome to the
party with the most leverage and status, but they may be costly in terms of relationships.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER
This paper's primary inquiry is to assess the WTO's processes for resolving first-order, second-order,
and third-order disputes. My findings have application outside the WTO and are intended to stimulate
thinking in the wider international dispute resolution community. My research draws on three types of
data: primary documents generated by the WTO's negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement
processes; the WTO's experience as reflected in its website documents and international trade
scholarship; and personal interviews with members of 15 trade missions and the WTO Secretariat.
The chapters are organized as follows.
Chapter 2: Multilateral Trade in the GATT and the WTO
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the GATT's and the WTO's institutional origins and the WTO's
legal and organizational structure for first-order, second-order, and third-order disputes.
75 Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved.
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Chapter 3: First-Order Disputes: Policy Disputes
This chapter considers the two stages of first-order disputes. Agenda-setting is the consensus-based
selection of issues and problems that member countries agree to negotiate at a given time.
Rulemaking is the negotiation process involved in setting treaty provisions and trade rules to which
the members agree to bind themselves. By comparing the agenda-setting and rulemaking processes of
four negotiating rounds (Kennedy, Tokyo, Uruguay, and early Doha), I identify ways in which the
agenda-setting and rulemaking processes have become or could be more effective, as well as ways
they have become more interdependent with the implementation and enforcement processes.
Chapter 4: Second-Order Disputes: Policy Implementation Disputes
Policy implementation by WTO members is monitored primarily in two ways: during meetings of the
WTO's operating committees and councils on the various policy areas, and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. This chapter considers the TPRM and committee experience in identifying and resolving
second-order disputes through WTO documents and evaluations.
Chapter 5: Third-Order Disputes: Policy Enforcement Disputes
Third-order disputes in the WTO are handled according to the Disputes Settlement Understanding.
This chapter examines the DSU experience of 1995-2003 through the case data, diplomat interviews,
and extensive scholarship generated to date.
Chapter 6: A Model for Dispute Settlement Systems
Chapter 6 considers the findings from assessing the three dispute orders and proposes modifications.
The chapter concludes with a model system that can be generalized for international dispute
settlement system design, some applications, and further research suggestions.
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CHAPTER 2: MULTILATERAL TRADE, THE GATT, AND THE WTO
The institutional design of the World Trade Organization was developed based on decades of
experience with its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This chapter describes
the origin and evolution of the GATT and then outlines the WTO's organizational functions,
including its mechanisms for handling first-order (policymaking), second-order (policy
implementation), and third-order (policy enforcement) disputes. The chapter concludes with an
overarching theoretical framework for the research in the remainder of this paper.
ORIGINS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE GATT
Economic growth is considered a primary engine for any nation's prosperity. Economists argue that
trade "liberalization" is one source of growth. This argument is based on the assumption that each
country seeks to maximize its comparative advantage in terms of its unique human, natural resource,
financial, and technological endowment. Economic benefits, it is assumed, will accrue from
liberalization whether or not other countries reciprocate; in reality, however, most countries demand
nonprotectionist behavior from their trading partners.
The Great Depression in the United States and the high tariffs instigated by the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 resulted in a period of diminished production and trade between the
United States and its trading partners and caused economic collapse worldwide during the 1930s. The
U.S. Congress's attempt to protect its industrial and agricultural constituencies only served to
stimulate retaliatory high tariffs from other countries. As tariffs escalated, the United States reversed
its approach. Congress authorized the President to negotiate a series of bilateral trade agreements
through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Over the next 15 years, the United States
proceeded to negotiate more than 30 bilateral agreements, and then began to champion a more
multilateral approach to trade liberalization.
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In an effort to restore the international economy after World War II, three institutions
comprising the "Bretton Woods International Economic Order" were proposed: The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) to promote economic development, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide liquidity for countries running trade deficits, and the
International Trade Organization (ITO) to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers and to expand world
trade. l The charter for the ITO was negotiated contemporaneously with the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. The GATT provided for the parties' tariff obligations, but it was not intended to
be an organization. The United States took the lead in generating a proposal for establishing the ITO,
in order to extend its free-trade approach to the entire international trading system. U.S. negotiators,
however, failed to build support for their proposal within Congress and within the U.S. business
sector. With Marshall Plan and Korean War pressures before it, Congress declined to ratify the ITO
constitution, so no umbrella trading organization was ever formed.
Consequently, the U.S. executive branch's authority to negotiate trade agreements2 included
only the GATT-the treaty itself-which came into force in 1948 with 23 contracting parties. 3 World
trade at that time approached $10 billion. Half the GATT signators were developed countries and half
were developing countries. As further described in Chapter 3, the contracting parties to the GATT
managed eight multiyear negotiating "rounds" between 1948 and 1994. In 1994, the Uruguay Round
was completed. One of its chief accomplishments was the formation of the World Trade
Organization.
1 According to the draft charter of the International Trade Organization, the ITO would be the "third leg of a
tripod which was to support the international economic relations of the principal nations of the world," along
with the IMF and the World Bank. This draft charter was signed by 53 nations in Havana, Cuba, in March 1948,
but the U.S. signature required congressional ratification. Raymond Vernon, "America's Foreign Trade Policy
and the GATT," Essays in International Finance (Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, Department of
Economics, Princeton University, October 1954).
2 The U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 delegated authority to the executive branch to negotiate
trade agreements; the Act was renewed in 1937, 1940, 1943, 1945, and 1948.
3 The original 23 included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern
Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States.
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The basic goal of the GATT (and now the WTO) was to reduce trade barriers (i.e., tariffs,
nontariff barriers, and quotas) that impede the free movement of goods and services across borders.
The GATT agreements (of 1947 and 1994) comprise a complex set of reciprocal trade commitments
among the contracting parties, along with rules to minimize government actions that limit the
importation of products.4 Parties are obligated to limit tariffs (Article II of the GATT), avoid
discrimination among nations (Article I), avoid discrimination between domestically produced goods
and those imported (Article III), and avoid the use of quotas and other nontariff restrictions on
imports (Article IX). Article XX provides some exceptions, so long as measures do not operate as
concealed protectionist barriers to international trade.
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The WTO was established "to provide [the] common institutional framework for the conduct of trade
relations among its Members." 5 As of April 2003, the WTO had 146 members. Of these, 28 are
developed countries, 89 are developing countries, and 29 are least-developed countries.6
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the WTO's umbrella agreement is the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (known as the WTO Agreement), which contains a
number of Articles as well as four Annexes. Annexes 1, 2, and 3 of the WTO Agreement comprise
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which are binding on all members. Annex 4 sets forth the
Plurilateral Trade Agreements. The adoption of these plurilateral agreements as Annex 4 was
approved by all contracting parties, but the plurilateral agreements are only binding on those countries
that have specifically agreed to be bound by them.
4 Reciprocal trade commitments take the form of "concessions," in which a country agrees to lower its tariffs on
imports from trading partners. The tariff concession schedules adopted at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
number more than 26,000 pages.
5 WTO Agreement, Article II, paragraph 1.
6 The terms developing and developed are not legally defined, but are self-determined by countries for
international recognition. Least developed is a category set by the United Nations.
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The content of the WTO Agreement's Annexes are as follows. Annex 1 has three parts.
Annex 1A is the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods. It includes:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) together with seven
Understandings on various provisions of GATT 1994
* Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
* Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
* Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
* Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
* Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994
* Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994
* Agreement on Preshipment Inspection
* Agreement on Rules of Origin
* Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
* Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B is the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Annex 1C is the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement is the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Annex 3 is the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism. And Annex 4 includes the plurilateral trade agreements on Trade in Civil
Aircraft, Government Procurement, Dairy, and Bovine Meat. The WTO Agreement also includes a
series of nearly 30 decisions, declarations, and understandings that formalized previous practices or
plurilateral arrangements adopted in the Tokyo Round. The GATT 1947 is the final referenced
agreement in the WTO Agreement.
Article VI of the WTO Agreement provides for an institutional secretariat. The Secretariat to
the WTO is headed by a Director-General with an international (not government-affiliated) staff to
carry out the duties prescribed by the General Council. Figure 2.1 contains an organizational chart for
the WTO Secretariat.7 As the chart reveals, the Director-General is assisted by four Deputy Director-
7 This chart came from http://www.wto/english/thewto_e/whatis e/tife/org2_e.htm.
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Figure 2.1 WTO Organigram
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Generals, each of whom oversees several functional, informational, and support divisions. The
current WTO Secretariat includes 601 staff and operates on an annual budget of nearly $130 million,
which comes from member contributions and miscellaneous income (including publication fees and
special activity trust funds).
The following sections describe in more detail the legal provisions and operational
implications of the WTO's policymaking, policy implementation, and policy enforcement system.
Policymaking at the WTO
Among the primary functions of the WTO is to:
"provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade
relations in matters dealt with under the agreements. and a framework for the
implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial
Conference.... With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-
making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development."8
Representatives of all WTO member countries meet in Ministerial Conference every two
years. The Ministerial Conference is the highest level of decision-making at the WTO. The General
Council, also composed of representatives of all members, meets in the intervals between Ministerial
Conferences to discharge its WTO functions. The General Council also convenes as the Dispute
Settlement Body and as the Trade Policy Review Body. Designated Councils have been formed to
discuss Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, with
subsidiary bodies as required. Additional committees are authorized as well.
As mentioned previously, WTO members make decisions by consensus. Like many other
GATT practices, the notion of "consensus" developed over many years without explicit language.
The WTO formalized this practice in Article IX, paragraph 1 of the WTO Agreement, providing that,
for ordinary decisions:
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the WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT
1947... [which means] "the body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on
a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the
decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.... If a decision cannot be
achieved by consensus, the matter shall be decided by a majority vote, with each Member
having one vote. (The European Communities shall have the number of votes equal to their
WTO Member states.)" 9
In fact, the backup "majority vote" option is essentially never used for policymaking matters. Thus,
each member nation has veto power over policy decisions. Note too, however, that consensus does
not require unanimity; that is, members may abstain from voting on an issue, but the issue will still
pass if no member explicitly votes against it.
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt
"interpretations" of WTO agreements, and may do so at the recommendation of the Council
overseeing the respective functioning agreement. Such interpretations must be agreed to by a three-
fourths majority of the Members. 0l° The Ministerial Conference may, in exceptional circumstances,
waive an obligation imposed on a member if so decided by three-fourths of the members, under
certain conditions. 1 Amendments to the WTO agreements may be made according to voting
procedures specified in Article X. Except as otherwise provided, the WTO is to be guided by the
customary practices followed by the contracting parties to the GATT 1947.
Since the formation of the WTO at Marrakesh in 1994, the Ministerial Conference has met
every two years, as noted in Table 2.1 on the following page.
The WTO's formal institutional process for policymaking is circumscribed by its provisions
on decision-making. In practice, countries conduct formal negotiations to consider what issues should
be regulated by new policy measures, then a network of trade negotiation committees struggles for
8 WTO Agreement, Article 111, paragraphs 2 and 5.
9 WTO Agreement, Article IX, paragraph 1.
10 WTO Agreement, Article IX, paragraph 2.
1 WTO Agreement, Article IX, paragraph 3.
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months or years to integrate a package of provisions into an agreement that can achieve consensual
support. This hybrid of formal and informal consensus-building processes is explored in Chapter 3.
Table 2.1: WTO Ministerial Conferences
WTO Ministerial Date Location
First December 9-13, 1996 Singapore
Second May 18-20,1998 Geneva, Switzerland
Third November 30-December 3, Seattle, Washington, USA
1999
Fourth November 9-13, 2001 Doha, Qatar
Fifth September 10-14, 2003 Cancun, Mexico
Sixth December 2005 Hong Kong
Policy Implementation
Each WTO member must translate international rules adopted in each trade negotiating round into
national implementing legislation. Furthermore, countries must not initiate new domestic policies that
are contrary to WTO rules. In order to achieve transparency on national regulations and policies,
member countries are required to inform the WTO of their specific measures, policies, or laws
through regular "notifications." Discussions in the WTO's operating committees cover a range of
implementation issues, but the most focused consideration of policy implementation issues takes
place in the WTO's regular reviews of individual countries' trade policies.
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism was established as a pilot program in 1989 and adopted
as permanent program in 1994 under Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement. The objectives of the TPRM
are:
* to contribute to improved adherence by all members to rules, disciplines, and commitments made
under the WTO;
* to increase the transparency and understanding of countries' trade policies and practices, through
regular monitoring;
l to improve the quality of public and intergovernmental debate on the issues; and
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* to enable a collective assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading system. 12
Although the objective of the TPRM is to examine the impact of members' trade policies and
practices on the multilateral trading system, each assessment is conducted in the context of a
country's wider macroeconomic and development circumstances. Members have undertaken a
commitment to transparency in support of these objectives, but acknowledge that implementation
must take into consideration each member's legal and political system. The impact of individual
members on the functioning of the multilateral trading system is measured in terms of their share of
world trade, which determines the frequency of reviews.
The largest four trading nations are reviewed every two years: Canada, the European Union,
the United States, and Japan. The next 16 largest trading nations are reviewed every four years.
The remaining 126 countries are reviewed every six years (or less for least-developed countries). In
this last group of 126 are 20 developed, 77 developing, and 29 least-developed countries.
To structure the reviews, the WTO General Council meets as the Trade Policy Review Body
(TPRB). The TPRB examines the impact of each member's trade policies and practices on the
multilateral trading system. The review includes three components: (I1) a full report from the member
nation under review regarding its overall economic situation, together with a detailed analysis of its
trade policies (the "country report"), (2) a report prepared by the Secretariat based on information
available to it and provided by the member, focusing on special areas of concern (the "Secretariat
report"), and (3) a meeting of the TPRB with the member.
Each trade policy review meeting lasts two days. During the first day, after an initial
statement by the country under review, two discussants chosen from among the participating
members comment (on their own responsibility, not on behalf of their governments) on the country
and Secretariat reports. Next, questions from other participants are invited. The country under review
can then prepare responses to present during the second day.
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12 WTO Agreement, Annex 3.
Roughly 16 reviews are conducted each year, evenly spaced to allow members time to
consider all reports. The Secretariat's TPRM division consists of a Director, 16 professional staff, and
11 support staff. The review process, from initial research and preparation of the country
questionnaire to the meeting of the TPRB, takes approximately 10 months.
In terms of diagnosis and resolution, the TPRM process provides a structured analysis of each
country's implementation of WTO trade policy. The TPRM "is not intended to serve as a basis for the
enforcement of specific obligations under the [covered] Agreements or for dispute settlement
procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members."13 Thus, an apparent gap exists
between the transparent and comprehensive diagnosis of each member's policy implementation
progress, and efforts to identify options for resolution of implementation problems revealed by the
assessment. Chapter 4 will consider opportunities to strengthen the policy implementation phase.
Policy Enforcement
This section discusses the policy enforcement procedures used previously under the GATT and then
the dispute settlement process used in the WTO.
GATT History and Experience
The discussions surrounding the establishment of the GATT and the ITO considered whether disputes
should be forwarded to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and whether civil or common law
principles should apply.14 Those in support of the ICJ as arbiter argued that its status as a politically
independent, impartial mechanism with a rule orientation would protect against the dominance of
major trading nations within the ITO. The United States argued that the ITO should maintain
jurisdiction over its own disputes and violations. The 1946 U.S. proposals contemplated a three-part
13 WTO Agreement, Annex 3, Section A(i).
14 Note that common law depends upon prior juridical decision for precedent as a supplement to legislated acts,
whereas civil law-practiced in countries such as France, Japan, and former European colonies-does not
depend on such precedents.
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dispute resolution procedure consisting of consultation among the parties; referral of a dispute to the
ITO, with the possibility of arbitration; and referral to the ICJ for advisory opinions on legal
questions arising within the scope of ITO activities. 15 When the establishment of the ITO was
dropped because the U.S. Congress failed to ratify it, so were the provisions for arbitration and
referral to the ICJ. The GATT was left to its own devices.
Without a central enforcement mechanism, it fell to the parties to invent some means of
resolving conflicts as they arose-in other words, when a contracting party believed that the
concessions granted under the GATT had been "nullified or impaired."'16 Parties agreed not to take
unilateral action against perceived violators, but to seek recourse through the dispute settlement
mechanisms of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT. These articles read in part as follows:
Article XXII: Consultation
Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another
contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired... [and if] no satisfactory adjustment is
effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time.. .the matter may
be referred to the contracting parties17 [who] shall promptly investigate any matter so referred
to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they
consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.
At the outset, then, a complainant had to request consultations with the "aggrieving" party. In
the early days, disputes were then simply referred to the chair of the plenary meeting of the
contracting parties, and the chair issued a ruling. As the number of complaints grew, the contracting
parties used "working parties" composed of the disputants and other interested parties; this mode of
15 Heather Hazard, "Resolving Disputes in International Trade" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1988), p. 22;
Article 96 of U.S. Proposals, cited in Olivier Long, Law and its Limitations in the GA TT Multilateral Round
(London: Graham and Trotman, 1987), p. 1.
16 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIII.
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conflict resolution was more in the nature of conciliation than dispute settlement. From the mid-1 950s
on, practice switched from working parties to independent panels. 18 These panels served in a
mediating capacity, helping the parties reach a settlement that both parties could live with.
Robert Hudec describes the 1950s as a period in which the participants were primarily
members of the "GATT club"-diplomats and trade officials who had negotiated the original
agreement-so "legal rulings were drafted with an elusive diplomatic vagueness" that reflected "an
intuitive sort of law, based on shared experiences and unspoken assumptions." 19
During the 1960s, disputes at first diminished with the formation of the European Economic
Community and the addition of more than 40 new developing country members. Hudec characterizes
this time as "a period when GATT more or less suspended its legal system, while it tried to work out,
by negotiation, the legal and economic adjustments that were needed to accommodate its new
members and its new agenda." In the 1970s, 32 new cases were filed, which spurred an effort to
develop a new and improved dispute resolution procedure at the Tokyo Round in 1979. The result
was primarily a codification of what had developed informally.
Practice then shifted to convening ad hoc panels of three experts (from nations other than
those of the disputants), acting in their individual capacities, to assist the contracting parties. The
disputants submitted their legal and factual case in writing, made oral presentations, and the panels
issued written reports interpreting the legal issues and reasons for their recommendations. These
panel reports came to be relied on as precedents, although only binding on the parties involved.
A well-drafted panel report was described to ideally have the following structure:
* Introduction (origin of the dispute and procedure followed)
* Factual aspects of the dispute
* Arguments of the parties
17 Note that "CONTRACTING PARTIES" (all caps) refers to the contracting parties to the GATT 1947 acting
as a body.
18 Pierre Pescatore, William J. Davey, and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Handbook of WTO/GATTDispute Settlement
(New York: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1991), p. 9.
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* Submissions of third parties (if any)
* Panel's findings (legal reasoning)
* Panel's conclusions (recommendations and rulings proposed to the Council)20
Unlike a judicial decision, these panel reports involved recommendations to the contracting
parties as a whole, and were not binding unless adopted by the GATT Council, which operated by
consensus. Therefore, the party adversely affected by the ruling could block its adoption. Even if the
ruling was adopted, there were no time periods for compliance with it.
Beyond procedural concerns, there were legal shortcomings. Many older reports were aimed
at working out an adjustment of the parties' competing interests rather than at a solving the dispute on
the basis of specific legal principles. Prepared by non-lawyers, such reports reached conclusions that
lacked any legal basis. In their Handbook of WTO/GATTDispute Settlement, Pierre Pescatore,
William Davey, and Andreas Lowenfeld write:
[T]he legal value of these reports is low because they do not contain the essential ingredients
for the advancement of the law: the structured expression of legal principles.... The problems
must...be addressed and solved in a logical order, which means putting preliminaries before
merit, separating procedural from substantive issues and, as far as the substance is concerned,
putting the expression of legal principles before particulars such as deductions, applications
and exceptions. 2 1
Since the panels' primary concern was to obtain the General Council's approval of the
reports, the panels tended to avoid any arguments that might arouse objections from country
delegations, who would not be prepared to assume any new obligations through dispute settlement.
Hudec explains:
19 Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GA IT Legal System (Salem,
N.H.: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), pp. 11-14.
2 0 Pescatore, Davey, and Lowenfeld, WTO/GA TT Dispute Settlement, p. 18. The GATT contracting parties
originally were scheduled to meet annually to make decisions. In the 1960s, when it was obvious that an annual
meeting was inadequate to deal with the large volume of regular business, they delegated much work to the
GATT Council and various committees. All contracting parties wishing to participate comprised the GATT
Council, which typically met monthly and operated by consensus.
21 Ibid, pp. 22-23.
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[The panel reports] are a legal slalom in which panels do their best to get around the obstacles
which stand in the way of reaching the finish line, which is to obtain the much desired
consensus. 2 2
Dispute Settlement under the WTO
This uneasy situation led to a reengineering of the GATT dispute resolution process during the
Uruguay Round. A principal accomplishment of Uruguay Round was the adoption of Annex 2: The
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (known for short as
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU).
The objective of the DSU's rules and procedures is to provide for consultations and the
settlement of disputes between members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions
of the WTO Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is authorized to establish panels, adopt
panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of the implementation of rulings and
recommendations, and authorize the suspension of concessions under the covered agreements. The
Dispute Settlement Body is called upon to inform the relevant WTO councils and committees of any
developments in disputes related to provisions of the respective covered agreements.
The significant changes in the WTO's DSU process over the previous GATT procedures are
the rules for the adoption of panel reports, the addition of an Appellate Body, and time schedules for
each stage of the process.23 The first step in settling disputes still requires bilateral consultations
between the governments concerned. During this early stage, the Director-General uses his "Good
22 Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law.
23 GATT 1994, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
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Offices"24 to discuss the dispute with the parties. Twenty percent of all disputes are resolved at this
level, where there is great flexibility and the "parties can trade anything."25
If the consultations are unsuccessful, the Secretariat selects a panel of three trade experts
(drawn from a list of qualified persons, serving in their individual capacities and not subject to
government instructions) who are then appointed to examine the case. A new provision allows the
panel to request a written advisory report from expert groups.26 The panel's report includes
descriptive (factual and argument) sections, findings, and conclusions and is submitted to the parties,
then circulated to all WTO members. If a panel decides that a measure in question is inconsistent with
the terms of the relevant WTO agreement, it recommends that the party bring the measure into
conformity with the agreement and may suggest ways in which that could be achieved. Panel reports
are adopted within 50 days of issuance, unless one party notifies of its decision to appeal, or a
consensus emerges against the adoption of the report.27 Thus, the consensus decision rule used under
the GATT has flipped; now the report is adopted unless all contracting parties oppose it.
If a party chooses to appeal a panel decision, the Appellate Body hears the appeal. The
Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, serving four-year terms, who have recognized
standing in the field of law and international trade and are not affiliated with any government. The
Appellate Body can uphold, modify, or reverse a panel's legal findings. Again, after issuance, the
Appellate Body report is unconditionally accepted unless there is a consensus against its adoption by
all contracting parties. After adoption of the appellate report, the party concerned must state its
intentions regarding the implementation of the recommendations. If it is impractical to comply
24 Good offices, conciliation, or mediation ("good offices") may be requested by any part to a dispute at any
time (DSU Article 5.3). The term generally includes efforts by the Director-General, by virtue of his position,
to assist the parties in resolving their differences. See Lawrence Susskind and Mich/le Ferenz, Good Offices in
a War-Weary World, Program on Negotiation Working Paper WP0 1-1 (Cambridge, MA: Program on
Negotiation, 2001).
25 Gary Sampson, Secretariat staff for WTO, personal communication, June 16, 1995.
26 WTO Agreement, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Article 13.
27 Recall that the GATT procedures required a consensus by all contracting parties to adopt a panel report-a
rule that allowed the target country to block adoption.
61
immediately, the member is given a "reasonable period of time" to do so; but if the respondent fails to
act within this period, it is obliged to enter into negotiation with the complainant in order to determine
mutually acceptable compensation (e.g., tariff reductions in areas of particular interest to the
complainant). If no satisfactory compensation is agreed, the issue goes to compulsory arbitration,
after which the complainant may request authorization to retaliate by suspending concessions or
obligations against the other party.
The timing of the dispute handling process is as follows. A panel must render its decision
within one year of the establishment of the panel. An Appellate Body must issues its ruling within
two to three months of appeal. If the Appellate Body finds that a violation has occurred, the
responding party has up to 15 months, or a reasonable time, to take action. A dispute's disposition can
be extended depending on what is determined to be a "reasonable time," what constitutes compliance,
and the sequence of determining compliance and authorized retaliatory action.
The history of GATT dispute settlement reflects the emergence of a process through which
panels of trade experts interpret how the GATT rules and principles should apply in a given situation.
Previously, policy recommendations regarding what steps, if any, should be taken to bring the
offending policies into compliance with the GATT rules were offered, but not explicitly or
consciously intended to constitute "judicial activism," i.e., policymaking from the bench.
Nevertheless, there has since been a radical change in tone, away from decisions designed to achieve
a pragmatic consensus among WTO members to outcomes that must be legally justified.
Panels are now liberated from the need to satisfy all parties and can concentrate on the merits
of the dispute and the unencumbered application of the facts to WTO law.... [B]y automatic
adoption, it appears that the parties "have substituted legal legitimacy for political legitimacy
in the dispute settlement process."28 This innovation in multilateral decision-making is lauded
2 8 A. Chua, "The Precedential Effect of WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports," Leiden Journal of
International Law I 1 (1998): 45, 46.
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by one commentator as the "most important change in the jurisprudence of the global
economy in the second half of the twentieth century."29, 30
The annual budget for WTO dispute settlement is approximately $1 million. The Legal
Affairs Division has 18 staff that managed the 304 cases filed from January 1, 1995, through
December 31, 2003. The Appellate Body has an additional staff of 14 and a panel of 7 members who
are recognized authorities in law, international trade, and the WTO agreements. Six appeals were
filed for review by the Appellate Body, and six reports were issued in 2003. The Appellate Body
issued its first Annual Report on May 7, 2004.31
To review, dispute diagnosis in the policy enforcement phase relies upon an individual
complaining country's legal, economic, and political assessment of whether to file a request for
consultations. If consultations are unsuccessful, then the resolution process shifts from the diplomatic
to the legal arena. The consequences of that shift will be considered in Chapter 5.
THEORETICAL BASE FOR EVALUATING THE WTO's DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a diverse literature contributes to the assessment of international dispute
settlement. The nature of the disputes are different in each of the three orders described, but the
common thread is a divergence of interests such that the affected parties' goals appear incompatible.
Settlement processes span a spectrum of strategies: negotiation, domination, capitulation, inaction,
withdrawal, or third-party intervention, including structured consultations, arbitration, and review.3 2
This research contemplates the system as a network of connections among these settlement processes
within the international trading regime.
29 p. Nichols, "GATT Doctrine," Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (1996): 379, 380.
30 James Cameron and Kevin Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,"
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50 (2001): 248-298.
31 Annual Report for 2003, WTO Doc. WT/AB/2.
32 Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: McGraw
Hill, 2004).
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This study characterizes and evaluates the dispute settlement processes utilized in each of the
three orders of disputes: policymaking, policy implementation, and policy enforcement. The
processes are reviewed in three ways. First, each is characterized as to whether the dispute is resolved
primarily according to the parties' power, interests, or rights. (This framework is discussed more
thoroughly below.) Second, each dispute resolution process is situated within its distinctive literature.
Policymaking disputes are resolved through multilateral negotiation, which draws upon international
negotiation and consensus-building theory. Policy implementation disputes are addressed through
structured consultations that focus on transparency and facilitating compliance. Policy enforcement
disputes are resolved through an arbitral panel and appellate body review, which is informed by
extensive general and trade-based scholarship on international dispute settlement. Chapters 3, 4, and
5, respectively, discuss how these theories emerge in practice.
A third review appears in Chapter 6, where the three orders of WTO dispute resolution
processes are considered in terms of cross-cutting criteria: transaction costs (in time and money);
satisfaction with outcome; satisfaction with process (procedural justice); effect on relationships; and
recurrence of disputes. The literature on conflict management systems design helps to integrate the
three orders of dispute resolution into a single system model.
Power, Interests, Rights
In Chapter 1, I introduced a dispute resolution theory that considers the role of power, interests, and
rights.33 In the WTO, power is measured primarily in terms of world trade volume. The four largest
trading nations-the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Union-comprise more than 40
percent of the world's GNP and are called the "Majors" or the "Quad."34 The interests of the WTO
members, as with ruling governments generally, include staying in power, serving powerful voting
33 William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett, and Stephen B. Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to
Cut the Costs of Conflict (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1988).
34 WTO, 2002 WTO World Trade Statistics, Tables A4 and A5 (Geneva: WTO, 2003). Note that China joined
the WTO in 2002 and, by virtue of its trading volume, may ascend to status as part of the Quad.
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factions, pursuing an ideological agenda, and addressing their commercial interests (including what
sectors are regulated (e.g., agriculture, telecommunications) and what levels of protection are set).
Rights derive from the principles established under the WTO; these include most-favored-nation
status, nondiscrimination, and tariff reduction, among others.
Within the power-interests-rights framework, we can consider in each dispute order who
participates, with what objective, and by what process. First-order disputes involve all WTO members
and thus are extremely multilateral. These disputes are resolved through a consensus-based
negotiation of parties' common interests in establishing rules of trade. Each party ostensibly has equal
standing: one vote per member country, without regard to trading volume. In fact, however, the
process of settlement is dominated by power. Those who have greater resources have greater
opportunity to participate and to shape the applicable rules to their interests; they are unlikely to
support rules that unduly constrain their ability to satisfy their constituencies and maintain their
relative power within the institution. In turn, the practical limitation on the participation of less-
powerful members has long-term consequences for the whole membership, in both resentment over
the power asymmetry and difficulties in implementation for all members.
Second-order, or policy implementation, disputes involve all WTO members and the WTO
institution. These disputes are resolved by a hybrid power-rights-interests consultation that is meant
to bring the parties' behavior into the open for appropriate scrutiny. Rules dictate the timing and
scope of the process, and members' behavior is measured against existing rules. However, if a gap
exists between a country's assessed and expected performance-whether due to political, economic,
or social reasons-there is no structured process to sort out feasible options for overcoming the
deficit. Power (who participates in the process, who has the economic leverage to pressure a target
country), interests (what are the competing demands for a country in meeting its WTO obligations),
and rights (what do the WTO rules require) all play a role in the resolution processes.
Third-order disputes are bilateral and are resolved through a series of increasingly directive
processes. Dispute settlement has shifted over the years from an informal, interest-based problem-
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solving process to a legal, rights-enforcing one. While fairly time-efficient relative to the world of
commercial litigation, the resolution of and compliance with third-order disputes remains an
expensive process in terms of time, money, and relationships.
Of the three orientations-power, rights, and interests-interests are viewed by scholars as
the most-effective basis for resolving disputes. If the parties' essential interests are satisfied, the
outcome is more likely to be sustainable. This study considers what factors might temper or transform
power- or rights-dominated processes into more interest-oriented ones. The factors vary with the
order of the dispute.
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CHAPTER 3: FIRST-ORDER DISPUTES: POLICYMAKING
This chapter examines the processes used for addressing the first-order disputes that arise in the
context of WTO policymaking. These disputes grow out of the tension between each nation's
sovereign right to protect its domestic political and economic interests, and the international
community's collective interest in a stable trading system. First-order disputes in international
policymaking occur in two phases, which I have called pre-negotiation (i.e., consensus building
regarding what agenda of problems to take on) and negotiation (i.e., consensus building regarding
what international policies will resolve those problems).
Chapter 1 introduced a theoretical framework for evaluating dispute settlement processes in
terms of power, rights, and interests. The first section of this chapter supplements that framework
with negotiation scholarship to analyze the GATT/WTO policymaking experience. The second
section poses three hypotheses examined in this research and relating to first-order disputes. The third
section describes the development of the GATT's early negotiations on tariff reduction, which leaned
more to political and economic efficiency than inclusiveness. (The history reveals that, as more
countries joined the GATT and the WTO and the issues extended beyond tariff reduction, the
decision-making process was increasingly strained.) The fourth section then chronicles and compares
in some detail policymaking disputes from four GATT/WTO negotiating rounds: Kennedy, Tokyo,
Uruguay, and Doha. (The Seattle Ministerial, where parties attempted but failed to launch a
"Millennium Round," is also briefly discussed.) Each pre-negotiation and negotiation is discussed in
terms of participation, issue linkage, information exchange, decision-making resources, and process.
The fifth and final section contains a discussion in which the four rounds are evaluated against the
hypotheses.
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THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING
Negotiation literature draws upon a wide range of analytical paradigms. WTO negotiations are
resolved by consensus, so in discussing first-order disputes I have chosen to focus on two branches of
negotiation theory: international negotiation and consensus building.
International Negotiation
When faced with conflict, parties-whether individuals, firms, or countries-may exhibit any of a
number of possible responses. Putting aside acquiescence and avoidance (though these are legitimate
responses in certain circumstances), the affected parties can maintain the most control over the
outcome of a conflict by negotiating directly with each other in an attempt to seek a solution. As an
alternative, the disputing parties may engage a "third party," or neutral, to either facilitate a
discussion among them, mediate a solution, or unilaterally decide the outcome through informal or
formal means.'
Negotiation, which is essentially joint decision-making under conditions of conflict and
uncertainty, can occur between two or more parties. Over the last three decades, a theory of
negotiation analysis has emerged in which the normative approach calls for identifying the parties and
their respective interests (both economic and non-economic), assessing alternative strategies to satisfy
those interests, and generating options for resolution that parties view as advantageous relative to
their alternatives. Barriers to reaching agreement-including problems of communication,
information, psychological or cognitive disjuncture, strategy, or procedure-all become increasingly
complex as the number of parties increases.2
The distinction among these three roles-facilitation, mediation, and arbitration-concerns the degree of
process and decision-making control delegated by the parties to the third party. For an overview of the
processes, see Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E.A. Sander, and Nancy Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation,
Mediation, and Other Processes (Boston: Little Brown, 1992).
2For negotiation theory, see Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1982); Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1981);
David Lax and James Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator (New York: Free Press, 1986); Dean Pruitt and
Jeffrey Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994); H.
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History is replete with disputes among nations, and most of those disputes have been solved
through diplomacy. Trade negotiations are one subset of this class of international diplomatic
endeavors. Trade negotiations are characterized by complex bargaining over problems that span long
periods of time, are linked to other disputes, and involve repeat players who are agents of their
governments and various domestic constituencies.3
William Zartman and Maureen Berman attempted to identify the essential criteria of
successful negotiations in The Practical Negotiator. Their study observed three stages: diagnosing the
situation and deciding to negotiate; negotiating a common formula that outlines a framework and
criteria for developing the details; and then negotiating the details to implement the issues in dispute.
They note, however, that the formula and detail phases may not be distinct in practice, and may loop
and iterate as the parties seek a solution. 4
In the WTO, as with international negotiations generally, there is a pre-negotiation, or
diagnostic, phase during which member nations identify problems to be addressed, develop a
commitment to negotiate, and arrange the negotiations.5 This phase corresponds with Zartman and
Berman's "diagnosing the situation and deciding to negotiate" stage. In considering a range of pre-
negotiations in the commercial, human rights, and security arenas, Zartman and Janet Stein identified
a number of pre-negotiation functions. In Stein's view, the pre-negotiation is effective for clarifying
the risks associated with negotiation and facilitating sufficient information exchange for parties to
make preliminary judgments about bargaining ranges and reservation points without having to make
Peyton Young, Negotiation Analysis (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991), I. William Zartman,
ed., International Multilateral Negotiation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994); James Sebenius, Negotiating
Law of the Sea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); Kenneth Arrow, et al., Barriers to Conflict
Resolution (New York: Norton & Company, 1995); and Fen Osler Hampson with Michael Hart, Multilateral
Negotiations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 33-47.
3 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). Nicolson notes the characteristics of
an ideal diplomat: "one who exhibits truthfulness, precision, calm, good nature, patience, modesty, adaptability
and loyalty, in addition to the assumed attributes of intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality,
charm, industry, courage and tact," (p. 106).
4 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1982).
5 Harold Saunders, "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiating Phases,"
Negotiation Journal (July 1985): 250.
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* 6public commitments. This initial phase also allows parties to manage their domestic politics and
initiate any necessary coalition building.7
Three factors should be taken into account in designing an international pre-negotiation
process:
* Participation: If a multilateral agreement is the goal (whether achieved by majority voting or
consensus), a broad range of key mid-size and smaller actors should be engaged in decision-
making.
* Agenda formulation: The parties must develop a balanced agenda of problems to be negotiated.
When taken as a whole, the agenda should track countries' current interests and priorities.
* Information: Sufficient information must be available so that each country can assess and relate
their interests (domestic and global) to the tradeoffs available in potential bargains.
If pre-negotiation results in a decision to proceed, full negotiation ensues with the aim of
achieving consensus on a package of policy rules. The chief factors involved in negotiation parallel
those of pre-negotiation: participation, issues, and information, coupled with effective process
management. Since decisions for both the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases in the WTO require
consensus, I next explore what contributes to an effective consensus-building process.
6 1. William Zartman, "Pre-Negotiation: Phases and Functions," and Janet Gross Stein, "Getting to the Table:
The Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Pre-Negotiation," in Janice Gross Stein, Getting to the
Table (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 1-17,239-268.
7 Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International
Organization 42 (1988): 427, 53. Putnam argues that issue bargaining occurs simultaneously at the international
and domestic levels and that it is essential to calibrate both sets of parameters. Kenneth Hanf describes a three-
level game, including the domestic administrative arms that will implement the policy agreements. Kenneth
Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, eds., Adapting to European Integration. (New York: Longman, 1998). David Lax
and James Sebenius analyze coalition formation and maintenance in "Thinking Coalitionally: Party Arithmetic,
Process Opportunism, and Strategic Sequencing" in H. Peyton Young, ed., Negotiation Analysis (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan, 1991) p. 153; and James Sebenius, "Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom
Shall I Negotiate First?" in R. Zeckhauser, R. Keeney, and J. Sebenius, eds., Wise Choices: Decisions, Games
and Negotiations (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) p. 324.
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Consensus Building
Building agreement by consensus is a special class of negotiation that has been the subject of
considerable research.8 The criteria for evaluating such a process fall into the categories of
participation, process, and resources.9
Participation. Assuming that consensual agreement is the goal, all parties whose interests are
significantly affected must ultimately have a voice in the consensus-building process, and their
interests must be represented through multiple venues that allow for both inclusive and focused
technical participation. Leaders, including technical experts and those with political and economic
power, must be willing to address political obstacles and commit time and resources to the process.
Process. To be most effective, a consensus-building process should be managed by skilled,
professional neutrals according to clear ground rules that establish (1) the purpose and expectations of
the process and outcomes; (2) the roles and responsibilities of participants; (3) opportunities for
informed and candid debate on the issues and options for resolution; and (4) a plan for monitoring and
implementing any resulting agreement.
Resources. Adequate resources must be available to the process, including technical
expertise, funding, information (collected and disseminated in a transparent manner), and sufficient
time for learning and option development.
In the WTO, three aspects of participation correlate with reaching consensus: inclusion, or the
openness of the process to all member states; commitment by the leading powers; and the availability
of representative, technically expert working groups to master the issue details. Once a negotiation is
8 See Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), Best Practices for Government Agencies:
Guidelines for Using Collaborative Agreement-Seeking Processes, Report and Recommendations of the Society
of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (Washington, DC: SPIDR, 1997); Lawrence Susskind, Sarah
McKearnan, Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds., The Consensus Building Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 1999); Lawrence E. Susskind and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Reaching Consensus: Procedures for
Overcoming the Tyranny of Majority Rule (Cambridge, MA: MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program/Consensus
Building Institute, April 2, 2004); and especially Judith Innes, "Evaluating Consensus Building," in Susskind,
McKearnan, and Thomas-Larmer, eds., Consensus Building Handbook, pp. 631-675.
9 Innes describes three time phases for evaluation: mid-course, to assess progress and consider improving the
process; post-agreement, to assess the parties' satisfaction and outcome; and retroactive, to consider the quality
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launched, the institution and its members are called upon to commit significant human, financial, and
technical resources to the effort. Because members vary in their resource capacity, however, some
depend on the support of and information generated by other countries and organizations. Information
exchange among countries includes a number of sub-tasks: the development and analysis of baseline
information; access to information by all participants; and input from outside sources and experts.
The WTO's General Council structures the formal negotiation process, and the role of meeting
facilitators is usually filled by presiding chairs' ° or the Director-General.
Power, Rights, and Interests in WTO Policymaking 
Chapters 1 and 2 introduced the characterization of dispute resolution processes according to power,
rights, and interests. Policymaking involves all three for resolution. The overriding goal for
policymaking disputes is to find a balance between national interests and the collective global interest
in a stable trading system by regulating rights and obligations. But power, even when tempered by
rules, appears to influence whose interests dominate.
Zartman identifies power as the foremost factor in negotiation. The more symmetrical the
parties' power, the more mutually satisfying and timely the outcomes." In most multilateral
negotiations, power among the parties is highly asymmetric. When the decision rule is consensus, any
country holds veto power over an agreement, but countries vary in their economic and political
power-and thus in their ability to use that veto power. Those with greater resources wield the power
of information and opportunity to participate, and thus have the ability to shape the applicable rules to
their interests. Jeswald Salacuse notes, however, that weaker parties can augment their power with
skillful tactics, taking the initiative, developing knowledge on the issues, and mobilizing their
of the agreement and longer-term effects such as relationships and stability. This review of the WTO system is
of the retroactive type. Ibid., pp. 654.
0 WTO, Guidelines for Appointment of Officers to WTO Bodies, WTO Doc. WT/L/31 (Geneva: WTO,
February 7, 1995).
i 1. William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin, eds., Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan,
2000).
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available resources.12 In his treatise on international negotiations, Fred Ikle noted that negotiations
designed to redistribute power and rights exhibited the following: a community spirit that led to an
interest in reciprocity, interest groups that crossed national boundaries, and the delegation of specific
functions to a supranational body. 13
In the WTO, first-order disputes are resolved not through majority or weighted voting, but
through a consensus-driven negotiation of parties' common interests in establishing the rules of trade.
Winfried Lang described the process as follows:
Because consensus is not unanimity but the construction of a coalition that agrees surrounded
by a group that is willing to go along, power is the way in which consensual coalitions are
created. Proximity of parties on issues and differentiation of coalitions among various types
account for the types of power available and are applicable to building winning coalitions.'4
Richard Steinberg has also considered whether consensus-based bargaining in the
GATT/WTO derives from rules or power. He concludes that agenda-setting (the pre-negotiation
phase) is market power-based, while the negotiation itself is more rule-based. He cautions that
consensus may be "organized hypocrisy," in which the procedural fiction of consensus and sovereign
equality is merely an external display meant to legitimize the outcome. 15
The next section integrates these negotiation and consensus-building factors in three research
hypotheses.
HYPOTHESES
First-order disputes involve all WTO members, currently numbering 146 countries. These disputes
are resolved through a consensus-based negotiation of parties' common interests in establishing the
rules of trade. The settlement process is clearly dominated by those with more power, measured in
12 Jeswald W. Salacuse, "Lessons for Practice" in Zartman and Rubin, eds., Power and Negotiation, p. 258.
3 Fred Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
14 Winfried Lang, "Toward a Theoretical Synthesis" in Zartman, ed., International Multilateral Negotiation, p.
215.
15 Richard H. Steinberg, "In the Shadow of Law or Power?" International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 339-
374.
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terms of share of world trade. This power is manifested in the pre-negotiation phase, in which the
parties determine what issues to address and whether to proceed with formal negotiations, as well as
the negotiation phase, where it affects participation, resources, and process management.
Among the factors of power, interests, and rights, dispute resolution scholars consider
processes that deal with interests to be most effective. The more a given outcome satisfies the affected
parties' interests, the more likely it is to be sustainable over time. This study thus considers what
factors might render power-dominated processes to be more interest-oriented. As discussed in the
previous section, scholars have identified three factors as important in any consensus-building
process: the number and type of participants; the process by which the negotiation is conducted
(including the use of neutrals and the development of ground rules to guide participation); and
sufficient resources, including expertise, finances, time, and the quality of information available to
decision-makers. Since this research is based on historical, anecdotal evidence to assess the
GATT/WTO negotiating experience, we can only approximate the direction of effect, not the
magnitude, of these factors on outcomes.
For first-order dispute resolution, I present three prime hypotheses. First, the more
representative the participation in the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases at the WTO, the more
likely the agenda will incorporate a sufficient array of countries' interests, and thus the more likely
the agreement will achieve broad-based support at its inception and compliance in its implementation.
Participation has been shown to have positive effects on participants' attitudes about an institution
and its goals, in part because (in the WTO's case) being invited to participate implies recognition of
the participant country as an actor in world trade. Such inclusion has been shown to contribute to
party buy-in when agreements are contemplated, and so it might aid in consensus building. In
addition, there is ample evidence that "being heard" has a markedly positive effect on the satisfaction
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that individuals experience in dispute resolution processes.' 6 There is reason to believe that country
representatives in WTO negotiations would experience a similar rise in satisfaction if they felt
"heard," which could positively affect a representative's efforts to convince his or her country to go
along with a consensus decision. Finally, there is evidence that parties who participate are more likely
to follow through on implementing the decision of a dispute resolution process, whether or not they
agreed with the result. If wide participation were to improve implementation at the WTO, it would be
well worth the time and effort. So, Test Hypothesis is: More representative participation (i.e., more
in number and kind ofparticipants) contributes to an agenda of interests that will engage short-term
and long-term support of an agreement.
Second, the more resources available to negotiators (e.g., time, financial support, technical
expertise, and information) the more likely it is that countries will develop the capacity to understand
the issues and negotiate meaningful commitments. Test Hypothesis 2 is thus: Broader participation in
information exchange (including the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information)
contributes to sustainable commitments.
Third, a carefully designed and managed negotiation process, including the use of skilled
neutrals, will help to ensure the participation of diverse parties; enable the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of relevant information; facilitate more creative options for resolution; and enhance the
credibility of the decision-making process. The process is intertwined with the role of the skilled
neutral as process manager. A neutral cannot necessarily balance power asymmetries, but he or she
can help countries respond to the complexity of participating effectively in the WTO process by
helping to ensure access to information, resources, technical training, and working groups.
Professional neutrals have not been used in formal negotiations of the GATT or WTO; however,
presiding chairs and the Secretariat have served some of the functions of a neutral. So, Test
Hypothesis 3 is: A negotiation process that includes a skilled neutral(s) and procedural rules to
16 John W. Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice; A Psychological Analysis (Hillsdale, NJ: Halsted
Press Division of Wiley, 1975); and Tom R. Tyler and E. Allan Lind, The Social Psychology of Procedural
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ensure balanced participation, information exchange, and option generation will increase the
likelihood of agreement.
The next sections describe the GATT/WTO's policymaking efforts from 1962 to the present.
THE EVOLUTION OF GATT NEGOTIATION NORMS
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the GATT was adopted in 1947 by 23 countries with the aim of "entering
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce."17
Recall that the drafters of the GATT contemplated the simultaneous establishment of the
International Trade Organization. When the ITO failed to be ratified, the GATT was left as merely an
agreement, without a supporting organization. The functional "decision-making body" of the GATT
was the contracting parties themselves, who met periodically in eight separate negotiating rounds to
discuss continued improvement of the trading system. (Recall Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.) GATT
negotiations from 1946 to 1949 functioned as a pre-negotiation for the first five trade negotiation
rounds-held from 1949 to 1961-which were devoted to progressively lowering tariff rates.'8 While
rounds were designated for discrete periods, the process was really a continual one.
Heather Hazard identified several structural characteristics that emerged from the early tariff-
reduction rounds:
* a norm of agreement by consensus, and a strong feeling that agreement must be reached;
* a small number of parties (20 to 40) with a balance of bargaining power, intimate knowledge of
the issues, and longstanding relationships;
Justice (New York: Plenum Press, 1988).
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble.
s18 Tariffs were considered a transparent, and thus acceptable, mechanism of trade restraint as compared to
quotas, which are more opaque.
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* a limited agenda-tariff reduction-with transparent consequences; 9 and
* ease of verification and compliance.20
Tariff negotiations were conducted on a largely bilateral basis, product by product. Each was
a relatively simple negotiation, but multiplied many times over for each trading partner/product set.
Like many other GATT practices, the notion of "consensus" developed over many years without
explicit language. In 1994, the WTO formalized the practice of consensus-based decision-making in
Article IX, paragraph 1, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Under this provision, majority voting
remains a theoretical option, but members have been highly adverse to its use. Thus each member
essentially has veto power, though consensus decisions do not have to be unanimous (that is, a
country can abstain from voting). The noted international economic scholar John Jackson explained:
The spirit and practice of GATT...has always been to try to accommodate through
consensus-negotiation procedures the views of as many countries as possible, but certainly to
give weight to views of countries that have great weight in the trading system. This will
undoubtedly not change. 21
GATT/WTO NEGOTIATING ROUNDS FROM 1962 TO 2003
This section looks at a series of four negotiating rounds to assess how the diagnostic and resolution
process factors played out during pre-negotiations, what levels of participation and information
exchange were typical, and how issue identification was handled. For the negotiation phase, I
consider the scope of participation, information access, resource availability, and management of the
negotiation process. The Kennedy Round served as a transition from the first five GATT tariff-
reduction negotiations to the three more complex negotiations thereafter.
19 Transparent means that tariff levels on any given product were public knowledge to a potential trading
partner, so the competitiveness of an import could be assessed.
Heather Hazard, "Resolving Disputes in International Trade" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1988), p. 3 5 -4 1 .
Hazard especially notes that the parties had a high degree of knowledge of their own interests, their adversaries'
interests, the negotiating conventions, and logistics. The original group included modest economic powers,
except for the United States. The United States was committed to building the GATT institution and making it
worthwhile for countries to join, and so did not exploit its position of leverage.
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The Kennedy Round (1962-1967)
The Kennedy Round, negotiated by nearly 80 nations over five years, was the last of the trade
negotiations to be primarily concerned with tariff reductions.22 In comparison, the previous five trade
negotiations had been conducted among 20-40 nations and had each lasted one to two years. The
Kennedy Round is not described in depth here, but its structure is sketched out as a point of reference
for subsequent negotiating rounds.23
Negotiation
Regarding the Kennedy Round, Gilbert Winham wrote:
[The Kennedy Round] took on enormous importance as a symbol as it went along. It became
a test of the national will of the major participants to continue the postwar trend toward trade
liberalization. Even more important, it was a test of the willingness of nations to avoid a
breakdown that would have led to increased protectionism. The main reason the Kennedy
Round succeeded is that governments feared what the implications of failure might mean for
the international economic system, and because they wanted to avoid blame for causing such
implications.... Thus the main political result of the Kennedy Round was the achievement of
the agreement itself, especially since the agreement was significant in trade terms.24
During the Kennedy Round, tariff negotiations usually started bilaterally on a given product,
between the principal supplier of the product and a major importer. The principle of reciprocity was
applied to evaluate any bilateral exchange of concessions. Previous negotiations had involved a
"linear-cut approach," in which requests and offer lists (describing products under consideration,
present rate of duty, and requested rate of duty) were exchanged bilaterally. Once concessions were
granted between the initial negotiators, the concessions would be "multilateralized" through the
21 John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2d ed.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 73.
22 Side agreements were also reached on antidumping and trade in grains.
23 See generally, Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 6 8- 7 8.
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"most-favored-nation" principle, which meant that each country was entitled to the most favorable
tariff rates for a product that were available to any country.25 Given its intrinsically distributive
nature, this negotiation process was slow, highly contentious, and built from the bottom up.26 The
end-game negotiation required countries to integrate a complicated set of multilateral and bilateral
concerns.
The size of a nation's economy determined its importance in these negotiations. The larger a
nation's trading volume, the more incentive it would have to make demands on its exports, and the
more it had to offer on its imports. This also placed a big negotiating burden on the larger countries-
including the United States, European Community, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan-to meet all
demands as primary exporters and importers. Smaller countries were often excluded from
negotiations until the end, when the larger nations would attempt to sell the deals already made. In
parallel to the various bilateral negotiations were discussions between the national delegations and the
GATT Secretariat to access and analyze relevant information. In the final phase, the negotiators made
tradeoffs to form packages that balanced concessions within similar product sectors if possible, but
across sectors if necessary. Interestingly, within-sector negotiations turned out to introduce a valuable
multilateral element to the negotiations, through which participants gained more detailed
understandings of the industries concerned and the compromises that were possible.27
As Winham describes it:
The Kennedy Round was a multilateral negotiation, but participants quickly found that
meaningful concessions usually could be given only between the principal supplier and major
importers. Thus, multilateral negotiations were useful for exchanges of information and for
general discussions of structural problems of trade and production in different industries, but
they did not facilitate specific discussions of reciprocity (or quid pro quo) that were a
24 Gilbert R. Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), p. 61.
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article 1.
2 6 An alternative process used in the Kennedy Round was to offer a "substantial linear tariff reduction" of
roughly 50 percent on industrial products with a bare minimum of exceptions, subject to negotiation. GATT
Press Release No. 794, May 29, 1963.
27 Dam, The GATT, p. 77.
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necessary part of the exchange of concessions. Consequently, what was a multilateral
negotiation in name became a large, complicated series of bilateral (or plurilateral)
negotiations in fact.28
Major delegations might bring in more senior individuals toward the end of the negotiations,
a strategy that would introduce new faces and new ideas and bring some added flexibility to conclude
a deal. The Kennedy Round finished rather dramatically, with the U.S. negotiator's authority about to
expire and the GATT Director-General, Sir Eric Wyndham-White, actively intervening to bring about
a successful conclusion.
Up to the Kennedy Round, the purpose of GATT negotiations was to reduce tariffs. Tariffs
were the clearest barrier to trade, and tariff concessions turned on a principle of reciprocity. As tariffs
were reduced over 15 years, attention turned to other barriers to trade, which were collectively termed
nontariff measures (NTMs). In the Kennedy Round, NTMs were recognized as a new issue and were
included on the agenda, but discussions of them resulted in only a modest agreement on antidumping
and the "American selling price" system of customs evaluation.29 Other NTMs (e.g., quotas, licensing
requirements, health standards, and variable levies) were set aside in the end, only to emerge as the
trigger issues five years later during pre-negotiation of the Tokyo Round.
One notable shift in dynamics during this round was the emergence of the European
Community negotiating as a single unit (the so-called "Europe of the Six"). This was described as
"replacing six smaller and generally law-abiding nation states with one muscular superpower."30 For
its part, the United States, made a "fundamental decision in initiating the Kennedy Round to meet the
potential threat of a unified Europe through liberal rather than isolationist policies."31 However, the
U.S. negotiators were only authorized by Congress to address tariffs, not NTMs. In the future, the EC
2 8 Winham, International Trade, pp. 64-65.
29 GAT, 1967 Antidumping Code, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 74, 1 5th Supplement, 1968. The
American selling price was a duty on a foreign product that was based on the value of "like or similar" goods
produced domestically-a valuation that could be quite onerous for exporters.
Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law (Salem, NH: Butterworth, 1991), p. 12.
31 Winham, International Trade, p. 34.
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and the United States would need to work out issues like NTMs before other nations would, or could,
be engaged.
The Kennedy Round was a transitional negotiation between the early years and subsequent
rounds. In reviewing the pre-negotiation factors, several points are remarkable. The pre-negotiation,
or diagnostic phase, had really begun more than 15 years prior when the original 23 contracting
parties to the GATT committed to progressive tariff reduction. The participants, ranging from 43
member countries in 1962 to 74 in 1967, were veterans who knew their own interests, knew their
counterparts' interests, credentials, and integrity, and understood the negotiating conventions and the
logistics. Information exchange was facilitated between the Secretariat and the respective capitals.
In building consensus, the participation, resource, and process factors mirrored those of
earlier rounds. The United States, European Community, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan carried
the burden of initiating tariff negotiations, and in turn expected smaller countries support the deal in
the end. The two-tier approach weighted the interests of the primary suppliers and importers, and
belied truly inclusive participation. Core decision-making took place among a handful of key players,
through their professional diplomats in Geneva; developing countries were marginal participants.
Summary
In summary, the agenda issues, parties, and decision-making norm for the Kennedy Round were pre-
established and facilitated through the GATT regime. The negotiation itself followed the model of the
previous rounds, with initial bilateral negotiations led by the principal suppliers, followed by
multilateral negotiations. Information was generated by the capitals and the Secretariat. The NTM
issue was less a bilateral issue between specific trading partners than a multilateral issue on classes of
trade practices with a wider target of actors, but it was only preliminarily addressed. A dominant
factor was the symbolic importance of consensus on the need to achieve agreement. The common,
binding, collective interest was to push for liberalization; the alternative-no agreement-was
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deemed unacceptable. The symbolic importance of achieving any agreement has echoed in the
negotiating rounds since.
Tokyo Round (1973 - 1979)32
The Tokyo Round was negotiated by more than 80 contracting parties over a six-year period. The
historical agenda of tariff reduction was expanded in this round to include nontariff measures:
antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, government procurement, licensing, and
technical trade barriers. GATT contracting parties during this round included many who did not share
a common history of negotiating tariff levels over the previous 20 years. The countries' diversity of
interests, experience, and knowledge challenged the "old-boy" consensus operation.
At the end of the previous round's negotiations, the GATT Secretariat tried to persuade the
major trading nations to extend trade liberalization into the nontariff area. While unsuccessful at
introducing this new issue late in the process, nontariff measures clearly triggered the Tokyo Round.
But the notion of reducing NTMs was problematic, as they were largely unidentified, numerous, and
often buried in government policies designed for nontrade purposes. Thus, a pre-negotiation period
for policymaking was essential for building some consensus among diverse participants around the
scope and negotiability of agenda issues.
Pre-Negotiation
Several incidents contributed to the launch of the Tokyo Round. The United States suspended
convertibility of the dollar into gold in 1972, a move that contributed to a period of increasing
instability in international monetary markets. The European Community extended its area of
preferential trade treatment to African and Caribbean nations and deepened its agricultural protection.
The United States negotiated a number of voluntary export reductions, which, while not inconsistent
with GATT rules, did unilaterally unbalance the international trading system. There was also a
82

growing awareness that the trading system needed to be made more flexible to handle emerging forms
of protectionism and that a new balance needed to be struck between national legislation and the
33regulation of international commerce.3
Presidents Johnson and Nixon commissioned expert discussions3 4 that ultimately led to the
preparation of the Williams Report in July 1971. The report referenced a number of monetary
questions and trade matters and concluded that new international trade negotiations should be
launched. The report stated:
These problems will not wait. Several times during the past few years, situations developed in
which unilateral actions by one or another major trading nation could have precipitated an
international crisis. We believe no time should be lost in getting these negotiations
underway.3 5
Proposals for new multilateral trade negotiations were also endorsed by the Rey Report, published in
1972 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).3 6
Another key event was the expansion of the European Commission to include three new
members-Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom-on January 1, 1973. In June 1973, the
European Commission issued an "Overall Approach" for forthcoming trade negotiations,
encompassing negotiation on international arrangements for certain product price ranges and supply;
codes of conduct on export practices; and relations with developing countries.
32 See Winham, International Trade.
33 E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935), p. 5. See also
Thomas Schelling, "National Security Considerations Affecting Trade Policy" in U.S. Government, United
States International Economic Policy in an Interdependent World, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), pp.
723-37.
34 President Johnson appointed a Public Advisory Committee on Trade Policy, composed of leading union and
business representatives, who, with the special representative for trade negotiations, were to consider U.S. trade
policy. U.S. Government, Future United States Foreign Trade Policy, Report to the President submitted by the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, January 14, 1969 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969). President
Nixon continued this policy exercise by establishing the Commission on International Trade and Investment
Policy, also composed of labor, business, and academic representatives and chaired by Albert Williams of IBM.
5 U.S. Government, U.S. International Economic Policy, Williams Commission Report (Washington: GPO,
1971), p. 307.
36 The OECD was formed in 1960 to address problems of coordinating and harmonizing economic policy
among all advanced industrial states. OECD, Policy Perspectives for International Trade and Economic
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Before launching a new round, the parties needed to develop an information base that would
enable them to understand the issues and develop the mechanisms and capacity to address the issues
systematically. Lower-level government officials initiated the process by collecting and organizing
the basic technical information; their effort served to facilitate interactions among national delegates
and the GATT Secretariat to build intellectual and negotiating capacity on the issues. The GATT
authorized the creation of a Committee on Trade in Industrial Products to explore potential progress
on trade liberalization, an "objective analysis" of tariff situations relative to Kennedy Round
concessions (the "Tariff Study"), and an inventory of nontariff measures affecting the trade of
members.3 7 Development of the Tariff Study, which involved the preparation of computer tapes on
product and tariff data, significantly facilitated subsequent tariff reduction concessions.
The NTM inventory started with a "notification drive." First, all member countries were
asked to notify the organizers of their existing nontariff measures. This was based on the common
practice of having each GATT member applying a tariff restriction to provide information about that
restriction to the international body. It became clear, however, that notification did not work as well
for NTMs as it did for tariffs, as NTMs were not necessarily intended (or recognized) as protectionist.
So, the notification burden was shifted. Exporting countries were asked to report measures maintained
by other (importing) countries that they believed constituted a restriction, and the importing countries
maintaining such measures could then respond. This procedure demonstrated the seriousness and
good intentions with which GATT members approached the NTM problem. In this manner, the NTM
initiative assembled 800 notifications containing the following information: the country maintaining
the measure, the notifying country, a description of the measure, a summary of factual aspects, and
the positions of the parties. The notifications were organized into five main groups, with working
groups established to deal with each. Each of the measures was compared to the legal requirements of
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Relations, Report by the High-Level Group on Trade and Related Problems to the Secretary General of OECD
(Paris: OECD, 1972).
3 7 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 17 th Supplement, 1970, p. 115.
the GATT. "Essentially this was a bureaucratic act," Winham wrote, "and in an environment of
ignorance, uncertainty, and complexity it was a creative act as well."3 8
This tremendous effort at information gathering, spanning more than two years, constituted
an important pre-negotiation phase in advance of collective policymaking. The information garnered
from the NTM inventory helped to define the prevailing practices and was gradually structured into
negotiable categories from which the subsequent Tokyo Round codes eventually evolved. As such, it
serves as a dramatic example of the function of pre-negotiation to increase the capacity (and will) of
parties to undertake negotiations.
Negotiation
The Tokyo Ministerial, held September 12-14, 1973, was attended by representatives from 102
nations (members and nonmembers).39 The Tokyo Declaration, authored by the parties and issued at
the end of the Ministerial meeting, stated that the aim of the negotiation was to "achieve the
expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world trade and improvement in the standard of living
and welfare of the people of the world and secure additional benefits for the international trade of
developing countries."40 The Tokyo Declaration raised the stakes for the round. As Winham
observed:
Negotiation is traditionally a mechanism for conflict resolution, but multilateral negotiation
in GATT has become more than that: it is an investment in international decision-making.
Once entered into, it is difficult to end without some form of agreement being reached, since
the time and effort expended create a kind of "sunk cost" for governments that can be
justified only through achieving a negotiated settlement.41
Once the round was launched, however, the negotiations stalled. Internationally, the 1973
Yom Kippur War and ensuing oil boycott disrupted the world markets. Domestically in the United
38 Winham, International Trade, p. 88.
39 Nations who are not members, but perhaps are negotiating accession, may attend as observers.
4 0 GATT, The Tokyo Declaration, Tokyo, Japan, September 12-14, 1973. The Declaration structured the
exercise of trade policy for participating nations in terms of both process and substance.
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States, internal politics among Congress, special interest groups, and the administration blocked the
granting of negotiating authority (to include nontariff measures) to the President until 1975. The 1976
presidential election diverted attention further, so that it was not until 1977 that the United States had
a top-level team in place to negotiate. Winham sums up that "the period 1974 to mid-1977 constituted
down-time for the trade negotiation. Some work got done, but it was mainly technical work,
especially the gathering and collecting of data."42 Finally, in January 1978, direct bargaining began.
Three categories of issues were up for negotiation: (1) six codes dealing with NTMs; (2) tariff
reductions (an average of 35 percent reduction in tariffs covering $100 billion in imports, phased over
an eight-year period); and (3) a series of revisions to GATT articles of particular interest to
developing countries. The revisions, initiated by Brazil, became known as the "framework
agreement." The framework agreement had five parts, with the objective of increasing openness and
certainty and decreasing the sometimes arbitrary nature of the trade rules. Of particular note in the
framework agreement was the establishment of dispute settlement procedures to increase the
likelihood that trade regulations would be explicit, justifiable, and more certain for exporters. This
was crucial because "in many cases, it is uncertainty, even more than absolute levels of protection,
that deters international exchanges."4 3
The Tokyo Declaration expanded the machinery for the negotiations by establishing the
Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC), which consisted of all countries participating in the Tokyo
Round and was chaired by the GATT's Director-General, Olivier Long. The task of the TNC was to
devise appropriate plans and negotiating procedures and supervise the negotiations. The large size of
the TNC precluded any negotiations at that level, but it met regularly, received formal reports from
subordinate bodies, and monitored the pace and substance of the negotiations. In February 1974, the
TNC formed six specialized subcommittees. The parties apparently recognized that "nothing gets
41 Winham, International Trade, p. 92.
42 Ibid., p. 129.
4 Ibid., p. 17.
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done unless formal tasks are assigned to specific individuals or groups, and with deadlines
attached. "4 4
Despite the careful efforts at organization and procedure, problems plagued the negotiation.
The issues were difficult, and the parties found it hard to determine an acceptable scope.
Nevertheless, the passage of time also helped the parties build up the necessary technical information
base and identify the main lines of disagreement among them. Finally, a series of agreements was
drafted to incorporate draft negotiating texts and lists of principles on the various issues. These
agreements served as a marker for a certain momentum and capacity to negotiate.
Two particular problems should be noted. One is that diplomats often draft agreements
knowing that they are postponing the most insoluble problems for those who must administer the
agreements' provisions down the road. One could expect that implementation problems with the
Tokyo Round would surface in the subsequent round-which in fact they did during the Uruguay
Round.4 5
A second problem was the pyramidal, "top-down" approach that was taken. The negotiations
were initiated by the major trading nations and flowed downward to include other nations once
important decisions (and compromises) were made. This process caused considerable resentment
among developing countries, who were most often excluded from the process, and who then
responded with opposition to the substance. By November 1979, the challenge became how to
conclude the agreements-both politically and legally-with such frustrated and marginalized
members. An additional legal problem was that the new codes were plurilateral agreements-that is,
countries would only be bound by the provisions if they explicitly so agreed. This was in contrast to
the multilateral, single-undertaking agreements of the previous and subsequent trade negotiations.
44 Ibid., p. 98.
45 Similarly, implementation problems with the Uruguay Round are now the subject of negotiation during the
Doha Round. This may, in fact, be an efficient use of time and resources in the long run, and it will be discussed
in Chapter 6.
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Despite these problems, the Tokyo Round framework negotiations concluded in Geneva on
April 12, 1979, with four agreements that modified GATT procedures on differential treatment for
developing countries, balance-of-payment measures, safeguards, and dispute settlement. Six code
agreements (on government procurement, customs valuation, technical barriers to trade, import
licensing, antidumping, subsidies, and countervailing duties) were adopted plurilaterally.
Overall, the Tokyo Round was considered a substantial accomplishment that served to limit
the damage of trade and monetary tensions, demonstrate the negotiators' ability to deal with very
complex issues, and advance the capacity of the international trade bureaucracy. Through delegation
management and information handling, the world trading system became more stable and more
politically resilient. On the process side, the negotiation strengthened the rule-orientation of the
system by increasing certainty, order, and simplicity, all of which represented a clear move away
from a process that was primarily power-oriented. The Tokyo Round's negotiation entailed both the
management of relationships and the distribution of benefits, essentially "building a cooperative
structure that would contain competitive actions by individual nations."46
Three distinctive negotiation dynamics emerged during the Tokyo Round. First, the round
was a negotiation over words, rather than just over numbers (tariff levels). Second, the issues
necessitated a shift from bilateral concessions to multilateral issue management. Third, the
importance of negotiating definitions shaped the whole process. Naming political or economic
constructs is not value-free, and this had distinctive operational implications.
Winham comments that the world trading system is fragile; it is a system "where relations are
expected to be competitive, but where that competition is in turn kept within reasonable bounds by a
series of self-imposed rules and norms of behavior."47 He anticipated that three problems would occur
after the Tokyo Round. First, he said it would be difficult for the GATT to continue to manage its role
as negotiating protectionism-in other words, to accommodate national practices that ran counter to
4 6 Winham, International Trade, p. 366.
47 Ibid., p. 402.
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the GATT's concept of free trade. Second, he questioned how member nations would contain
economic nationalism, as with the Lome Conventions granting preferential status to certain nations,
or the growing number of regional trading arrangements. Third, he suggested it would be difficult to
institute effective techniques of system control.
Summary
To review, the pre-negotiation period spanned two years, during which time a diverse group of
participants struggled to turn a collective need to avert global financial chaos into a structured
negotiation. All three pre-negotiation factors-participation, agenda formulation, and information
exchange-were catalyzed by the Tariff Study and NTM inventory. Initial analytical work by the
OECD and the United States built support for the NTM issue, and then the two-year GATT
notification and information-gathering exercise brought the parties to agreement on an agenda for
negotiation.
The negotiation itself was built upon the U.S. commitment, information, and the capacity-
building value of the Tariff Study and NTM inventory. A Trade Negotiation Committee, chaired by
the Director-General, served to structure the formal negotiations, but was in fact merely a forum for
collectively receiving subcommittee reports and information. Instead of the early bilateral to
multilateral progression of tariff reductions, the Tokyo Round followed a pyramidal sequence in
which important terms were decided by the leading traders and the smaller countries were expected to
follow. The latter, however, keenly resented this approach and were observed to express opposition
on procedural as well as substantive grounds. Winham characterized the negotiation as an
"investment in international decision-making...a symbol." The sunk costs invested in the negotiation
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could only be justified by reaching an agreement. In fact, the agreement was impressive substantively
and served to increase certainty in the global markets.48
The Uruguay Round (1989-1994)
Pre-Negotiation
As with the Tokyo Round before it, the seeds of the Uruguay Round49 lay in the remnants of the
previous round. The two "leftover" issues were agriculture and safeguards. To complicate things, the
nontariff measure codes adopted as part of the Tokyo Round were plurilateral agreements; they were
only binding on those countries that explicitly adopted them, not on all GATT members. As it turned
out, it was primarily the OECD countries that signed the NTM codes. Developing countries were far
more concerned about agriculture, textiles, and clothing. However, both developed and developing
countries were concerned about unilateral, extra-GATT behavior and implementation of the previous
agreements. A final category of concerns included new issues, such as services (e.g., shipping, air
transport, banking, and insurance), investments, and intellectual property. The GATT Secretariat was
not sufficiently staffed to analyze the new issues, nor was it authorized to do so until late in the pre-
negotiation process.
The United States pushed the 1982 GATT Ministerial meeting to consider a trade round
launch and was especially keen to include the new issues on a draft agenda. The move for a new
round (i.e., for even beginning pre-negotiations over a possible agenda) was sharply resisted by
developing countries.
48 Paul Lewis, "Olivier Long, 87; Led Predecessor of WTO," The New York Times, May 9,2003. Long was
largely credited with holding countries to their commitment to complete the round, despite pleas for protection
amidst the OPEC oil shocks and high inflation in the world economy.
49 See generally, Gilbert R. Winham, "The Pre-Negotiation Phase of the Uruguay Round" in Stein, Getting to
the Table, pp. 44-67; Gunnar Sjostedt, "Negotiating the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade" in Zartman, ed., International Multilateral Negotiation, pp. 44-69; and Michael Hart, "Multilateral
Trade Negotiations" in Hampson, Multilateral Negotiations, pp. 125-254.
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The United States thus turned its focus away from the GATT and recommended that the
OECD include services in its liberalization program and begin to identify the exchange of services
across borders as a form of trade. The OECD undertook some analysis and monitoring, and, in June
1981, issued a report regarding the import of trade in services.
Investment as a new trade topic was handled similarly to services, with initial research and
analysis conducted outside of the GATT. Intellectual property was raised at the end of the Tokyo
Round as a new issue, but it was far too late (the summer of 1979) to be considered then. In 1980 and
1981, the United States held a series of bilateral talks with the EC, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland on
intellectual property. Coincidentally, a U.S.-Canada dispute on patent rights in 1981 moved the issue
from conceptual to concrete.
In 1983, the GATT's Director-General appointed a blue-ribbon group, headed by Fritz
Leutwiler, to examine the trading system. The Leutwiler Report, issued in 1985, recommended a new
trade round that would take up both old and new issues. Many nations, especially Brazil and India,
expressed concern that a new round would emphasize new rights for industrialized countries at the
expense of sorting out unresolved issues of greater importance to developing countries. Europe was
somewhat ambivalent; while interested in advancing rules on services and investment, it was not
prepared to scale back its protectionist agricultural policy.
Around this same time, a GATT body called the Consultative Group of 18 (CG1 8) weighed
in. This special GATT entity was not involved in multinational negotiations, nor did it have any
formal decision-making authority.50 However, it was comprised of high-level, national representatives
with responsibility for the GATT's strategic planning. The larger industrialized and developing
countries had permanent seats in the group; others rotated membership. In early 1985, the CG 18 held
a series of informal ministerial meetings among 20 key trading nations from North and South to
explore-without any commitment-an agenda for the Uruguay Round.
5 0The CGI 8 existed in the GATT between 1975 and 1990. It brought together senior officials from Geneva and
the capitals.
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In June 1985, the GATT Council established an official group with a mandate to find a viable
compromise between positions for and against a new GATT round. The United States had made some
progress with its allies, and through an unusual but highly calculated call for a procedural vote,
succeeded in calling a meeting to prepare for the establishment of a preparatory committee, which
would authorize the use of GATT resources and staff for research and discussion of prospective
negotiating issues. By January 1986, a GATT preparatory committee was formed and chaired by the
GATT Director-General, Arthur Dunkel.
As with the Tokyo Round, then, nearly three years of research and discussion activities were
needed to build political support for a new round.5' This protracted impasse actually gave the parties
time to work through differences. Strong opposition by a number of developing countries diminished
as export-oriented countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America became favorable to new a GATT
round. Early leadership by the United States through issue analysis in collateral forums was later
assumed by smaller countries such as Colombia and Switzerland, who involved Canada, the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) nations52, Australia, New Zealand, and various developing countries. In the
end, almost 50 countries participated in a large coalition of small and middle powers that built a
bridge between, on the one hand, the United States, the EC, and Japan, and, on the other, former
dissidents Brazil and India. This part of the pre-negotiation phase became a game of issue
clarification. The sequence of steps was to identify the issues (e.g., services, investments), and then
conduct research to understand them and build a "consensual background" on which the issue could
be framed for introduction to the agenda.
The contracting parties met in Ministerial Conference in Punte del Este, Uruguay in
September 1986 to develop an agenda for a new round. The struggle at this point was over what
issues were to be negotiated in the round and in what sequence; what parties (or institutions, e.g., the
51 Sjostedt, "Negotiating the Uruguay Round," p. 54.
52 EFTA was formed in 1960 and included Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland,
and Sweden. Most countries left to join the European Community or the European Union; Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland, and Liechtenstein remain.
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GATT v. the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development) would negotiate the issues;
and how to structure the negotiations (with an eye for future tradeoffs). Winham recalled an oft-told
metaphor for trade negotiations-the so-called "bicycle theory." Similar to how a bicycle must
maintain forward motion in order to stay upright, Winham explained, "unless the GATT sustains the
momentum in the fight to maintain a liberal trade regime, this regime will collapse as nations take
unilateral action to protect their producers from foreign competition."53
The specific drivers for the United States to launch a new trade round were several: its status
as a major agricultural exporter; its increasing dependence on the production of services rather than
goods; its long-running trade deficit (which was likely to prompt Congress to adopt a unilateral,
protectionist trade strategy); and its recognition that nearly half of world trade was outside the GATT
disciplines. Winham explained:
Factors that salvaged the new negotiation were strong leadership and organization of the
Punta del Este meeting, and the knowledge that a failure to negotiate would have left the
GATT without any programme for the immediate future. Delegates to the Punta del Este
meeting commented that the fear of renewed protectionism (especially in the United States)
finally seemed to have had an impact on all national delegations, and a certain fear of the
"long shadow of the future" promoted a willingness to seize on negotiation as a way of
avoiding that future.54
Once again, Winham said, the pre-negotiation followed a
pyramidal structure, whereby issues tended to be first negotiated between the United States
and the EC; and once a tentative trade-off was established, the negotiation process was
progressively expanded to include other countries. In this way co-operation between the
United States and the EC served to direct the negotiation. Where co-operation was not
forthcoming between these economic superpowers, the negotiation went nowhere because
they had effective veto power; and when the two did agree, only the combined efforts of other
parties (usually the developing countries) had any real prospect of altering the outcome.55
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53 Winham, International Trade, p. 48.
5 4 Ibid., p. 51.
" Ibid., p. 54.
The Punta del Este Ministerial was scheduled for six days and began with three competing
texts containing draft negotiating agendas. The main text came from the preparatory committee and
was sponsored by a group of 40 developed and developing countries chaired by Colombia and
Switzerland (the "cafe au lait group," so named for Colombian coffee and Swiss dairy). The second
text represented the views of 10 developing countries following the lead of India and Brazil. The third
text was submitted by Argentina as an attempt to bridge the other two. The U.S. threatened to
withdraw unless the new issues (services, investments, and intellectual property) were addressed. On
services, the dispute was between the developed and developing countries. On agriculture, the dispute
was between the United States and the EC.
From a process perspective, it was clear from the beginning that negotiating the agenda in full
plenary would not suffice. The opening session on September 15 began with each delegation
presenting a 1 0-minute speech-a process that would consume at least two full days alone. Some
alternative process was needed that could narrow the interaction and increase efficiency, while
maintaining adequate representation. Further, the parties needed a single text to serve as the basis for
negotiation. Thus Ministerial Chair Enrique Iglesias, Uruguay's Minister of Foreign Affairs, turned
the plenary session over to the vice chair, the minister from Egypt who was one of the new-round
opponents. The vice chair continued to hear all opening statements. Meanwhile, Minister Iglesias
created a "little plenary" consisting of the leading minister from each country plus one deputy-still,
180 people. This forum functioned as a "heads of delegation" meeting to develop a common strategy,
steer the discussion, and resolve difficult issues. A third initiative, supported by advice of the GATT
Secretariat, involved a small, invitation-only consultation committee of 20 nations representing the
main factions at the meeting. This group met, generally in confidence, five miles outside of Punta del
Este. Its existence was known and tolerated, so long as the little plenary served to balance it out. A
fourth process initiative was to establish two substantive groups-one on services and one on
agriculture-to run parallel to meetings of the consultation committee. Iglesias chaired the services
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subcommittee; the Austrian ambassador chaired the agriculture subcommittee, to mediate between the
United States and the EC.
The main challenge was to maximize the interaction between the most important nations at
the meeting: those nations whose economic size was large enough to ensure that they were included
in an agreement, and whose political importance derived from leadership in GATT affairs. The main
protagonists would leave the room to settle differences. Once services was dealt with, then other
issues were not worth risking the agreement, so the intellectual property and investment issues fell
into line. Negotiations stretched through the last night of the Ministerial meeting and an agreement
was delivered late in the morning on the last day. Thus the Uruguay Round was formally launched on
September 20, 1986. This was the 8th multilateral trade negotiation round since the adoption of the
GATT.
Winham wrote that the pre-negotiation
succeeded in the end because of the widely held perception that failure to begin a new
negotiation would have harmful consequences for the GATT regime and for prospects of
continued liberalization of international trade. Thus crisis avoidance was an important
motivation during both the early pre-negotiation period and the Punta del Este session.
However, once the momentum in favour of a new negotiation had developed, the main
motivation behind each delegation's activities became even more sharply focused as a fear of
being isolated and blamed for the failure of the special session.... Only India and an
increasingly uncertain Brazil were left...and [they] found it impolitic to be isolated and
acquiesced. 5 6
The same held for France, when it was deserted by the EC on its agriculture demands.
[The] final conclusion...is that process (that is, what issues will be raised and how they will
be dealt with) appeared to be elevated over substance (that is, how the issues would be
resolved) in pre-negotiation.... International negotiation is a less stable form of policy-
making than democratic government, and a process has to be worked out between the parties
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56 Ibid., p. 64.
for each negotiation. How this process is established, and whether or not it will facilitate any
negotiation that might follow, is what the pre-negotiation is all about.57
Negotiation
Once the Punta del Este Declaration was issued, the negotiations over the substantive issues were
organized to place the highest authority with a newly formed Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC).
The TNC's task was to supervise and coordinate negotiations in all issue areas. It had two main
subsidiary bodies: a Group on the Negotiations on Services (GNS), which was technically outside the
GATT framework, and a Group on Negotiations on Goods (GNG), which covered everything except
services. Actual negotiations were conducted within 14 negotiating groups reporting to the GNG.58
All negotiating bodies were open, in principle, to all countries that were formal participants of the
Uruguay Round. These negotiations had two notable characteristics: the tremendous complexity
confronting the parties, and the compartmentalization of the agenda. Each negotiating group was
quasi-independent, with its own problems, sticking points, conceptual framework, and national
representation.
The first essential task was to build up consensual knowledge. By December 1986, the
negotiating groups had developed plans of action and timetables. A midterm ministerial review and
stocktaking was set for Montreal in late December 1988, followed by another stocktaking in summer
1990, with hopes that the round could conclude at the Brussels Ministerial in December 1990. All
negotiating bodies were serviced by the GATT Secretariat for background information and analysis,
summaries of session records, and syntheses of country positions. Later the Director-General, Arthur
Dunkel, served as mediator.
7 Ibid., p. 67.
58 The 14 negotiating groups were formed around tariffs; nontariff barriers to trade; natural resources; textiles
and clothing; agriculture; tropical products; GATT articles; multilateral trade agreements negotiated in the
Tokyo Round; safeguards; subsidies and countervailing duties; intellectual property rights; trade-related
investments; dispute settlement; and the functioning of the GATT system. Sjostedt describes these negotiating
groups in "Negotiating the Uruguay Round," pp. 58-59.
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Recall that tariff negotiations were quantitative and were negotiated as offers/requests by
product, or according to a formula across the board. The Uruguay Round issues were not amenable to
this procedure. Instead, there emerged "editing diplomacy: the establishment of a convention text
with the objective of developing principles, norms, rules, and procedures for a particular issue area-
the rules of the game."59 There were two core stages: first, issue clarification, in which strong
technical and diplomatic skills were required and up to 70 percent of the parties were inactive, and
second, text consolidation.
In the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, negotiations essentially rotated around a U.S.-EC axis. In
the Uruguay Round it was somewhat different. Several negotiating group chairs, including that from
the group on services, were from developing countries. And few coalitions were made up purely of
developing countries. A number of issues had mixed coalitions; the Cairns Group, for example,
included 13-14 countries that were competitive exporters of agriculture goods. At a more general
level was the "de la Paix" group, a coalition of mid-size and smaller trading nations that had paved
the pre-negotiation up to Punta del Este and continued to promote negotiating solutions at the table
through a mixture of leadership and mediation.60
By the summer of 1990, it was clear that it was unrealistic to achieve a draft text. Instead,
each negotiating group developed a "profile" to describe its main elements. Integrating the profiles
proved difficult, however. In part, this was because some issues could only be resolved in a final and
decisive exchange of concessions-and parties wouldn't do that until they were certain that
negotiations were near to being closed once and for all. After the December 1990 Ministerial in
Brussels, it was not possible to conclude, but it was generally understood that it would be disastrous
to accept official failure, so instead the Director-General was asked to undertake a thorough
evaluation of progress in various sectors, which he did throughout 1991.
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60 Ibid., p. 63.
A new system of seven negotiating groups (dealing with separate clusters of issues) was then
established.61 The stocktaking was completed in the summer of 1991, and the deal was scheduled to
close in November. It was during 1991 that the model of a "world trade organization" entered the
negotiation. The Director-General finally had a draft Final Act in December 1991, and a new
structure of final negotiations was made with four tracks: (1) industrial products and agriculture
goods; (2) trade in services; (3) review of all negotiating texts; and (4) tradeoffs at the decisive stage.
A new target of April 1993 was set. However, due to unsuccessful talks between the United States
and the EC, and another U.S. presidential election, this deadline also passed.
It was noted that the tremendous complexity of the agenda and diverse negotiating groups
made it very difficult to reach constructive cross-sectoral trade-offs. The U.S. leadership in earlier
rounds was counterbalanced by the EC and Japan, and a number of developing countries were active
players as well. Gunnar Sjostedt wrote that, ironically, "a disturbing observation is that the increasing
'democratization' of GATT talks occurring at the Uruguay Round-the participation of more
countries in informal negotiating groups-is not entirely beneficial. It seems that multilateral
processes tend to become unmanageable unless some critical decision can be taken by small groups of
leading countries."6 2
A new Director-General, a new U.S. President, and another year passed before the
negotiations were finally concluded in Marrakesh in April 1994. As described in Chapter Two, the
Marrakesh agreement resulted in the formation of the World Trade Organization as an umbrella
organization to oversee the multilateral trading system of 121 (now 146) member nations. Three
annexes with more than 14 agreements were adopted as a single undertaking by all members; a fourth
61 These seven groups included market access (tariffs, nontariff measures, natural resource-based products,
tropical products); textiles and clothing; agriculture; trade-related investments and rulemaking (subsidies and
countervailing duties, antidumping, safeguards, pre-shipment inspection; rules of origin, technical barriers to
trade, import licensing procedures, customs valuation, government procurement, and some GATT articles);
trade-related intellectual property rights; institutions; and trade in services.
6 2 Sjostedt, "Negotiating the Uruguay Round," p. 69.
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annex covered four plurilateral agreements. Overall, this was seen to be an extraordinary
accomplishment.
Summary
To review, the pre-negotiation factors (participation, agenda formulation, and information
development) evolved from 1982 to 1989. The number of parties hovered around 90 nations as the
issues expanded by an order of magnitude. Insufficient information for decision-making constrained
progress.
As early as 1978, before the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the United States had proposed
in the CGl 8 that services be considered for negotiation. Developing countries' resistance then, and
over the next several years, prevented the GATT from directly undertaking any formal preparatory
work. The new issues of intellectual property and investments were similarly opposed. The
plurilateral codes on NTMs from the Tokyo Round had been adopted by OECD countries primarily,
and so required attention to be multilateralized. Once the GATT formally acknowledged possible
negotiations, another three years was spent building a consensual background, defining the issues,
and agreeing on an agenda framework that included: (1) new issues of services, investments, and
intellectual property; (2) continuing issues of agriculture, safeguards, and implementation of the
Tokyo Round NTM codes; and (3) establishment of a new institution, the WTO. Informational
support from the OECD was necessary until the GATT itself could garner support to launch
preparations for negotiation. Coming into the Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este, the
overarching motivation was the bicycle theory: global trade liberalization would collapse if the GATT
parties did not agree to move forward. The "cafe au lait coalition" of 50 mid-sized countries
functioned as a mediator. Organizational leadership and skilled process management at the
conference carried the day. A tri-level negotiation system-the full plenary, little plenary, and smaller
consultative meetings among 20 specially invited nations-worked to bring the GATT members to
consensus on pursuing negotiations.
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Building consensus for full agreement took another five years, and astute coalition building
was key. The Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, the Quad (the United States, Europe, Japan, and
Canada), the developing country caucus, and the de la Paix Group (small countries that met regularly
in Geneva) each in turn served to clarify issues, align interests, and provide creative leadership. Even
though the Uruguay Round was more multilateral in tone than earlier rounds, only 30-40 countries set
the terms of the deal before the text was consolidated with the full membership. As participation
levels increased, negotiations became more divisive, and critical decisions could only be made by
smaller groups. The Secretariat provided the background information and analysis, summarized
negotiation sessions, and synthesized country positions. The formal process centered on the full Trade
Negotiations Committee supplemented by a decreasing number of specialized negotiating groups,
with the Director-General serving as mediator.
Seattle: An Attempt to Launch a Millennium Round (1999)
At Marrakesh, WTO member countries agreed to meet at least every two years in Ministerial
Conference. At its First Ministerial, held in December 1996 in Singapore, the members agreed to a
process of analysis and exchange of information to better understand the current issues and identify
interests before undertaking negotiations.6 3 The Second Ministerial, held in Geneva in May 1998,
advanced preparations for negotiations and decided that: "a process will be established under the
direction of the General Council to ensure full and faithful implementation of existing agreements,
and to prepare for the Third Session of the Ministerial Conference." The General Council was to
construct a work program on the basis of submissions from WTO members and the work resulting
from the analysis and information exchange process initiated in Singapore.6 4
63 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC, December 13, 1996.
64 Geneva Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1, May 20, 1998.
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Pre-Negotiation
Thus, the Third Ministerial to be held in Seattle in 1999 contemplated the launch of major new
negotiations to further liberalize international trade-and this only five years since the conclusion of
the previous trade negotiation. Two topics-agriculture and services-had been specifically
scheduled for new negotiations by the beginning of 2000. Whether, and how many, additional issues
would be placed on the agenda of a "Millennium Round" was open to discussion.
From March to November 1999, more than 800 proposals for agenda items, in 20 topical
areas, were submitted for negotiation. The General Council started to put the various ideas together in
a draft declaration, to be issued in Seattle, that would include an agenda for negotiation. The draft
included not only the "built-in agenda" of agriculture and services, but other recurring and new issues
as well: tariffs, antidumping, subsidies, safeguards, investment measures, trade facilitation, electronic
commerce, competition policy, fisheries, transparency in government procurement, technical
assistance, capacity-building and other development issues, and intellectual property protection. Of
these, developing countries particularly wanted to examine how the Uruguay Round agreements had
been implemented over the past five years (the so-called "implementation" issues).6 5
Five working groups were organized by the General Council to consider the various
proposals, and the Seattle Ministerial was scheduled for November 30 - December 3, 1999. During
the Ministerial, delegations met formally in working groups (each open to all members) and
informally, but no agreement on an agenda could be found. Meanwhile, thousands of people and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations protested in the streets over the lack of access to
these global negotiations.
Hiramitsu Arai, vice-minister for international affairs for the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, noted: "In addition to these stumbling blocks on the substantive
issues, the balance of transparency and efficiency in the conduct of the negotiations was seriously
65 In particular, these included the agreements on antidumping measures, subsidies, textiles and clothing,
intellectual property, investments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to trade.
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distorted. Many developing countries that were left out of the informal consultation process had
serious misgivings about the decision-making mechanisms. The result was a serious loss of
confidence in the WTO."66
Schott noted that negotiations broke down not only along North-South lines, but among the
quadrilateral countries: the United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada: "The U.S., as leader
of the trading system and host of the Seattle ministerial .. .failed to build consensus either at home or
abroad on the importance of new trade negotiations and how they should be structured."6 7 The United
States' narrow objectives-short negotiation, limited agenda, and concrete results in its priority
areas-not only did not have support, but provoked equally positional responses from other countries.
Thus, trade ministers failed to craft an agenda for new trade talks encompassing the key issues of
interest to both developed and developing countries.
Summary
Pre-negotiation factors for the Seattle ministerial mirrored those of previous rounds, but were marked
by lack of coordinated leadership and commitment among Europe, the United States, and Japan. The
United States hosted the meeting, but failed to align its strategy with either Europe or developing
countries. Three years were devoted to the analytical and information-exchange process. Eight
hundred proposals in 20 topical areas essentially broke down into three categories: (1) continuing
issues of services and agriculture; (2) implementation issues from the Uruguay Round; and (3) new
issues of investments, competition, and environment. The information and agenda formulation factors
did not appear distinctively deficient, compared to earlier rounds, but the participation factor faltered
in its lack of transparency to engage all stakeholders, and the lack of coordinated commitment by the
leading powers. The inability of the membership to launch a negotiating round was viewed as a
6 6 Hisamitsu Arai, "Some Reflections on the Seattle Ministerial: Toward the Relaunching of a New Round," in
Jeffrey Schott, The WTO After Seattle (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000) p. 59, 65.
6 7 Schott, WTO After Seattle, p. 5-7.
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failure, akin to that suggested by the "bicycle theory," and the specter haunted the pre-Doha
deliberations.
Doha Round (2001-present)
In the months after Seattle, world leaders, scholars, and citizens struggled over the causes of the
breakdown and alternative strategies. Nearly a year later, leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation stated, "We believe that a balanced and sufficiently broad-based agenda that responds to
the interests and concerns of all World Trade Organization members should be formulated and
finalized as soon as possible in 2001, and that a round be launched in 2001 .,,68
Pre-Negotiation
By the summer of 2001, momentum had once again gathered behind the idea of a new round, but the
fundamental differences between rich and poor nations, and between the United States and its trading
partners over what should be on the agenda, still loomed. Concerns over the global economic
slowdown, and the tendency toward protectionism that could follow, created an urgency for trade
talks. Japan's trade negotiator commented: "If we fail for a second time, it will contaminate the
atmosphere and create the idea that we can't take on the hard decision." 69
The European Union argued for a broad mandate so that concessions could be made within
the constraints imposed by domestic pressure groups. The United States favored a more "focused
agenda" concentrating on better access for services and agricultural and industrial goods. Pascal
Lamy, the European Union Commissioner for Trade, and Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade
Representative, issued a joint statement in July 2001:
As the two biggest elephants in the global economy, the EU and the United States need to get
our act together on trade. Our governments are natural partners with a rich history of
68 Calvin Sims, "World Trade Talks Revived by Pacific Rim Conference," New York Times, November 17,
2000.
69 Elizabeth Olson, "Seattle Failure Weighs on Future of New Trade Talks," New York Times, June 26, 2001.
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cooperation; now is the time to cash in the chips and build on that history. It's time to
recognize a simple fact. If the European Union and the United States do not work together to
launch a new round of global trade negotiations, it will not happen. We need to create a
framework for negotiating the reduction of trade barriers while also strengthening and
extending the rules of the international trading system.... Building a fairer, rules-based
trading system is a key way to help integrate these [poorer] nations into the world economic
system.... We appreciate that the trading system needs to respect national differences that
reflect the decisions of sovereign governments.... We will need to work to achieve a
compatibility of distinctive regulatory systems. Given the stakes, we will continue to manage
our differences through reason, negotiation, respect for each others' political constraints, and
particularly by compliance with WTO rules. We believe the European Union and the United
States-and all the members of the WTO-can and must work together to launch a new
global trade round this November. For the WTO, and all of its members, the potential reward
for success is great. The price for failure would be painfully high.7 0
A two-day meeting in Geneva concluded with strong words from WTO Director-General
Mike Moore, who said that the trade group was on the edge of "irrelevance" without a new trade
round. The U.S. indicated some support for the European Union's push for a broader agenda to help
offset the likely obligations required to reduce Europe's agricultural subsidies. Despite developing
countries' resistance to a round (which was due to unfulfilled promises from the Uruguay Round),
these countries risked being further marginalized without a new round of talks. Moore noted that "on
their own, they do not have enough leverage to negotiate beneficial bilateral deals with large
countries."7 1
By the November 2001 Ministerial in Doha, Qatar, a tangle of alliances and issues emerged.
Key among the issues proposed for the agenda were agriculture, textiles, intellectual property, and
dumping.7 2 On agriculture, the United States and developing countries pressed Europe and Japan to
70 Pascal Lamy and Robert Zoellick, "In the Next Round," Washington Post, July 17, 2001.
71 Elizabeth Olson, "Two Camps at WTO Said to Be a Bit Closer," New York Times, August 1, 2001.
72 "Dumping" occurs when a country exports a product for sale at a price lower than the cost required to
produce it. As an example, the United States has invoked its antidumping laws frequently to protect its steel
industry against imports from Brazil, Japan, and Korea. Joseph Kahn, "A Trade Agenda Tempts Murphy's
Law," New York Times, November 9, 2001; and Helene Cooper and Geoff Winstock, "Domestic Demands
Limit U.S., EU Bargaining at Trade Talks," Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2001.
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reduce the extensive protection of their farmers. On textiles, the European Union and developing
countries pressed the United States to improve market access for low-end manufactures of textiles
and clothing by reducing its quotas and tariffs to protect its politically influential industries. Japan and
developing countries pressed the United States on its antidumping rules. India and Brazil, along with
a number of African nations, pushed the United States on the intellectual property front relative to a
public health exception on pharmaceutical patents. Europe argued for a broader agenda, including
environment, investment, and competition, to help offset its anticipated concessions on agriculture.
WTO officials drafted an 1 -page text with hopes that it might serve as the basis of agreement.73
Drawing lessons from Seattle, Zoellick extensively prepared on the issues and talked with
trade officials around the world-many of whom had not been consulted by U.S. diplomats in years.
Recognizing the diversity of the developing world, he attempted to listen, be respectful, and put
himself in his counterparts' shoes in order to better solve their problems. Further, the personal
commitment and relationship between Lamy and Zoellick contributed to the essential leadership
needed to launch the round.74
Peter Drahos described the negotiating process as decision-making in concentric circles.
Through a series of informal meetings, the United States and the European Union would form a core
coalition, then successively draw in Japan and Canada, other developed countries, then the
developing countries. Drahos also described countries' sources of bargaining power, including their
share of market power (via domestic markets); commercial intelligence networks (gathering,
distribution, and analysis of information regarding trade, economy, and business of self and others);
73 While acknowledging the tremendous pressure on the Secretariat, developing country observers expressed
real frustration with the drafting process. "In the process, we would object to a text, but it would still appear.
We would state that we wanted a text added in, and still it would not appear. It was like a magic text." Aileen
Kwa, "Power Politics in the WTO," Focus on the Global South, January 2003, p. 23.
74 Joseph Kahn, "Trade Talks Hinge on Finesse of U.S." New York Times, November 10, 2001.
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ability to enroll other states and nongovernmental organizations in the coalitions; and support of
domestic institutions.7 5
A final deal on the negotiating agenda was ultimately made in the green room, where only 23
countries were admitted.7 6 In the end, after seven years, the 142 nations of the WTO launched a new
round of trade negotiations. Commitment to study the new issues-competition and investment-was
pivotal in giving the Europeans the political cover they needed to offset agricultural subsidies. Brazil,
Africa, and India stood up to the United States and other industrial countries to get the intellectual
property rules on drug patents suspended in certain public health situations (such as AIDS). 7 7 At the
meeting's conclusion, Robert Zoellick commented: "This agreement sent a powerful signal to the
world that we have removed the stain of Seattle. We will continue to build a common trading system
based on common rules."7 8
The agreement-called the Doha Declaration79-constitutes a mandate for negotiations on a
range of subjects and other work including issues concerning the implementation of the present
agreements, analysis, and monitoring. The negotiations are taking place in the Trade Negotiations
Committee, as well as other WTO councils and committees. The Declaration includes a timetable
running from November 2001 to the Fifth Ministerial Conference in September 2003 in Cancun,
Mexico, with an ultimate deadline of the Sixth Ministerial on January 1, 2005, for a single
undertaking. 8 0 The negotiations are headed by the TNC under the authority of the General Council
and chaired by the WTO Director-General. The organizing principles for the negotiations include:
75 Peter Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization"
International Negotiation 8, no. 2, 2003, pp. 79-109, 85. The sequencing power for building coalitions is
discussed extensively by Sebenius in "Sequencing to Build Coalitions"
76 The 23 included Australia, Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Egypt, European Union, Guatemala, India,
Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, Uruguay,
United States, and Zimbabwe, plus the Director-General. Kwa, "Power Politics in the WTO," p. 27.
7 7 Helene Cooper and GeoffWinstock, "Poor Nations Win Gains in Global Trade Deal, as U.S. Compromises,"
Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2001; Joseph Kahn, "Nations Back Freer Trade, Hoping to Aid Global
Growth," New York Times, November 15,2001.
78 Kahn, "Nations Back Freer Trade."
7 9 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I, November 20, 2001.
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single undertaking, participation, transparency, special and differential treatment, development, and
environment.
A separate Implementation Programme decision contains 12 subject headings and two
catchall headings for outstanding issues, covering more than 40 items settled at Doha.8 Most
outstanding issues are the subject of immediate negotiations, and all concern developing countries'
problems in implementing the WTO Agreement, which was adopted as part of the Uruguay Round.82
Nearly 50 decisions were adopted in Doha to clarify the obligations of developing country member
governments relative to issues of agriculture, subsidies, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to
trade, trade-related investment measures, and rules of origin. Further, a work program was outlined to
address other matters not already settled, some to be negotiated according to the mandate and others
to be handled as "a matter of priority" by relevant WTO councils and committees. The latter bodies
reported to the Trade Negotiations Committee by the end of 2002 for "appropriate action."
The Negotiation
The TNC met four times during 2002 to oversee progress on the negotiations mandated at Doha.
Director-General Mike Moore reported at the July 19, 2002, meeting that the "road map and deadlines
are now clear" for the Fifth Ministerial Meeting scheduled for September 10-14, 2003 in Cancun,
Mexico, and the work of TNC bodies "is now about substance and real negotiations." 8 3 Adequate
technical assistance was once again highlighted as being essential. One delegation warned against
8 0 Single undertaking means that all member countries agree to the whole set of agreements as a single act. In
contrast, the Tokyo Round negotiation allowed members to select which agreements to approve, which created
a series of plurilateral agreements that were difficult to monitor and enforce.
81 Doha Ministerial: Ministerial Declarations & Decisions, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
Decision, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 7, November 14, 2001.
82 The barriers to implementation are institutional, political, and economic. For example, one World Bank report
estimated that "the average cost for a developing country to implement just three of the Uruguay Round
agreements is US$150 million-more than what many countries receive in foreign investment in a year." S.
Sothi Rachagan, WTO Reform and the Role of Civil Society, paper presented at the WTO Symposium in Issues
Confronting the World Trading System, July 6-7, 2001.
83 "Trade Negotiations Committee," WTO News, July 18-19, 2002.
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moving the process out of Geneva by holding small meetings of ministers.84 Another, however,
stressed the importance of involving ministers and capital-based officials, and hoped that not too
many issues would be left to ministers at Cancun.
Supachai Panitchpakdi succeeded Mike Moore as Director-General and assumed
Chairmanship of the TNC in September 2002. Supachai explained his aim of focusing on four
"pillars:" (1) the legal framework to bind the multilateral trading system together; (2) assistance to
developing and least-developed countries; (3) the promotion of coherence in international economic
policymaking; and (4) strengthening the WTO as an institution. 85
The October 3-4, 2002, TNC meeting was chaired by incoming Director-General Supachai,
who offered these comments:
[The Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico] is set to act as a mid-term review. This
means that by then we will need a clear picture of what is achievable across the negotiating
agenda. Only on that basis will ministers be able to provide the necessary additional political
guidance in order to conclude the Doha Development Agenda Work Programme successfully
by the 1 January 2005 deadline.... It is important we meet these [interim] deadlines....
Deadlines are important because they allow us to measure how we are advancing.... A
successful outcome for the Doha Development Agenda is essential for the future of our
societies. A larger degree of openness and predictability in international relations can only
come about if we have the same set of rules and if we set our sights on similar objectives.
That is precisely what this Organization can offer." 86
There is already a widespread sense of the globality of the negotiations, of the need to make
progress across a broad front and to build a balanced overall result. But I would encourage
delegations to move rapidly away from defensive positions-we no longer have the time to
wait for someone else to make the opening move. This is not a zero-sum game. It is certainly
about national interests, but it is also about our shared interest in a system which delivers for
all its members. We can only counter these economic uncertainties by strengthening
84 This is a reference to a series of "mini-ministerials" held in Mexico, Singapore, Sydney, and Tokyo.
85 WTO News, Speech by Director-General Supachai to Swiss Bankers Association on September 20, 2002,
Basel, Switzerland.
86 "Trade Negotiations Committee," WTO News: Press/315, October 3, 2002.
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predictability, by achieving what we are supposed to achieve within the time that we have
been mandated to do so.87
In November 2002, 25 trade ministers were hosted by the Australian Trade Minister to push
forward the negotiations and provide some political direction on areas that had been progressing more
slowly. Previous "mini-ministerials" were held in Mexico (August 31-September 1, 2002), Singapore
(October 16, 2002), Tokyo (February 15-16, 2003), and Montreal (July 2003).
The October TNC meeting marked a new phase of the negotiations-that of substantive
engagement.88 Smaller delegations had special practical problems in participating effectively within
the accelerating time demands for negotiations. Supachai commented that "the key to a successful
endgame is for everyone to understand that, while delaying tactics may seem useful as a tactical
move, they will never secure a final outcome.... As we come towards the period between the middle
game and the endgame, all deadlines can be calibrated to be more in tune with one another."8 9
At the December 2002 TNC meeting, 46 delegations spoke on the negotiation topics,
especially agriculture, trade and development, trade-related intellectual property issues (TRIPs), and
public health. Supachai noted a rising level of participation since October, and committed to schedule
the negotiating group meetings carefully to strike a balance between flexibility and predictability.
Despite all the hard work to date, members could not reach agreement on definitive solutions on most
of the issues before them. It was suggested that Supachai consult on all issues and report back to the
TNC. He also committed to consider how to engender a more interactive type of discussion at
meetings and to turn general statements into more specific ones, with the aim of clarifying positions
and moving toward convergence.
A mini-ministerial held in Tokyo on February 15-16, 2003, was attended by ministers from
22 countries, but could mark no significant progress in either formal or informal proceedings, due in
part to the impending war in Iraq and U.S.-European tensions. Supachai warned: "We are facing
87 "Supachai Urges Negotiators to Stop Waiting for Others to Move First," WTO News, October 15, 2002.
These remarks were made at meeting of the General Council.
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imminent gridlock. Only tightly focused political energy can avoid it.... Failure to make real progress
on [TRIPS and access to essential medicines for poor countries] has deepened suspicions among
developing countries that the 'Development' part of the Doha Development Agenda may be little
more than a slogan."9 0 Another mini-ministerial of 25 select countries was held in Montreal in July
2003. The Wall Street Journal wrote: "Frustrated by the difficulties of achieving consensus among all
members..., WTO leadership is giving increasing importance to these so-called mini-ministerial
meetings."91 The hope was that streamlined groups of "movers and shakers" would better understand
each other's positions and form the seed of consensus for the full negotiating group. But the secretive,
selective nature of the meetings, whose participants were chosen by the host country, caused
resentment and suspicion from other members and the public. Pascal Lamy, the EU Commissioner for
Trade, commented that the United States and the European Union "remain the two big elephants of
the system, accounting for 40 percent of world trade...." He continued: "In the WTO of 2003, EU-
U.S. agreement is necessary, but not sufficient, to get an overall deal. Developing countries demand,
rightly, that their views must count in the final deal."92
In August 2003, a group of 12 African nations proposed a process innovation to
accommodate diverse interests in a transparent yet tractable way. The proposal provided in substantial
part as follows:
1) "We reiterate the crucial importance of creating a transparent, democratic, all-inclusive,
and consultative decision-making process in the WTO, as this is vital to enhancing the
credibility of the WTO and the multilateral trading system...
2) We reiterate the importance of taking decisions by consensus
3) We urge that the remainder of the preparatory process is transparent and inclusive,
through the adoption of procedural rules, that ensure
a) proposals are reflected adequately in draft texts that form the basis of negotiations
88 Chairman's Statement, Trade Negotiations Committee, October 3-4, 2002.
89 Ibid.
90"Tokyo Mini-Ministerial Fails to Deliver Results," Bridges Weekly, March 5, 2003.
91 Scott Miller, "Seeking to Simplify Negotiations, WTO Holds Smaller Meetings," Wall Street Journal, July
29, 2001.
92 Pascal Lamy, "Strip Poker at Cancun," Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2003.
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b) transparent and inclusive mechanisms and procedures must be established so that all
Members effectively participate in the drafting, revision, and adoption of draft
Ministerial texts
c) at the Ministerial Conference, a plenary should be established and should operate
through the Conference as the main decision-making body, to decide on items,
including: the agenda, the appointment of officials, the establishment of any working
groups or consultation groups, the Chairs of such groups, and the transparent and
inclusive procedures for drafting, revising, and adoption of Ministerial texts
d) any consultations should be open ended and inclusive and such meetings should be
announced and publicized in proper time
e) if small meetings or consultations on particular issues are considered useful, they
should be governed by proper rules, and reports on these meetings should be made to
the plenary for the information and decision by all Members
f) ministers are entitled to choose whichever officials to accompany them.... The
number should not be restricted, given that the Ministers may require expert advice
from various officials
g) there should be fair procedures especially in the final day and hours of the Ministerial
conference.... There should not be a last night or last day exclusive green room
meeting." 93
The September 2003 Cancun Ministerial marked the midpoint assessment for the Doha
negotiations. Concern over lack of progress spurred last-minute moves over the summer by
Europe to modify its agricultural policy and by the United States to facilitate the sale of essential
medicines to poor countries. General Council Chair Carlos Perez del Castillo distributed a draft
Ministerial Declaration to the heads of delegations on August 24, 2003, for consideration.94
Prepared on his own responsibility, but in close cooperation with the Director-General, the draft
declaration outlined decisions in the various areas under negotiation plus a framework for
modalities on agriculture and market access. Castillo noted that
93 Proposals for Improving the Decision-Making Process in the WTO Before and at the Fifth Ministerial
Conference, WTO Doc. WT/GC/5 10, August 14, 2003. Recall that "green room" meetings are small gatherings
of like-minded countries, named for a conference room down the hall from the WTO Director-General's office
in Geneva.
9 4 WTO Doc. WT/MN/Job 03, August 24, 2003.
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while the text had drawn much criticism, the criticism had been varied and focused on
different aspects of the text, and no one had outright rejected it. The fact that no one loved it,
but everyone could live with it, was a good sign rather than a bad sign.... He concluded that
discussions had come to an end in Geneva, and the large remaining divisions could only be
worked out at the political level by ministers.9 5
The ministers, however, were unable to achieve consensus on any agenda items in Cancun.
The factors blamed for the failure were many, including the scheduling of negotiations on the more
contentious Singapore issues (e.g., competition, investment, government procurement, and trade
facilitation) before agricultural subsidies, which was a topic of primary importance to developing
countries; tension between the United States and Europe; the decision-making process itself (i.e., the
consensus requirement, but limited participation in the green room); and the intransigence of the G-
20, a new coalition led by India, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa that said that "no deal was better
than a bad deal."9 6
The Director-General continues to meet with ministers in Geneva and the capitals to develop
a feasible negotiation package and recapture a sense of urgency. It is generally agreed that the talks
on agriculture are central to any progress. The G-20 group of developing countries and the Cairns
Group of agricultural exporters are working on a consolidated position for market access, having
already agreed to a common position on domestic subsidies and export support.9 7 The United States
and the European Union have indicated a willingness to drop the Singapore issues from single
undertaking of the Doha Round in order to facilitate progress; negotiations on these issues might be
pursued plurilaterally outside the round.98
A committee assembled by the WTO is reconsidering the consensus approach to decision-
making. Options being considered include narrowing the scope of topics within the WTO's purview,
95 Bridges Weekly 7, no. 29, August 28, 2003.
9 6 Elizabeth Becker, "Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade," New York Times, September 15,
2003.
97
"Mixed Signals for Doha Round," Bridges Weekly 8, no.4, April 2004, p. 1.
98 Ibid., p. 2; Robert Zoellick, letter to Ministers dated January 11,2004, reprinted in the Financial Times,
January 11, 2004.
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increasing Secretariat staff, improved organizational preparation and structure of ministerials, and
relaxing the single-undertaking requirement, thus allowing members not to sign new trade agreements
through an "opt-out clause." 9 9
Summary
The Doha pre-negotiation was significantly shaped by the Seattle experience-a sense that if the
WTO failed to build an agenda for negotiations, that it would cement its institutional irrelevance. The
United States' behavior was pivotal: if it didn't cooperate with Europe and consult with a broad range
of parties, then success would elude the WTO again. For their part, developing countries could either
resist and be marginalized, or engage and be counted. Several cross-coalitions formed on the issues.
The United States and developing countries lined up against Europe and Japan on agricultural
subsidies; Europe and developing countries challenged the United States on textiles; Japan and
developing countries countered the United States on antidumping; India, Brazil, and Africa demanded
that the United States compromise on intellectual property rights related to essential medicines; and,
as seen in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, developing countries demanded assistance with
implementing previously adopted commitments. The resulting Doha Development Agenda managed
to accommodate the requisite array of interests, but is proving to be difficult to negotiate.
Negotiators continue to struggle over process and participation. The Trade Negotiation
Committee was organized similarly to previous rounds and is governed by principles of single
undertaking, participation, transparency, special and differential treatment, development, and
environment. Nevertheless, the complexity of the issues and number of parties has overwhelmed the
ability of the formal process to manage it. Deadlines are missed and negotiators are unable to even
define the modalities for negotiating. A series of mini-ministerials sought to streamline negotiations,
but frustration over exclusive participation outweighed the value of an exchange that might sow the
99 Scott Miller, "After Cancun, WTO Panel Seeks an End to Gridlock," Wall Street Journal, September 29,
2003; "Lamy, Experts Take Serious Look at WTO Reform," Bridges Weekly 8, no. 4, February 4, 2004, p. 3.
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seeds of consensus. The demand for an inclusive, transparent, consultative process echoes. If
consensus is to be achieved on the Doha Development Round by 2005, the WTO may need to
consider reforming its procedural rules.
DISCUSSION
Policymaking disputes arise from countries' differing perceptions on what global trade issues are
sufficiently troublesome to require international collective action. Negotiating an agenda requires that
nearly 150 countries agree, by consensus, on a set of issues to be regulated, in order to better balance
the trading rights and obligations among countries, facilitate more predictable behavior, and produce
a more stable system. I have looked at policymaking disputes in the two phases of first-order dispute
resolution: (1) determining what problems need to be negotiated (pre-negotiation), and (2) negotiating
what rules will remedy those problems.
This discussion has three parts. The first is a synthesis of the pre-negotiation and negotiation
phases from the last four negotiating rounds. The second is a review of the hypotheses for first-order
policymaking disputes. And the third is a preliminary assessment of those patterns against the criteria
of a successful dispute resolution process.
Synthesis of the Four Negotiating Rounds
Pre-Negotiation Phase
We have considered participation, agenda formulation, and information to be the chief elements of
the pre-negotiation, or diagnosis, phase of policymaking.
Participation has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. On the quantitative side, all
member countries need an opportunity to voice their concerns in decision-making. When broad
participation is curtailed, whether for reasons of political expediency or logistical management, those
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excluded are likely to resent the process (for its perceived unfairness and lack of transparency) and
the outcome (for its failure to incorporate their interests).
On the qualitative front, there appear to be three prongs of leadership required for both the
pre-negotiation and negotiation phases: (1) the United States and Europe must agree to participate, (2)
a representative group of other trading nations must be identified and engaged, and (3) the Director-
General must act as a generally recognized leader. These are discussed below.
Major trading countries generally, and the United States and Europe in particular, are
necessary actors in any negotiating round. The threshold to launching a round is that both the United
States and the European Union be committed to the undertaking and coordinated in their efforts. In
each case described, both the United States and Europe led the pre-negotiation effort, often preceded
by an information-gathering and analysis period in cooperation with Japan and Canada. The lack of
success in Seattle was attributed to the lack of coordination between these two actors, as much as to
the gulf between developed and developing countries. In contrast, Doha's success in developing a
negotiating agenda reflected the U.S. and Europe working out their differences and also
accommodating a threshold of developing countries' concerns (as the name implies-the Doha
Development Agenda).
The second prong of leadership comprises more than 20 mid-size trading countries that are
representative of the remaining parties and whose participation shapes the balance of a feasible
agenda. These countries filled out the CGI 8 and Consultation Group in the Uruguay Round, and the
green room in Doha. But it is not only the number and kind of participation by mid-size countries, but
how those countries are selected, that is critical. The ad hoc selection of "friends of the chair" to
attend green room meetings has been perceived as biased and obscure, and so green room decisions
lack legitimacy in the eyes of many.
The third prong of leadership is the executive authority of the Secretariat, in the person of the
Director-General, to facilitate both the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases. Since its origin, the
GATT and WTO Directors-General-from Long to Wyndham-White to Dunkel to Supachai-have
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each informally mediated information and interests among the parties to facilitate eventual agreement.
The Director-General formally chairs the Trade Negotiation Conference, and his neutrality is
scrutinized. Some countries find the current Director-General less oriented to facilitating the
expression of both sides of debates than promoting the views of major powers. One observer writes:
"What we have then is a system of decision-making in the WTO in which formal democracy is
actively undermined by the processes in which the major powers, with the active participation of a
supposedly neutral secretariat, impose their will on the majority of the members." 10 0° °
Agenda formulation. The agenda represents agreement on what the parties identify as the
most critical, disputed issues that can be negotiated at a given time. Over the last 50 years, the
international trade agenda has expanded from tariff reduction (freer trade), to include nontariff
measures (measures affecting more fair trade) and institutional governance topics. The increase in
both topical complexity and numbers of parties has both substantive and procedural dimensions. The
dynamic has shifted from a bilateral one over tariff concessions granted between key exporter and
importer nations to include multilateral consideration of cross-cutting policies. Generally, the U.S.
and Europe push for setting policy on emerging issues, while developing countries seek an improved
ability to implement previously negotiated issues. A balanced and consensually supported agenda
requires a decision-making process that is both representative and informed. However, an overly
comprehensive agenda becomes unwieldy and impossible to manage. Few, if any, smaller countries
can master all of the issues up for consideration, much less appreciate the potential of those issues to
produce cross-cutting options once the perspective of nearly all the other countries is added to the
mix.
This tension is apparent in the trends we examined from the Kennedy Round to the Doha
Round. With the increasing diversity of WTO membership, and the increasing interdependency of the
'10 Chakravarthi Raghavan, "Member-Driven or Secretariat-Driven Process?" Third World Network, December
2001; see also Tetteh Hormeku, "Institutional Reform of the World Trade Organisation," Third World Network,
July 6, 2001.
116
__
commercial world, the more complex agendas reflected the need to include the interests of a wide
range of parties, but may also have made meaningful participation more illusory.
Information. While "resources" figure prominently in the negotiation phase, the information
component is particularly critical during pre-negotiation. Negotiators must be well-informed to be
able to identify, define, and understand the disputed topics to be negotiated. The principal sources of
information are each nation's domestic ministries, who are knowledgeable about what has the most
significant effect on the nation's trade, but may have limited resources to prepare the delegation. The
GATT/WTO Secretariat is an important source of information, but again, the demand for information
(especially during the pre-negotiation phase) may exceed the Secretariat's resources and authority. In
such cases, other organizations (governmental, nongovernmental, and private) make significant
contributions. The parties need a baseline understanding of identified problems in order to establish
priorities for negotiation, and the parties need to participate in the design of that information
gathering. The long lead time between proposing a new round and actually launching it is essential in
enabling that consensual base of information to be built. The seeming pre-negotiation impasses
reached before launching the Tokyo, Uruguay, and Doha rounds served, in retrospect, as necessary
periods of information absorption that enabled the subsequent negotiations to occur.
Questions persist about how to develop member countries' capacities to develop, analyze,
and share the information needed to participate effectively in the increasingly complex agenda-setting
and negotiation processes. Suggestions for managing the interdependence of information and agenda
formulation are included in Chapter 6.
Negotiation Phase
The negotiation, or resolution, phase of policymaking is an elaborate consensus-building process. The
key elements of consensus building are participation, resources, and process.
Participation. In a consensus-based organization, the need for an inclusive decision-making
process is apparent. Adequate participation is essential in both the pre-negotiation and negotiation
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phases, but it has a more formal character in the latter. In each case observed, a plenary trade
negotiation committee (TNC) that included all of the member countries was where decisions were
ultimately made. However, the plenary was too large a body to address more than organizational
issues, periodic stocktaking, and formal information exchange. Subsidiary to the TNC were two kinds
of working groups: (1) subcommittees or councils, with universal participation but a narrower
substantive scope, and (2) working groups with smaller numbers of people who were sufficiently
expert and representative to assess linkages and tradeoffs among the competing issues and texts. Both
kinds of groups are important for making progress in negotiations, but the composition of the latter
can be quite politically sensitive. The use of mini-ministerials in the Doha Round (and special
steering committees and green room meetings in previous rounds) triggered a frustrated response
from those not included. The more transparently selected and representative the group, the more
likely it can persuade the next strata of participants that any resulting proposed agreement merits
consideration.
Resources. Access to adequate resources is critical to negotiation. Member nations develop a
consensual information base in the pre-negotiation phase and then refine it in the negotiation phase.101°
Once a round formally begins, the Secretariat is authorized to develop the relevant background
research and policy papers for the respective negotiating committees. Input from outside experts
offers a significant supplement. The ideal is an institutional "capacity to collect, analyze, and
publicize critical information...neutrally acquired and channeled."' 0 2 The Secretariat commits
tremendous resources to gathering and disseminating information, building its members' capacity to
negotiate, and facilitating that process. At the national level, ministry officials need access to
information in order to gauge interests and priorities on the negotiated issues. The increasing
complexity of the issues themselves, and the number of issues to consider, make this a daunting task
o101 Consensual information base refers to a shared responsibility for the identification, collection, and analysis
of the information needed to address a particular issue.
102 David Malone, "If the U.N. Were Being Created Today.. .Intelligent Intelligence," New York Times, March
15, 2003.
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for all but the largest countries. One source estimates that the Doha negotiation workload for trade
missions and their Geneva-based negotiators will be at least 50 percent greater than for the Uruguay
Round. 103
Process. Along with procedures for representative participation, a key prescription in the
negotiation literature is the opportunity for all stakeholders to work together to develop a range of
options for achieving their respective interests, and then to freely debate the respective merits and
potential tradeoffs. Again, a smaller number of parties makes for more manageable negotiations, but
the credibility of any decision depends upon the participants' acknowledged expertise and the extent
of parties' perception that they are represented.
Critics have noted the importance of process not only in party selection but also in division of
labor and decision-making. For example, Winham noted during the Uruguay Round:
There is a well-established yet informal structure of senior steering committees that organize
and direct work, and ultimately make important decisions in the various key areas of the
negotiation. This structure is ephemeral, and likely would not be continued beyond the
Uruguay Round. However, the organizational experience is lasting and would likely be re-
created again in the event the GATT faced another series of important policy decisions. 0 4
Use of the GATT and WTO Directors-General to manage the resolution of negotiating rounds
demonstrates that the employment of a neutral is integral to process management in the resolution
phase. The GATT and WTO Directors-General are repeatedly relied upon, formally and informally,
to exhibit an array of skills commonly demonstrated by skilled neutrals. The Directors-General
engage the parties, create a vision of need (e.g., the "bicycle theory") and opportunity, establish a
work plan, and cajole participants to relinquish their positional bargaining and invest in a creative
problem-solving approach that will improve the institution and its members. The presiding chairs of
the plenaries, committees, and working groups serve as partners in this meta-dispute-management
endeavor.
103 Raghavan, "Member-Driven or Secretariat-Driven Process?"
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This overview of policymaking dispute resolution has highlighted factors that contribute to
the success of pre-negotiation and negotiation. As discussed previously, dispute resolution processes
can be characterized as to whether they emphasize parties' power, interests, or rights. The WTO's
policymaking process, like most such processes, appears to be a hybrid. Given the "one country-one
vote" system, each member country has the opportunity to grant or withhold its support for consensus
on a negotiating agenda, and then on an agreement to regulate its international trading rights. In
making these decisions, each country weighs the extent to which its national interests can be
synchronized with global interests in an equitable, efficient, and mutually acceptable manner. Power,
however, appears to skew both rights and interests in the agenda-setting process. Those countries with
greater trading power also tend to be those with greater access to resources, information, and ability
to participate, and they use that leverage to achieve policies that advantage their interests. Lesser
trading powers, when organized into substantial coalitions, can effectively counter the pressure, but
they are typically cautious about risking offense to significant trading partners and sources of
economic aid. The WTO was established as a rule-based institution in part as an effort to reduce the
potential power dominance of some members and decrease the overall inequality of members.
First-Order Dispute Resolution Hypotheses
In this section, the factors highlighted in the four negotiating rounds are discussed in terms of the
research hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter. For each hypothesis, there is a summary from the
four negotiating rounds followed by a preliminary assessment of whether the hypothesis is confirmed.
Since the first-order, second-order, and third-order dispute resolution processes are conceived as a
whole system, a more comprehensive assessment is considered in Chapter 6.
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104 Gilbert Winham, The Evolution ofInternational Trade Agreements (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1992) p. 67.
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Test Hypothesis 1: More representative participation (i.e., more in number and kind ofparticipants)
contributes to an agenda of interests that will engage short-term and long-term support of an
agreement.
Kennedy: Between 43 and 74 countries participated in the Kennedy Round. Most negotiators
were veterans of trade negotiations who knew their own and their counterparts' interests. For them,
the short-term goal of tariff reduction was consistent with the common interest among old and new
member countries of reaching an agreement that symbolized progress on trade liberalization. The
newly admitted developing countries were more marginally involved; in deference to their developing
status, they were granted liberalization benefits without an obligation to fully reciprocate, but this
early concession served to diminish their power at the bargaining table because they had no additional
concessions to offer. While the number of participants may have been adequate, the kind was not
sufficiently balanced among developed and developing countries, long-term and newer members, and
larger and smaller economies, to support long-term implementation of the agreement. The
consequence was a short-term agreement on tariff reduction, but long-term resentment among those
newer members who were not included.
Tokyo: More than 80 contracting parties were involved in the Tokyo Round. The newer
members did not share the older members' 20 years of experience in establishing the values and
structure of the GATT trading system. By virtue of their numbers, the newcomers could overcome
any two-thirds requirement for agreement amendments. 10 5 The top-down approach to negotiations
caused considerable resentment among the parties. Negotiations were initiated by the major trading
nations and flowed downward to include others once the important decisions (and compromises) were
made. The consequence of this approach was that only two agreements were agreed upon by all
members; the other nine agreements were plurilateral (i.e., signed voluntarily by some of the member
countries).
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Uruguay: The Uruguay Round involved 91 to 128 countries over an eight-year period. The
United States pushed hard for the inclusion of new issues (services and intellectual property) for
nearly six years before the round was launched. Developing countries expressed concern that an
emphasis on new rights for developed countries would come at their expense. An agenda was finally
accepted under exhortation by the Director-General that failure to initiate negotiations would
endanger the international trading system. Strong leadership by the United States and the European
Community represented a double-edged sword. Without their commitment, no progress would be
made. But the top-down approach during pre-negotiation, building from the Quad down to the smaller
countries, provoked resentment. During the negotiation itself, a bridging coalition of 40 developed
and developing countries (the de la Paix group) continued to promote agreement through leadership
and mediation. The increasing "democratization" of the GATT talks-in other words, the
participation of increasing numbers of countries in the informal negotiating groups-tended to make
decision-making unmanageable, but in the end "ensured that this round would be more multilateral,
and thus potentially more broadly supported, than any previous GATT negotiation."10 6 Furthermore,
the cross-membership coalitions based on national interests rather than North-South ideologies helped
move the negotiations forward productively once they got started.
Doha: The Doha Round negotiators have numbered more than 140 nations since the round's
launch in 2001. Spurred on by the disappointment in Seattle, the United States engaged in extensive
consultations with trade officials around the world in order to build a mandate for the agenda. Since
2001, however, negotiations on the complex agenda, under a tight timetable, have foundered in
gridlock. A series of mini-ministerials, attended by a mix of 20 to 30 developed and developing
countries, have sought to use a streamlined group of "movers and shakers" to form the seed of
consensus for the full negotiating group. However, the lack of transparency in the selection of
105 Article X of the WTO Agreement provides that an amendment of a covered multilateral trade agreement be
approved by consensus of the Ministerial Conference, or, if consensus is not reached, by a two-thirds majority
vote.
106 Hampson, Multilateral Negotiations, p. 247.
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members to participate is proving troublesome: A group of 22 countries was able to block agreement
at the Cancun Ministerial in September 2003, saying that no agreement was better than a bad
agreement.
The Kennedy and Tokyo rounds depended upon the top-down approach to negotiation, with
the United States-Europe axis driving the agreement, and others engaged subsequently with limited
leverage to pursue their interests. The Uruguay and Doha negotiation agendas reflect an increasingly
diverse membership, but the complexity of issues and parties challenges the formal processes. Despite
the fact that "participation" and "transparency" are two of the stated organizing principles for the
Doha Round, attempts to utilize smaller working groups are met with suspicion for failure to select a
balanced mix of participants in a transparent manner. A greater number and kind of participants does
contribute to a more balanced agenda and potential agreement, but the process of participant selection
appears to be the more determinative limitation on the effectiveness of wider participation.
Test Hypothesis 2: Broader participation in information exchange (including collection, analysis, and
dissemination) contributes to sustainable commitments.
Kennedy: The chief issue regarding negotiation and agreement in the Kennedy Round was
tariff reduction, for which information was generated by the Secretariat and the respective capitals.
Participants in the within-sector negotiations were able to gain detailed understandings of those
industries, which contributed to a willingness to support the concession packages promoted by the
larger traders. Preliminary information was generated on the new issue of nontariff measures, but
absent U.S. authority and a full understanding of the issue by the negotiators, this information played
only a minor part in the final agreement.
Tokyo: The NTM inventory was a comprehensive, two-year effort to gather information from
all member countries in order to define and assess the role of nontariff measures. That consensual
learning process marked a real institutional step toward the substantive success of the Tokyo Round
agreements. Unfortunately, the level of participation in the negotiation was not the same as in the
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information exchange, which ultimately curtailed the number of countries who adopted the NTM
agreements.
Uruguay: A wealth of information was developed inside and outside of governments on the
issues covered by the Uruguay Round during the three-year pre-negotiation period and the five years
of negotiations. Fen Osler Hampson remarked on the "large and committed epistemic community of
trade experts...to ensure a professionally committed and competent negotiating process."10 7 Even
with that, however, a number of developing countries lacked sufficient understanding of the
implications of certain agreements, such as TRIPs. The consequence of so many countries feeling
unduly pressured to sign the Uruguay single undertaking was that the subsequent pre-negotiation for
the Doha Round was dominated by developing countries demanding that the core of the agenda be a
discussion of the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments.
Doha: With so many countries and so many issues on the agenda, information exchange has
moved slowly in the Doha negotiation. Negotiations on the Singapore issues have faltered, with
insufficient time to build a broadly participatory database on the complex issues of investments,
competition, and market access. Negotiations on agriculture have made some progress in the Cairns
Group (the group of agricultural exporters, including developed and developing countries). The
negotiators have been unable to agree on how to structure the information base and approach the
agenda issues.
The importance of broadly participatory information exchange appears confirmed. In the
Kennedy Round, there was insufficient information to adopt any NTM provisions, despite U.S.
pressure; in the Tokyo Round, the two-year NTM inventory involved notifications from all members,
and the resulting consensual information base built both joint understanding of the issue and the basis
on which negotiators could assess priorities and tradeoffs. The Uruguay Round involved an
extraordinary number of new and complex issues. After three years of pre-negotiation and five years
of negotiation, under increasing time pressure, countries adopted the single undertaking. Yet a
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significant number of countries regretted their lack of understanding on the meaning of their
commitments. This has jeopardized countries' ability and willingness to comply with those
commitments. In the Doha Round, the Singapore issues are of greatest importance to the developed
countries, so much of the information collection and analysis is done by the U.S., the European
Union, and the OECD. This is helpful at a preliminary stage, but other countries still need to be
involved at some point if they are to be sufficiently informed to evaluate and negotiate tradeoffs
between those issues and others of more significance to their own countries.
Test Hypothesis 3: A negotiation process that includes a skilled neutral and procedural rules to
ensure balanced participation, information exchange, and option generation will increase the
likelihood of agreement.
Kennedy: The GATT Director-General, Sir Wyndham-White, was credited with actively
engaging the key parties, disseminating relevant information, and facilitating the terms of agreement.
The number of member countries was relatively low. The issue (tariff reduction) was a fairly
straightforward issue on which most countries were well-informed. And the process of initiating
negotiations as bilateral deals between primary suppliers and importers was accepted practice.
Tokyo: The full plenary Trade Negotiation Committee, chaired by Director-General Oliver
Long, served to structure the formal negotiations, but it was merely a forum to collect subcommittee
reports and information. Six specialized subcommittees conducted the negotiations under specific
deadlines, but after four years had only managed to draft working texts. The shift from negotiating
over numbers (tariff levels) to words was difficult and required a higher degree of understanding.
Many developing countries were excluded from the process, and they responded by opposing the
substance of the agreements. As a consequence, most of the Tokyo Round agreements were not
included in the single undertaking, but were instead plurilateral.
107 Ibid., p. 246.
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Uruguay: In the Uruguay Round, the complex agenda was broken down into 15 separate,
formally mandated working groups. The informal work of various coalitions (the Cairns Group, the
Rio Group, the de la Paix Group) served to move the negotiations forward. Director-General Dunkel
succeeded in preparing a draft that served as the intellectual framework for ultimate agreement,
though he was unable to build political support for it. His successor, Peter Sutherland, and a new U.S.
President were able to build momentum and eventual agreement.
Doha: WTO Director-Generals Moore and Supachai have both played key roles in guiding
pre-negotiation and negotiation. Supachai serves as chair of the Trade Negotiation Committee,
remonstrating when countries lag and cheering their progress. However, some countries have
expressed concern that the he is biased toward the major developed countries. More than 80 percent
of the Secretariat staff, which services the members with background papers and issue syntheses, are
from developed countries, which contributes to the perception of bias.
The importance of process to a sustainable agreement has only increased over the period
studied. As the number of parties and issues has increased the complexity of the negotiation task,
there has been a corresponding increase in the demand for a more transparent process. The Directors-
General and presiding committee chairs have attempted to manage negotiations in multiple venues,
including the formally structured, fully participatory Trade Negotiation Committee and the more
exclusive green room meetings. Deal-making is clearly done in the more informal sessions among
key players. While most parties agree that smaller working groups are necessary, the means of
selecting attendees is too obscure to be credible. The African proposal (described previously)
highlights the importance of "creating a transparent, democratic, all-inclusive and consultative
decision-making process...through the adoption of procedural rules" for operation of the plenary and
smaller meetings.108 The use of professional neutrals in the working groups, possibly in partnership
with presiding chairs, in order to develop and carry out a protocol on the selection of representative
108 Proposals for Improving the Decision-Making Process in the WTO, WTO Doc. WT/GC/5 10, August 14,
2003.
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participants in the smaller meetings and to make explicit the procedures for those meetings would go
a long way toward diminishing suspicion about the process. It would also allow greater focus on the
substantive aspect of negotiations.
A preliminary overview of these results is provided below.
Table 3.1: First-Order Dispute Resolution Hypotheses
H1: Increased number H2: Broader H3: Skilled neutral and
and kind of participation in procedural rules 
participation agenda information exchange agreement
of interests - sustainable
increased agreement commitments
support
Kennedy Round + + +
Tokyo Round + + +
Uruguay Round +, but with limits. + +
Good process may
substitute.
Doha Round +, but with limits. + +
Good process may
substitute.
A plus sign (+) denotes that a positive correlation in the hypothesis is confirmed
Assessment of the WTO's First-Order Dispute Resolution against Dispute Resolution Criteria
Through a more practical lens, how does the WTO's resolution of policymaking disputes fare if we
weigh the various costs and benefits of increased participation and improved process facilitation? The
costs include time, financial and human resources expended, opportunity costs, and stress on
relationships. The benefits all tend to correlate positively and cover countries' satisfaction with the
negotiation process and outcome, the maintenance of good working relationships among trading
partners, and decreased recurrence of the same problem issues. While this research lacks absolute
quantitative measures on these criteria, relative assessments are possible.
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Transaction Costs
The costs of multilateral negotiations over several years amount to a significant total in every measure
(e.g., time and financial and human resources) to every party. The test of effectiveness, however, is
less about the cost-benefit analysis of more participation in these negotiations, and more about
whether it is more or less costly to pursue an alternative resolution process at a different stage of the
dispute. If a country does not have a voice in the multilateral negotiation, its alternatives are several.
It can withhold support (for an agenda or an agreement) unless and until it is coerced to do so by
larger players. Even if it does ultimately support the adoption of an international rule, it can defer
national implementation and compliance until a trading partner complains. 10 9 A country may also
decide to pursue bilateral or regional negotiations instead of multilateral negotiations. Each of these
alternative strategies carries a different cost in terms of time, economics, human resources,
constituent relationships, and diplomacy.
The most compelling cost of deficient participation is the consequent failure of
implementation. Because smaller and developing countries were excluded from principal decision-
making in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, these countries were unprepared to implement the
obligations they had assumed. The result was a demand that the same issues be re-negotiated in the
subsequent rounds. 0 It may be that iterated negotiations are desirable or even necessary, especially
when there is insufficient information or experience to support full resolution in early stages.
However, the political and economic complications of noncompliance, the ill will of excluded
participants, and the frustration of establishing renegotiation as accepted precedent should also be
taken into consideration when comparing the transaction costs of top-down versus managed
participation.
109 Examples of this approach include Argentina's protection of its leather and footwear industry and
Indonesia's protection of automobile manufacturers. In both cases, the issue was raised during the Uruguay
Round negotiations, during subsequent trade policy reviews, and finally became the basis for a complaint before
the Dispute Settlement Board.
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Satisfaction with Outcome and Process
Parties' satisfaction with the agreed-upon outcome is a function of whether their (dynamic) interests
have been met (or at least, not significantly compromised)-including both the global interest in a
stable, predictable, trading system and each country's national political and economic interests. Part
of that satisfaction derives from whether the outcome was negotiated through a fair process. We know
that parties' perceptions of a fair process are highly influenced by the extent to which each country is
allowed a voice in deciding upon an agreement's provisions. One researcher found that, in evaluating
dispute outcomes, process was twice as important as substance in terms of satisfaction with the
outcome. ' The critical elements of fair process are not consensus, but rather engagement on the
merits, explanation of how decisions are made, and clarity on what is expected under the agreement.
If process management and participation are so critical, what steps can the WTO take to address the
intense criticism of its consensus-building processes? The African proposal is consistent with the
literature in answering this question.
Relationships
Relationships among trading nations form the foundation of diplomacy. Having an opportunity to
learn about each other's perspectives, exchange ideas, and explore options is fundamental to building
long-term working relationships. Power- or rights-focused resolution processes are more likely to risk
harming relationships, perhaps unnecessarily. In contrast, an interest-based resolution process is
consistent with the WTO's consensus-building framework, and with preserving relationships. For
110 For example, antidumping and government procurement were negotiated in the Tokyo Round, then again in
the Uruguay Round; services and intellectual property were negotiated in the Uruguay Round, but
implementation is part of the Doha negotiations.
1 1 See, for example, Thibaut and Walker, Procedural Justice; Tyler and Lind, The Social Psychology of
Procedural Justice; and W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, "Fair Process: Managing in the Knowledge
Economy," Harvard Business Review, July-August 1997, p. 65.
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example, substantive working groups, where country representatives get to know each other across
interest groups, would serve the function of both relationship-building and information-building.
Recurrence
Recurrence (or lack thereof) of the same problem issues is partially a test of a durable resolution.
Issues that recur from round to round, like government procurement and intellectual property, may
reflect a failure to adequately engage all of the essential parties in decision-making. Not only do
excluded parties resent being left out of negotiations, they lack the access to information and
deliberations that would have built their capacity to implement the policies. Other disputes may recur
with different countries, who have increasing obligations as their level of development progresses.
Other issues recur because they are ongoing, and in many (if not most) cases the agreements will need
modification in light of later events. So, the test may be less whether the issue recurs, than if former
signatories are more able to wrestle with it intelligently in subsequent cases-in other words, to agree
upon adequate and fair representatives, identify and share the most important information, and
identify appropriate ground rules and/or effective third parties to help.
Pursuing the theory that an interest-based resolution process is more effective, what might the
WTO do to improve its approach to policymaking? How might the WTO foster a transparent,
consultative, consensus-building process in which all views are considered? The concerns expressed
by the African missions in their WTO reform proposal revolve around procedural rules on the
preparation of draft negotiating texts and participation in the drafting and decision-making process. In
that proposal, smaller working groups are recognized as an important tool for reaching consensus.
Establishing rules for the selection of participants and the operation of those smaller groups would
alleviate suspicion and contribute to the groups' credibility as representative deliberations. Utilizing
neutrals (internal and external) who are impartial, expert, and fairly selected would contribute to the
130

effectiveness and legitimacy of the process.l 12 In short, increased levels of participation in a more
transparent, consultative process would enable more interests to be met. The costs of fostering a
highly participatory multilateral process may be high in terms of time and resources, but those costs
may be outweighed by the benefits of satisfaction with the outcome and subsequent implementation
and compliance.
The relative benefits of resolving disputes at the policymaking, policy implementation, and
policy enforcement stages will be revisited in Chapter 6.
112 The WTO Director-General has floated the idea of appointing facilitators who could travel and consult as a
way of improving the management of the WTO and its decision-making processes at ministerial conferences.
Raghavan, "Member-Driven or Secretariat-Driven Process?"
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CHAPTER 4: SECOND-ORDER DISPUTES: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The previous chapter described how the WTO identifies and resolves what I have termed first-order
disputes-those that arise in setting international trade policy. Once policies are adopted by the WTO,
it is incumbent upon member states to translate those international rules into national legislation and
regulations-in other words, to operationalize the WTO rules into domestic policy. This chapter will
look at how the WTO and its member states monitor that translation. I first consider a theoretical
structure for diagnosing and resolving these second-order, or policy implementation, disputes, and set
forth two hypotheses. I then describe two mechanisms for assessing countries' implementation of
WTO policy: operating committees and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Next, several
evaluations of the TPRM are discussed in some detail. The chapter closes with an assessment of the
WTO's experience relative to the hypotheses.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
As discussed in Chapter 2, the WTO's primary purposes are to ensure the reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade and to eliminate discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. To
achieve these aims, the WTO has a substantive code of conduct and an institutional framework for the
administration and implementation of that code. Article XVI(4) of the WTO Agreement provides that
"Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements."
At the simplest level, policy implementation is what a nation does to make its national
regulation of domestic industries align with its international commitments. As described in the
implementation vignette in Chapter 1, for example, all WTO members agreed in Article 111 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 that they would not apply internal taxes to imported
products so as to afford protection to domestic products. In 1995, Uruguay adopted a decree that
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placed differential taxes on domestic and imported alcoholic beverages. In 1998, during a review of
Uruguay's various trade policies that was open to all WTO members, Uruguay's trading partners
expressed concern that this tax was not consistent with WTO requirements. The existence of
Uruguay's differential tax represented a second-order policy implementation dispute-the question
was, had Uruguay failed to incorporate international nondiscrimination standards into its domestic
trade policy on alcoholic beverages? In contrast, a first-order policymaking dispute (the subject of
Chapter 3) arose at an earlier time: should WTO members be able to favor domestic protection
against imports? Article III says no, in principle. A third-order policy enforcement dispute (the
subject of Chapter 5) arose later and involved a complaint by a particular trading partner-Chile, in
this case-(as compared with a complaint by a collective body or the Secretariat of the WTO), over
the harm its alcoholic beverage industry suffered from Uruguay's disparate treatment of Uruguayan
and Chilean beverage products.
A nation's policy implementation, then, can be defined as compliance with its negotiated
obligations. Most fundamental may be the legal infrastructure to make international law also the law
of the nation through legislative, executive, and judicial means. Professor Harold Koh, Dean of Yale
Law School, has noted that, "It is through this repeated process of interaction and internalization that
international law acquires its 'stickiness,' that nation-states acquire their identity and that nations
define promoting the rule of international law as part of their national self-interest."I The likelihood
of compliance is increased by the law's perceived legitimacy, which Thomas Franck describes as "a
property of a rule.. .which itself exerts a pull toward compliance...because those addressed believe
that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process."2 In order to achieve compliance, two additional factors matter: the
political context in which governmental leaders manage the interests of domestic producers,
1 Harold Koh, "Transnational Legal Process," Nebraska Law Review 75 (1996): 181, 204.
2 Thomas Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System," American Journal of International Law 82 (1988):
705, 706.
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importers, exporters, and consumers, and a nation's administrative capacity, which includes human,
technical, and financial resources.
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes took up the question of compliance with
international regulatory agreements in The New Sovereignty. Their study of compliance with security,
economic, and environmental treaties concluded that acts that appear to be "noncompliance" really
encompass more than incidents of willful disobedience. A party in noncompliance may in fact be
experiencing one or more of four circumstances: (1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language,
(2) limitations on the capacity of the party to carry out its undertakings, (3) a need for more time to
implement the social and economic changes contemplated by the treaty, and (4) a decision to address
more pressing national priorities first. All of these may be better addressed through regime
management than enforcement sanctions. By more finely distinguishing among the various kinds of
defecting behaviors, one might assemble an array of "managerial" strategies, including reporting,
monitoring, capacity building, and institutional development.3 Chayes and Chayes focused especially
on "transparency" of countries' activities-a term interpreted broadly to include the availability of
and access to information about the meaning of the norms, policies, and activities of parties that are
relevant to treaty compliance. The interacting processes of justification, discourse, and persuasion
engender transparency, which in turn serves to reassure others of the intent to comply and deters those
considering noncompliance. The study describes the various incentives used by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Organization of
3 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). A counter view considers the quality of the
underlying treaty the primary function, and thus finds that weightier enforcement action is necessary as a tool to
both generate and enforce a deeper and more meaningful agreement. George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter
Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" International Organization
50 (Summer 1996): 379-406.
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to couple positive and negative incentives with
dialogue and accountability. 4
A leading scholar of economic law, Asif Qureshi, has written extensively about the
implementation of international economic rules generally and those of the GATT/WTO in particular.5
Qureshi believes that implementation depends on political consciousness that is grounded in technical
expertise, and he discusses three principal methods for assessing implementation: surveillance,
supervision, and dispute settlement.6 Surveillance involves collecting information and assessing
behavior in accordance with a particular standard. The assessment of behavior can be either legal in
nature, following a teleological approach, or economic, based on empirical observations of the
target's activities. The WTO lacks explicit surveillance powers, but derives implicit ones from Article
III: "to facilitate implementation of the WTO code."
Supervision as an implementation method poses problems at the WTO, as it suggests the
oversight of one party over another and would require a state to accede its sovereignty. States have
not granted such authority to the WTO Secretariat nor to fellow members.
Dispute settlement, as a third method of implementation, may involve disputes between an
organization and its members, or between members. In the WTO, enforcement is not initiated by the
institution against its members, but by one member against another. Such enforcement actions, or
third-order disputes, are the subject of Chapter 5. Of the three potential methods of implementation,
only surveillance is initiated by the WTO.
Qureshi goes on to categorize implementation in terms of achieving compliance with the
WTO code in time phases: to preempt noncompliance, to ensure compliance, and to correct
4 For example, the IMF has long used surveillance and monitoring as part of its conditionality of funding
applicant countries. The ILO has a progressive review process to assess member countries' compliance with
treaty obligations; noncompliance can lead to shaming through a form of "blacklisting."
5 AsifH. Qureshi, "The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in Transparency or
Enforcement?" Journal of World Trade (June 1990): 147-160; AsifQureshi, "Some Lessons from 'Developing'
Countries' Trade Policy Reviews in the GATT Framework: An Enforcement Perspective," The World Economy
18, no. 3, (1995): 489-503; and Asif H. Qureshi, The World Trade Organization: Implementing International
Trade Norms (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1995).
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noncompliance. To preempt noncompliance, he highlights: (1) involving a broad range of
stakeholders in trade policy formulation, including national legislators, diverse ministries,
nongovernmental organizations and interest groups (industry, unions, consumers), WTO
representatives, and trading partners; (2) harmonizing national trade policy with the WTO, with
possible prior approval; and (3) transparency in trade policy development. He notes the overall
importance of establishing
conditions that create a disposition to conform from within. Such conditions comprise, for
example, the construction of domestic systems that operate at the level of national policy
formulation to effect the desired policy; the engendering of the psychologically most
responsive posture in targeted officials of member states, for example, Ministers, delegates;
the creation of a conducive environment for parties predisposed to the objectives of the
[WTO] organization. 7
Efforts to preempt noncompliance thus take place in the pre-negotiation phase: involvement
of a broad range of stakeholders and transparency in trade policy development. This would suggest
that within a system as contemplated by this study, the more preemptive effort is invested during the
policymaking phase, the less burden is placed on the policy implementation phase. This relationship
will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Finally, Qureshi notes that, to ensure compliance, a number of specific information-sharing
techniques are needed, including notification, exchange of information among international economic
organizations, collection of information by the WTO, national information, and enquiry points.
Techniques to correct noncompliance-many of which are addressed in Chapter 5-include a variety
of third-party consultation, administrative review, and enforcement processes through the WTO and
national courts.
In this chapter I consider the conditioning and corrective aspects of the surveillance processes
that address second-order disputes. Disputes in this arena may arise when a member has not
6 Qureshi, The World Trade Organization, pp. 49-61.
7 bid., p.63.
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conformed its national trade policy with that of the agreed-upon WTO rules. The array of techniques
Qureshi prescribes as "conditioning compliance" are found primarily in two domains: the WTO
operating committees and councils, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
In terms of our overarching framework, second-order disputes emanate from the confluence
of power, rights, and interest pressures. The rights are embodied in the policies established by the
WTO agreements. Power is exerted by trading partners in establishing those rules, and then by the
dominant players on the domestic scene and their representatives-industry, importers, exporters,
consumers-to temper those rule constraints. Interests flow at two levels-international and
domestic. A ruling government seeks to remain in power domestically and enhance its standing
internationally by satisfying the interests of its key constituencies, consistent with its political
principles.
HYPOTHESES
Second-order, or policy implementation disputes, concern whether a country has incorporated its
WTO-negotiated obligations into domestic policy. The more transparent a country's policymaking
process, the more likely the WTO and trading partners are to be able to assess whether the country
has in fact complied with its obligations. Indeed, a target country may prefer to avoid such an
assessment of its compliance status, unless it receives compensating benefits in the process. For
example, if a country cannot implement certain policies due to a lack of legal, economic,
administrative, or political capacity, the WTO may be able to offer assistance to ease the transition.
This would meet the target country's interest in remaining in good standing and the trading partners'
expectations of compliance, in addition to upholding the institution's integrity.
The evaluation of a policy implementation process might usefully focus on two aspects. First,
is there a diagnostic process to determine whether a country is implementing its international
obligations? Second, if the country has not implemented its obligations, is there a process to diagnose
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the barriers to doing so, and resolve how those barriers might be overcome? The following two
hypotheses relate to these two aspects.
Test Hypothesis 1: Transparent Surveillance
A country is more likely to be transparent about its national policymaking if all fellow members are
subject to the same process and there is a reciprocal obligation and benefit to the collective
information exchange. Surveillance involves the collection of information from countries and an
assessment of their behavior in accordance with a particular standard or rule. The most productive
surveillance process would require all nations to notify the institution periodically of their domestic
trade policies and provide an opportunity to explain their particular circumstances. Test Hypothesis 1:
A rights-oriented surveillance process is likely to be more successful if universal, periodic, discursive,
and transparent.
Test Hypothesis 2: Overcoming Barriers
If implementation issues are identified-e.g., incidents of apparent noncompliance-theory suggests
that they result from a lack of understanding or capacity. For the target country, the perceived
consequences of noncompliance may be less onerous than the domestic political or economic costs of
compliance. In the interest of stabilizing trade among the collective membership and upholding the
legitimacy of the institution's rules, identified implementation disputes are more likely to be resolved
within a flexible, problem-solving process that addresses not only international legal obligations, but
also domestic economic and political interests. Test Hypothesis 2: The resolution of implementation
problems will be enhanced by a process that allows for the exploration of a range of transitional
options to bring the party into compliance.
In the next two sections, I consider two implementation processes at the WTO. In the first,
operating committees, membership is universal (i.e., committees are open to all WTO member
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countries) and the scope of review is specific to the covered agreement that forms the mandate of the
committee's work. In the second, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, participation is also universal,
but the scope of review is much broader and includes any issue covered by the WTO Agreement.
WTO IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE: OPERATING COMMITTEES
In the first decade of the GATT, decision-making authority was vested directly in the 20 to 30
contracting parties, who managed all necessary business. In 1960, a General Council, composed of
the contracting parties, was authorized to meet monthly. In 1979, the Tokyo Round introduced a new
innovation: standing committees of signatories, who were charged with monitoring the
implementation of each of the separate nontariff barrier codes (i.e., on customs valuation, import
licensing, antidumping, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, and subsidies).
These committees were comprised of representatives of the member states and staffed by the
Secretariat. They met several times each year to allow members the opportunity to consult on any
issues relevant to the committees' topical mandate. Committees considered changes in legislation,
notifications8 of national regulatory measures, trading partner practices and policies, and
interpretations of any operating issues relative to the respective agreement, with support by the
Secretariat. This committee practice was confirmed under the 1994 WTO Agreement and continues
today.
The committee structure was illustrated in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. Three councils report to
the General Council, one for each broad area of trade: Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in
Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Subsidiary to these councils are a
number of committees, each of which consists of all WTO members and is responsible for consulting
on any matter relating to the operation of its mandate. These committees and councils serve as the
8 The term notification refers to a country's act of advising the WTO of a domestic trade measure it has
enacted.
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principal norm-setting bodies for WTO policies in the implementation phase. Table 4.1 summarizes
the mandate and operations of the councils and committees.
Table 4.1: Summary of Operating Committee/Council Mandates and Annual Report
9
2003 Report of the Council for Trade in Goods, WTO Doc. G/L/665, December 4, 2003.
10
Committee on Agriculture, General Council Overview of WTO Activities 2003, WTO Doc. G/L/662,
November 21, 2003.
11 2003 Report on the Activities of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO Doc.
G/L/661, November 18, 2003.
12 The TMB is different than the other operating committees, both in composition and function. Its operation is
discussed further below.
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Council or WTO Council/Committee Meetings Highlights from 2003 Annual
Committee Agreement Mandate in 2003 Report
Council for Agreement on WTO Agreement, Art. 5 (Review of annual reports of
Trade in Trade in Goods IV.5: Authorizes a subsidiary committees) 9
Goods council to oversee
functioning of
Multilateral Trade
Agreements
Committee on Agreement on Art. 17: Authorizes a 4 * 171 notifications in four
Agriculture Agriculture committee areas: market access,
Art. 18: Calls for domestic support, export
committee to review subsidies, and export
implementation of restrictions 10
commitments, including
notifications
Committee on Agreement on Art. 12: Authorizes a 3 * Discussions regarding
Sanitary and Application of committee implementation
Phytosanitary Sanitary and Art. 17: Calls for * 650 notifications submitted
Measures Phytosanitary transparency * Problems with enquiry points
Measures Art. 13: Authorizes * 32 countries submitted
implementation request for technical
Annex B: Calls for assistance'
transparency, enquiry
points, notification
Textiles Agreement on Art. 8: Authorizes a
Monitoring Textiles and Textiles Monitoring
Body (TMB) Clothing Body 12
Committee on Agreement on Art. 13: Authorizes a 3 * Each member to notify on
Technical Technical Barriers committee to consult on implementation and national
Barriers to to Trade matters relating to enquiry point; 92 submitted
Trade operation of agreement, statement of implementation
including preparation, and 121 submitted
adoption, and information on enquiry points
application of technical * Improved notification
regulations addressed in triennial
review 1 3
Committee on Agreement on Art. 7: Authorizes a 3 Members obligated to notify
Trade-Related Trade-Related committee to consult on if TRIMs inconsistent with
Investment Investment matters relating to agreement; 26 members
Measures Measures operation and notified on 37 measures in
(TRIMs) implementation of 1995-97
agreement * 22 countries notified that no
TRIMs were inconsistent
with agreement 4
Committee on Agreement on Art. 16: Authorizes a 3 * Semiannual reports required
Anti-Dumping Implementation of committee to consult on of members, but only 27
Practices Article VI of the matters relating to reported 414 provisional and
GATT 1994 operation of the final measures
(Antidumping) agreement * Concern regarding low level
of reporting and
notification 15
Committee on Agreement on Annex II: Authorizes 3 * 74 members have notified of
Customs Implementation of Technical Committee national legislation; 57
Valuation Article VII of the on Customs Valuation members not yet made any
GATT 1994 to ensure uniformity in notification
(Customs interpretation and * Meetings spent reviewing
Valuation) application of notifications and extension
agreement, including requests 16
technical problems and
advisory opinions
Agreement on Pre- No committee.
Shipment Ministerial Conference
Inspection to review
implementation
Committee on Agreement on Art. 4 and Annex I: 1 * Fewer than 90 members have
Rules of Rules of Origin Authorizes a committee notified regarding rules of
Origin to consult on matters origin
relating to agreement * Concern about low level of
and review compliance with notification
implementation requirements 17
Committee on Agreement on Art. 4: Authorizes a 2 * Members required to notify
Import Import Licensing committee to consult on regarding legislation, but
Licensing Procedures any matters relating to only 94 have done so to date
Procedures operation of agreement * Low level of compliance
and to review with mandatory
notifications and notifications-main topic of
implementation committee 1 8
13 2003 Report of the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO Doc. G/L/657, November 11, 2003.
14 2003 Report of the Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures, WTO Doc. G/L/649, October 22,
2003.
15 2003 Report of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, WTO Doc. G/L/653, October 28, 2003.
16 2003 Report of the Committee on Customs Valuation to the Council for Trade in Goods, WTO Doc.
G/L/654, October 31,2003.
17 2003 Report of the Committee on Rules of Origin to the Council for Trade in Goods, WTO Doc. G/L/656,
November 4, 2003.
18 2003 Report of the Committee on Import Licensing Procedures to the Council for Trade in Goods, WTO
Doc. G/L/652, October 28, 2003.
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Committee on
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures
Committee on
Safeguards
Council for
Trade in
Services
Council for
Trade-Related
Aspects of
Intellectual
Property Rights
(TRIPs)
Agreement on
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures
Agreement on
Safeguards
Council on GATS
Council on TRIPs
Art. 24: Authorizes a
committee to consult
on any matters relating
to operation of the
agreement; review
notifications; and
conduct surveillance.
Authorizes Permanent
Group of Experts to
assist panels and
provide advisory
opinions to members
and committee
Art. 13: Authorizes a
committee to monitor
implementation of
agreement, recommend
improvements, and
review notifications
WTO Agreement Art.
IV.5: Authorizes a
council to oversee the
functioning of the
GATS
WTO Agreement Art
IV.5: Authorizes a
council to oversee the
functioning of the
TRIPs agreement
5
4
2
4
* All members required to submit new
and full notification of subsidies:
only 45 members have done so
* 96 members have notified of
domestic countervailing duty
legislation; 35 have not notified
* Countervailing duty actions under-
notified 19
* Reviewed notifications on national
legislation; 100 members notified of
national safeguards legislation
* Concern regarding noncompliance
on notifications
* 18 findings of serious injury or
threat 20
* Two notifications received
* Discussions of implementation2 1
* 124 members notified regarding
implementing legislation to date
* Reviews completed on five
countries; 15 reviews pending 2 2
Each of the committees and councils meets regularly, is open to all member nations, and
provides a knowledgeable forum to aid countries in the translation of formal rules to national practice.
Committee and council agendas each include consideration of national legislation and implementing
regulations. Despite specified reporting forms and offers of assistance from the Secretariat, however,
the annual reports for nearly all the committees in 2003 expressed concern over noncompliance with
notification and reporting requirements.
19 2003 Report of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Doc. G/L/655, November 4,
2003.
20 2003 Report of the Committee on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods, WTO Doc. G/L/651,
October 24, 2003.
21 2003 Annual Report of the Council for Trade in Services to the General Council, WTO Doc. S/C/19,
December 5, 2003.
22 2003 Annual Report of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
IP/C/30, December 1, 2003.
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While this research does not include a full analysis of the WTO operating committees, the
work of another scholar has made a significant contribution to understanding how these committees
function. Christina Sevilla examined the effectiveness of the operating committees as an informal
means of enforcing compliance. She considered two types of oversight compliance: "police patrol"
oversight, which involves the centralized and routinized monitoring of all countries' policies in order
to detect and address possible treaty violations; and "fire alarm" oversight, which involves the
creation of procedures and channels of access to alert governments to possible treaty violations.23
Complaints raised in committees (concerning failure to transpose WTO rules into domestic law)
represent the "police patrol" type; third-order disputes submitted to dispute panels represent the "fire
alarm" mechanism and are the subject of Chapter 5.24 Sevilla's research of informal complaints
reviewed allegations of inconsistency between relevant standing rules and a member government's
policy behavior-allegations that were raised during private and multilateral committee meetings in
Geneva. 2 5 The committees met several times per year and allowed signatories to consult on
notifications and discuss changes in legislation and interpretation of the rules. The committees were
found to help adjust target country behavior.
Sevilla compared complaints raised formally before dispute panels (the subject of Chapter 5),
to those raised informally in committee meetings. She hypothesized that the costs of complaining
would have an effect on which institutional process (formal or informal) was used most often. The
costs a government bears in bringing complaints include bureaucratic costs (e.g., of information-
gathering and case preparation), the opportunity costs of pursuing alternative strategies, and
diplomatic costs. One would expect to find that governments tend to use the less costly, decentralized
23 Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus
Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1984): 1.
24 Christine Sevilla, "The Politics of Enforcing GATT/WTO Rules" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1988), p.
80. See also McCubbins and Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked."
25 Sevilla looked at the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures' Code and the Committee on
Government Procurement's Code; both of these codes were adopted as plurilateral agreements under the Tokyo
Round. These committees were chosen because each had members from the Quad and the mid-sized and
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complaint processes more frequently. Sevilla's research, targeted at the GATT rather than WTO
period of operation, noted that the complaint forum available through operating committees
functioned to facilitate both the diagnosis and resolution of implementation problems. Sevilla
concluded that this informal forum was used substantially more than the formal dispute panel process,
and it appeared to lower the costs of complaining for small countries. However, the committee system
(like the formal process) was used more by the larger trading countries than small or developing ones,
as small countries refrained from using the committees as often as they could.26
Seasoned GATT/WTO officials have noted that while the WTO was designed to reflect the
separation of powers doctrine, its organization really only exercises the legal rationale of the judicial
branch. One former GATT official noted that the institution's General Council has legislative
competency, but lacks the legal procedures that would allow it to balance domestic political and
economic interests. 2 7
Another former GATT official wrote that the institution's councils and committees are under-
utilized as "operational forums to discuss WTO law, to devise adequate means for its
implementations, and so reconcile diverging opinions, that could help to diminish the heavy case load
of the adjudicative organs."28 Individual members, he says, would be well-advised to exercise more
self-restraint on submissions to the Dispute Settlement Body (i.e., for third-order disputes) and
instead "devote their energies to facilitating the work of WTO committees established to oversee the
functioning of the different covered agreements."2 9 This is particularly apropos for developing
countries' access to justice, which Annet Blank contends will depend on their being "meaningfully
smaller development economies. The complaints raised in these committees were categorized into three types:
transposition of the code into domestic law; filing of notifications; and application of rules in specific instances.
26 Sevilla, "The Politics of Enforcing GATT/WTO Rules," pp. 119-121, 172-3.
2 7 Armin von Bogdandy, "Law and Politics in the WTO: Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship,"
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 5 (2001): 608-674.
28 Claus-Dieter Ehlerrmann, "Tensions between the Dispute Settlement Process and the Diplomatic and Treaty-
Making Activities of the WTO," World Trade Review 1, no. 3 (2003): 301-308.
29 Ibid.
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involved in the.. .everyday work of the WTO, such as the drafting of agendas within the WTO
councils and committees and participation in their discussions and decisions."30
These preliminary observations on operating committees suggest that they function only
moderately well as informal surveillance bodies to assess member countries' implementation of WTO
rules into domestic law and notification of policy measures adopted. The committees provide regular,
transparent discussions that are open to all WTO members, and they are designed to gather relevant
information and consult on implementation. This mandate would appear to offer a relatively lower-
cost process for understanding the basis for noncompliant behavior and developing a program for
improvement. The reality, however, is a high degree of noncompliance on even the reporting of
implementation. Thus, the committees alone do not appear to be a model for success in evaluating
implementation.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE: THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM (TPRM)
This section examines the work of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, a more elaborate
implementation process launched by the GATT as a pilot in 1989. The progenitors of the TPRM were
several. Both the OECD and the IMF long considered various means to increase policy accountability
by developed countries. The 1985 Leutwiler Report (also known as the "Wisemen's Report")
recognized this need and called for regular surveillance by the GATT itself of all its members on
matters of trade policy. The report noted that, "Governments should be required regularly to explain
and defend their overall trade policies."3 1 The next year, in 1986, the Negotiating Group on the
Functioning of the GATT System (known as the "FOGS"), recommended that the GATT "...develop
understandings and arrangements: (1) to enhance the surveillance in the GATT to enable regular
3 0 Annet Blank, "Equal Access to Justice in the WTO for Developing Countries," in Philippe Turrley, lain
MacVay, and Marc Weisberger, Due Process in WTO Dispute Settlement (London: Cameron May, 2001), p.
193.
31 Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Action (Geneva: GATT, 1985) ("The Leutwiler Report"),
Recommendation 8, p. 42.
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monitoring of trade policies and practices of contracting parties and their impact on the functioning of
the multilateral trading system."3 2
The FOG proposed that a trade policy review mechanism be established to monitor the trade
policies and practices of contracting parties. Such monitoring should not enforce nor create new
GATT obligations. Rather, monitoring should encourage transparency in the trade policies and
practices of the contracting parties, to connect GATT principles with the economic circumstances of
each country.3 3
At the 1988 Uruguay Round Mid-Term Review in Montreal, a TPRM, as devised by the
FOG, was proposed. It was endorsed in April 1989 and became provisionally effective immediately
as a pilot program. The TPRM became permanent under Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement in 1994.
As noted previously, Article XVI of the WTO Agreement requires that each signatory
transpose the international rules adopted in each trade negotiating round into corresponding domestic
legislation. Further, countries must not initiate new policies that are contrary to the WTO rules. In
order to achieve transparency on national regulations and policies, WTO governments have to inform
the WTO of specific measures, policies, or laws through regular notifications, as discussed in the
previous section. Through the TPRM, the WTO conducts regular reviews of individual countries'
trade policies. The objectives of the TPRM are:
* to contribute to improved adherence by all members to rules, disciplines, and commitments made
under the WTO;
* to increase the transparency and understanding of countries' trade policies and practices, through
regular monitoring;
* to improve the quality of public and intergovernmental debate on the issues; and
* to enable a collective assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading system.3 4
32 Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, paragraph E, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC, September 20, 1986.
33 Qureshi, "The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism," p. 148.
34 WTO Agreement; Annex 3: Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
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The general process established in 1989 for the TPR pilot continues to the present. The
TPRM examines the impact of a member's trade policies and practices on the multilateral trading
system within the context of the country's wider macroeconomic and development circumstances.
Members have undertaken a commitment of transparency in support of these objectives, but
acknowledge that implementation of domestic transparency must be voluntary and take into
consideration each member's legal and political system.
The frequency of a member nation's review is determined by its share of world trade.
Countries are categorized into three tiers. Tier I includes the four largest trading entities, who are
reviewed every two years: the European Union, United States, Canada, and Japan. Tier 2 includes the
next 16 countries, by size of global trade, 3 5 who are reviewed every four years. They are as follows:
Developed 3 6 Developing
Australia Brazil
Norway Hong Kong, China
South Africa India
Switzerland Indonesia
Israel
Korea, Rep. of
Malaysia
Mexico
Poland
Singapore
Thailand
Turkey
Tier 3 encompasses the remaining WTO members, who are reviewed every six years, or less for least-
developed country members.
The WTO General Council meets as the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) to conduct the
reviews, which are based on three components: (I) a "country report"-a full report from the member
35 These are the leading exporters in world merchandise trade (excluding intra-EU trade), 2001. WTO,
International Trade Statistics Reportfor 2001, Table 1.6 (Geneva: WTO, 2002). China joined the WTO in
2002. It ranks just behind Canada with 3.54 percent of total world trade, according to The Economist: World in
Figures (London: Profile Books, 2003). China's first TPR is not yet scheduled.
36 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the designation of developed or developing is self-selected. Developing countries
are not defined, but, following the general guidelines set by the IMF, have a per capita income per annum of
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under review on its overall economic situation, together with a detailed analysis of its trade policies,
based on a questionnaire sent by the Secretariat, 3 7 (2) a "Secretariat report"-a report prepared by the
Secretariat based on information available to it and provided by the member, focusing on special
areas of concern,3 8 and (3) a two-day meeting involving the TPRB and the member.
The two-day meeting is scheduled at least four weeks after the country and Secretariat reports
are distributed to all WTO member countries. The first day opens with an initial statement by the
country under review, after which two discussants chosen by the TPRB chair comment on the two
reports.3 9 Next, questions from other participants are invited.4 0 The country under review is then able
to prepare responses to present during the second day. Depending on the skill of the chairman, this
second day can elicit additional comments and questions and is usually quite interactive. Small and
large countries alike have an opportunity to question large trading countries. The major trading
powers aggressively question each other. "Questions are in fact probing, even barbed, comments and
critiques." 4 1 Canada and United States
regularly trade sharp blows and the United States goes after Japan with great gusto. At times,
however a 'glass houses' effect inhibits participants from throwing stones. Countries are also
often reluctant to criticize fellow members on whom they are dependent for special
privileges: when the European Union is up to review, for example, developing-country
beneficiaries of the EU trade preferences conspicuously hold their fire.42
$1000 or less. China will fall within this tier, but has not yet been scheduled for review. The designation of least
developed is according to the United Nations.
37 The Secretariat provides technical assistance to developing country and least-developed country members in
preparing this report. The outline format for country reports is based on the Decision of July 19, 1989 (BISD
36S/406-409) and is reproduced as Appendix __ hereto.
38 The Secretariat report is usually organized into six chapters: I. The Economic Environment; II. The Trade
Policy Regime Framework and Objectives; III. Trade-Related Aspects of Foreign Exchange Regime; IV. Trade
Policy and Practices by Measures; V. Trade Policy and Practices by Sector; and VI. Trade Disputes and
Consultation.
39 The discussants comment on their own individual responsibility, not on behalf of their governments.
40 Those who submit written questions in advance are addressed first.
41 Donald B. Keesing, "Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization," Policy Analyses in
International Economics, No. 52 (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998), p. 1.
42 Ibid.
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The TPRM offers a remarkable opportunity from several perspectives. The country being
reviewed receives a comprehensive analysis of its legal and economic trade policy from WTO staff.4 3
The country's trading partners receive a copy of the report and have a two-day open meeting in which
to raise any concerns about the matters disclosed or their trading relationship with the country. As the
TPRM is explicitly prohibited from serving as a pre-dispute settlement forum, what could be an
adversarial process tends to takes a more problem-solving tone to address pending tensions.
The following table summarizes the Trade Policy Reviews from January 1995 through
December 2003. Approximately 16 reviews are conducted each year. The Secretariat's TPRM
division consists of a director, 16 professional staff, and 11 support staff. The review process, from
initial research and preparation of the country questionnaire to the meeting of the TPRB, takes
approximately 10 months. The budget for the division is approximately $6 million of WTO's annual
budget of $115 million.
Table 4.2: Summary of Trade Policy Reviews, 1995 - 2003
43 The scope of this analysis is akin to what a client might pay a consultant like McKinsey and Company up to
$500,000.
44 The EU counts here as 15 members. On May 1, 2004, the EU expanded to 25 members.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total # of Reviews 11 15 8 16 12 15 15 15 17
(GATT/WTO)
Tier 1 Members 2 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 1
Tier 2 Members - 0 3 1 2 1 4 0 2 0
developed
Tier 2 Members - 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 3 4
developing
Tier 3 Members - 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 1
developed
Tier 3 Members - 7 5 3 4 5 3 8 6 5
developing
Tier 3 Members - 0 1 1 3 2 2 3 4 5
least-developed
Cumulative # of Reviews 65 80 88 109 120 135 150 165 182
since 1989
Cumulative # of Members 71 75 81 85 88 98 103 110
reviewed since 198944
. . .. 
_ -
The 182 TPRM reports reveal a consistent effort to compliment the reviewed country on its
progress and recognize its particular challenges. The target country representative has an opportunity
to explain its policies, highlight its improvements, and address its trading partners' concerns. Overall,
the review is looking for evidence that the country has increased the transparency of its policies,
simplified its tariff structure, implemented policies to sustainably stabilize its economy, and opened
its market consistent with the WVTO's rule-based system. There is now a push to reach those who have
not yet been reviewed, while maintaining the periodic schedule of reviews on larger trading nations.
The TPR program for 2004 proposes 16 reviews, including at least five least-developed countries.
The following tables summarize the key issues raised in reviews of the Tier 1 and Tier 2
countries.
Table 4.3: Key Issues Raised in Tier 1 Trade Policy Reviews
Tier 1 Last Review (and # of Last Review Issues: Last Review Issues:
Country reviews from 1989 to Special Sectors Trade Measures
2003)
Canada 2000 (7) Agriculture Antidumping
Steel Local content requirements
Textiles/clothing Sanitary/phytosanitary (SPS)
nontariff measures (NTMs)
Tariff peaks/escalation
European 2002 (6) Agriculture Antidumping
Union Textiles Government procurement
Health and safety
Import restrictions
Intellectual property
Preferential trade agreements
Safeguards
Services
Japan 2002 (6) Agriculture Competition
Government procurement
Market access
SPS
".~~~~~~ ~Tariffs
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)
United States 2001 (6) Agriculture Antidumping
Textiles/clothing Carousel amendment 5
Unilateralism
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Table 4.4: Key Issues Raised in Tier 2 Trade Policy Reviews
Tier 2 Country Last Review (and # of Last Review Issues: Last Review Issues:
reviews from 1989 to Special Sectors Trade Measures
2003)
Australia 2002 (4) Antidumping
Government procurement
Intellectual property
Services
SPS
Tariffs
Brazil 2000 (3) Antidumping
Government procurement
Intellectual property
Services
SPS
Tariffs
Hong Kong, 2002 (4) Wine Intellectual property
China Tariffs
India 2002 (3) Agriculture Antidumping
Import licensing
SPS
Tariffs
Indonesia 2003 (4) Steel Antidumping
Textiles/clothing Import measures
Tariff gap
Israel 1999 (2) Agriculture Import restrictions
Services
Tariffs
Korea, Republic 2000 (3) Agriculture Tariffs
of Steel
Malaysia 2001 (3) ' Export diversity
Government procurement
Licensing
Mexico 2002 (3) Agriculture Antidumping
Steel Customs
Government procurement
Import licensing
Norway 2000 (3) Agriculture Tariffs
Textile/clothing
Philippines 1999 (2) Beverages Import restrictions
Distilled spirits
Motor vehicles
Singapore 2000 (3) Alcoholic beverages Labeling of genetically
Motor vehicles modified organisms
South Africa 2003 (3) Agriculture Antidumping
(SACU) Motor vehicles Customs valuation
Textiles/clothing NTMs
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45 If a country is authorized to suspend concessions to a trading partner as a result of a ruling from the Dispute
Settlement Body, the country may rotate or change its list of suspended concessions, which is called a
"carousel."
In nearly every country across trading volume size, agriculture and textiles are noted as
sectors of concern, while antidumping, government procurement, intellectual property, and import
restrictions are leading trade matters of concern.
Each year, the TPRM prepares an annual report to the General Council that highlights the
value of the reviews to the members, the cost effectiveness of the process, and the procedural
improvements made. The evaluative aspects of these reports are discussed later; the key issues raised
in the annual TPRM reports for 1997-2003 are summarized in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Summary of Key Issues Raised in TPRM Annual Reports4 6
ISSUE 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Antidumping & countervailing duties * * * * * *
Competition & investment policy * * * * * * *
Customs clearance, duties, & valuation * * * *
Economic performance/Financial crisis * * *
Government procurement * * * * *
Implementation of WTO agreements *
Import & export restrictions; licensing * * * *
Intellectual property/TRIPs * * * * * * *
Nontariff measures * *
Regional v. unilateral, bilateral, and * * * * * *
multilateral trade policymaking
Sectors: Ag., motor vehicles, textiles/clothing * * * * * * *
Services/GATS * * * * *
Special & differential treatment * * *
Standards & international norms * * * * *
State-owned enterprises * * * *
Subsidies & tax rebates * * * * *
Tariffs (peaks, escalation, gaps) * * * *
Technical assistance * * * * * *
TBT, SPS, & market access * * * * *
Trade liberalization & economic reform * * * * * * *
Transparency of policymaking * * * * * *
46 Annual Reports of the Trade Policy Review Mechanisms, October 28,1996 (WTO Doc. WT/TPR/27);
December 15,1997 (WTO Doc. WT/TPR/41); January 15,1999 (WTO Doc. WT/TPR/59); October 7,1999
(WTO Doc. WT/TPR/69); October 13, 2000 (WTO Doc. WT/TPR/86); September 18, 2001 (WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/101); October 11,2002 (WTO Doc. WT/TPR/122); and October 31, 2003 (WTO Doc. WT/TPR/140).
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Switzerland 2000 (3) Agriculture Labeling
Clothing SPS
Thailand 2003 (4) Agriculture Customs valuation
Intellectual property Import licensing
Tariff structure
Turkey 2003 (3) Agriculture Antidumping
SPS
Tariff structure
In a cursory review of this table from the annual reports and the previous tables regarding the
top 20 trading nations, it's clear that there is some consistency in the issues that continue to challenge
WTO members and the institution. Chapter 5 will review the formal disputes that have been
submitted to panels-disputes that are in large part based on the same issues.
The question, then, is whether the TPRM assists countries in not only identifying but
resolving policy implementation problems. Members clearly benefit from the opportunity for self-
analysis and the information gained from this external audit.47 According to interviews with
representatives of selected countries, the reviews provide valuable input for national policymaking
and strengthen internal interagency discussions. For many, a review provides an opportunity to
explain national policies and technical needs, and to discuss trade policy with their trading partners.
Others describe the process as "trade policy lite," suggesting that it is a less-than-rigorous
examination of countries' trade policies. The TPR particularly benefits developing countries, in the
scope and depth of policy information generated through the process of being reviewed, and in the
opportunity to participate in the review of their trading partners. Overall, the process promotes
nonconfrontational discussion of key trade issues, de-linked from dispute settlement proceedings,
resulting in a comprehensive assessment of where the tensions lie. However, the process clearly does
little to help resolve key issues that arise, as the TPRM itself is explicitly not mean to be a dispute
resolution mechanism. Greater cross-fertilization between the TPRB discussions and other WTO
bodies might advance the parties' ability to resolve these disputes.
WTO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATED
The previous sections described the establishment and practice of the TPRM for 15 years, from 1989
to the present. This section discusses three formal evaluation studies prepared during this period.
These studies help consider what was expected, and achieved, of the TPR process. First, Asif Qureshi
undertook an extensive, scholarly assessment of what effective policy implementation might entail
47 This discussion is based on personal interviews with the TPRM staff and WTO missions, as described in
Appendix _
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and what the first few years of the TPR revealed. In 1998 Donald Keesing, of the Institute for
International Economics, prepared a study to publicize the TPRM, analyze the practical experience
with it to date, and suggest improvements. And in 1999 the TPRB itself presented a five-year review
to the Ministerial Conference at Seattle. These three studies are summarized here and then linked with
the dispute resolution assessment criteria for the policy implementation phase of this research.
Implementing International Trade Norms: Transparency or Enforcement?
Qureshi devoted a series of writings to the theory and practice of implementation in the GATT/WTO.
He first considered whether WTO implementation was oriented to enforcement or transparency, 4 8 and
he determined that the TPRM affected state behavior both ex ante as a "conditioning" mechanism and
ex post as a "corrective" mechanism.49 The conditioning, or pre-emptive influence, worked by
establishing norms (adopted as WTO agreements); the corrective function worked as parties
evaluated their respective trade policies, were drawn into consultations, and were pressured to reform
their trading practices. Qureshi said the impact of a country's trade policies and practices on the
multilateral trading system could be considered in legal, economic, and political terms,50 but he notes
that the GATT lacks competence in the political sphere. A legal review would inquire whether the
country had enacted the necessary laws and regulations to correspond to the respective WTO rules.
An economic assessment would consider whether domestic trade policy formed a barrier to
international trade, or was discriminatory within the international context. He distinguished between
economic analysis (determining the causal relationship between declared national policy objectives
and methodology) and economic prescriptions (determining the most efficient means to achieve
national policy objectives). Against this framework, Qureshi found that the TPRM exhibited both
48 Schermer's international law commentary notes: "When using the term enforcement, we include all methods
which help to realize the application of legal rules made by international organizations. Members will be
encouraged to comply with the rules, not only by the possibility of sanctions being imposed for non-compliance
but also recognition of violations." Henry G. Schermer, International Institutional Law (Alphen aan den Rijn,
The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoof, 1980), p. 684.
49 Qureshi, "The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism," p. 147, 152.
50 Ibid., p. 154.
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broad enforcement and transparency qualities, such that "transparency is a pre-condition...and a facet
of the enforcement function."51
He recommended that the TPRM improve in three areas: data gathering, partnering with
accession negotiations, and reviews of developing countries. Regarding data gathering, Qureshi found
the country reports quite comprehensive, but framed in general economic terms. More detailed data
might be gained, he said, if members and private parties were encouraged (perhaps through
anonymity) to bring items to the Secretariat's attention and if specific follow-up procedures were in
place, similar to the IMF's ongoing surveillance on exchange rate policies. On accession negotiations
(the negotiations by which a country becomes a member of the WTO), Qureshi believes that certain
preconditions to WTO membership could include more transparent criteria on national trade policy
formulation and implementation and administrative decision-making accountability. Lastly, regarding
reviews of developing countries, Qureshi emphasized that developing nations have limited access to
systematic data or expertise that could help them evaluate the relationship between their economies
and the multilateral trading system. For example, a developing country may have great difficulty
evaluating the relationship between the revenue it derives from trade-related taxes and its capacity to
raise revenue from non-trade-related sources. In some countries, as much as 40 percent of revenue is
trade-based, which curtails the ability to reduce tariffs without any alternative source of revenue. In
addition, the ability of a developing country to invoke self-help (e.g., antidumping and countervailing
measures) is complicated by non-trade political considerations and significant administrative costs.52
Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the WTO
Keesing, an academic and long-time economist for the World Bank, looked at the TPRM's
substantive effectiveness. He noted that while opening trade is advantageous to a country in theory, in
practice,
51 Ibid., p. 159.
52 Qureshi, "Some Lessons from 'Developing' Countries' Trade Policy Reviews," p. 489,497.
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trade concessions hurt certain groups in the economy even as they help others (and help the
economy as a whole). Injured groups and industries are often well organized and politically
powerful, while those that benefit are neither.... In multilateral trade, countries hold on to
their protectionist policies as valuable bargaining chips.53
Domestic politics can make it very difficult for countries to integrate their international obligations.
Therefore, some efficient, effective means of mutual surveillance of unbiased information is needed if
multilateral trade negotiations are to operate efficiently and fairly. The WTO agreements require that
members notify the WTO of all changes in trade policy. But there are problems with submitting all
required notifications, and even if notifications are received by the WTO, the Secretariat is
overwhelmed with the need to assess and organize the information into a meaningful form for review.
The TPRM offers a more comprehensive and cohesive means than notifications for evaluating
members' trade policies.
Against this background, Keesing asked: "Are the Trade Policy Reviews sufficiently probing
and analytical to provide information of real value? Do they cover all relevant aspects of members'
trade? Are they unbiased and objective? Does the WTO devote sufficient resources to the task of
conducting the reviews-and to organizing, focusing, and disseminating the information that they
generate? Is the potential value of this information to those outside the trade negotiations process
being realized?" 54
Keesing determined that the substance of the reviews was comprehensive, rigorous,
analytical, probing, and objective enough, given the quality of information available. He observed
that improvements could be made in some quantitative measures and the process could be fine-tuned.
He also found that the credibility and sustainability of specific reforms depended on legal
infrastructure capacity, in which case the "best course may be to raise doubts softly" and not sour
relations with too-harsh comments.55 Of particular note is his remark, echoing that of Jeffrey Schott,
53 Keesing, "Improving Trade Policy Reviews," p. 3.
54 Ibid., p. 2.
55 Ibid., p. 28.
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that the "TPRs neglect to propose alternative approaches of adjustment measures that could be
deployed instead of trade restraints"56 [emphasis added]. Keesing said that more focus on specific
issues would contribute to the reports' relevance, but he recognized the problem of balancing the size
and detail of the report against its readability. 57
Keesing commended the number and level of country representatives engaged in the TPRB.
He found the institution was fulfilling its responsibilities quite efficiently58 and noted a significant
benefit to members, especially developing countries. However, he found the
limited dissemination of TPR reports and their findings a major disappointment for those who
hoped the TPRM would influence debate on trade policy and practices beyond diplomatic
circles in Geneva. Used mainly by insiders in trade negotiation process, especially country
delegations, and so benefits beyond this inner circle are only seen as spillovers. The External
Relations Division is responsible; their help is critical if TPRs are to systematically influence
policymakers in member countries and beyond.5 9
Keesing recommended that the WTO disseminate the TPR reports more widely by targeting
business writers, trade and industry associations, chambers of commerce, labor experts and lobbyists,
political leaders, and advisors, rather than relying on indirect information flows.60
Keesing concluded with several recommendations. First, that the TPRM be supplemented
with an advisory committee of a dozen renowned trade economists and policy experts who could
support the work of the TPRB with advice on improving the substance and methodology of the TPR
process and dissemination of the reports. Substantively, he said that the costs of protectionism needed
to be quantified more concretely, and that alternative transitional policies should be developed for
56 Ibid., p. 33. See Jeffrey Schott, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1994).
57 For example, antidumping, regional and bilateral arrangements, export promotion, corruption, and global
problems. Keesing, "Improving Trade Policy Reviews," pp. 39, 50.
58 Keesing noted that, at the WTO, relatively low pay but high expectation of mastery and productivity relative
to other international organizations led to high staff turnover. The use of outside consultants was recommended
and has since been adopted.
59 In a personal conversation I had with a representative of a developing country, the representative noted that,
despite the value of the TPR report and process, he did not believe the report was ever read, let alone addressed
seriously by his trade minister.
60 Keesing, "Improving Trade Policy Reviews," p. 47.
158
country members to consider. Lastly, he suggested an increased emphasis on issues that surfaced
repeatedly in the policy reviews, dispute settlement panels, and negotiations, including antidumping,
regional trade arrangements, export promotion, corruption, and global problems like textiles, motor
vehicles, and agricultural tariffs. 61
Appraisal of the Operation of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism - Report to Ministers
In 1999 the WTO Secretariat published a TPRM Appraisal, which focused on whether the TPRM was
facilitating countries' implementation of WTO rules, and whether the TPRM served an effective
institutional function. The appraisal opened with a restatement of the TPRM mission: to focus on
improved adherence by members to rules, disciplines, and commitments already made. It was noted
that the TPRM functions were effectively met and that
its objectives were generally being achieved, although not all members had yet been
reviewed... [The] Mechanism had demonstrated that it had a valuable public-good aspect,
particularly in its contribution to transparency. The Mechanism had also been a catalyst for
Members to reconsider their policies, had served as an input into policy formulation and had
helped identify technical assistance needs.62
As for resource efficiency, the TPRM Appraisal reported that TPR staff were using trade-
relevant macroeconomic information from other international governmental agencies and retaining
outside professional consultants. Information was being increasingly exchanged with other parts of
the WTO Secretariat, including the Integrated Framework for technical assistance to least-developed
countries, but care was being taken to safeguard restricted information as appropriate. The expense of
the TPRM-5 percent of the WTO budget-seemed well spent.63
The Appraisal further noted that the substance of the TPR reports generally reflected a good
complement between the Secretariat and the respective government reports, and a balance between
61 Ibid., p.51.
62 Appraisal of the Operation of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Report to Ministers, ("TPRM
Appraisal"), WTO Doc. WT/MIN(99)/2, October 8, 1999, pp. 1-2.
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traditional and relatively new areas of WTO operation. It was noted that a continuing effort for focus
and readability would be sought.6 4
The Appraisal said that the TPRM's meeting schedule balanced the competing considerations
of managing a realistic workload but reviewing all members as soon as possible. Meetings were
paced over the year, rather than bunched, and deadlines were being better met. The change to two
half-day forums with a day in between (for the reviewed country to prepare its responses) had worked
well, and the participation of high-level representatives had increased markedly. 6 5 There was a desire
to make the discussion sessions more interactive. 6 6
While the Appraisal is only five pages long and so is not a very detailed assessment, it
reflects a positive attitude on the part of the WTO institution and the TPRB leadership that the policy
review process serves an important ongoing function, consistent with its mandate. Overall, the TPRM
has increased the transparency of domestic trade policy and impact information. The scheduled
"external audit" reviews have imposed a useful discipline on members to reexamine and reevaluate
their policies, promote nondiscrimination in treatment of trading partners, stimulate interagency
discussion and cooperation, and help exporting countries identify barriers to trade.
These three evaluations offer fairly consistent conclusions about the effectiveness of the
TPRM. The reviews are considered sufficiently comprehensive, analytical, probing, and objective to
promote transparency of domestic trade policies and enhance compliance with WTO obligations. An
advisory committee of international experts might guide improvement in the substance, methodology,
and dissemination of the reports. On substance, more emphasis could be placed on recurring issues,
63 Ibid, p. 3.
64 Ibid, pp. 2, 4.
65 One country commented on the importance of the U.S. trade official being present, and that the U.S. example
of more regular attendance in the last couple of years had appeared to improve attendance overall.
66 TPRM Appraisal, p. 3. Clemens Boonekamp, Director of the TPRM, noted to me that countries increasingly
seek reviews and that he meets with the ministers in country as part of the process. He said there has been an
increased number of notifications and an increased delivery of technical assistance to least-developed countries.
He also noted that developing countries are just beginning to recognize the value of challenging their trading
partners, and not viewing the TPRM as a mandatory defense of their own policies. Personal communication,
Clemens Boonekamp, April 2001.
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such as antidumping and agriculture. On methodology, countries (especially developing countries)
would benefit from specific follow-up procedures that include alternative transitional adjustment
measures to bring domestic policies in line with WTO requirements, akin to IMF practice. Lastly,
broader dissemination of the TPR reports to relevant ministries and industry representatives would
increase the likelihood of improved trade policy development.
DISCUSSION
In this discussion I summarize the WTO's experience with policy implementation disputes in the
operating committees and the TPRM, and then consider how that experience squares with the
hypotheses posed at the beginning of the chapter. Next, I view this experience through the lens of our
overarching framework on the role of power, interests, and rights in the dispute resolution processes,
and offer a preliminary evaluation against the criteria of costs, outcome, process satisfaction,
relationship maintenance, and problem recurrence. The chapter closes with a few observations on
how other institutions approach policy implementation, and aspects that might benefit the WTO.
Synthesis of Implementation Experience in Operating Committees and TPRM
Policy implementation concerns how countries domestically adopt rules that they have already agreed
upon. Conflict between international commitments and domestic priorities gives rise to disputes,
which are identified through surveillance by trading partners and the WTO. The WTO's operating
committees and Trade Policy Review Mechanism provide the primary means of surveillance.
The WTO's several operating committees provide the first line of monitoring. They are
charged to manage and consult about the operation and implementation of various issue areas, such as
intellectual property, subsidies, and government procurement. These committees meet periodically to
consider members' transposition of international rules into domestic law, notifications of trade
measures to the WTO, and application of the rules in specific instances. Most committees have noted
a consistent problem of noncompliance with these reporting requirements. With limited staffing,
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committees lack capacity to assimilate these notifications very deeply and handle more than the crisis
of the moment. While committees provide a relatively low-cost, informal forum to condition
compliance and help adjust members' behavior in accordance with the rules, they appear to be under-
utilized.
The TPRM was specifically established to facilitate members' adherence to the GATT rules,
increase the transparency of national trade policy practice, and improve the quality of debate and
collective assessment of policies. Members are subject to periodic reviews that are generally
considered to be valuable educational exercises in both their preparation and the ensuing discussion
among trading partners. Structured as a diplomatic peer review process, the TPRM provides bi-
directional signals to trading partners on practices that cause concern and on the feasibility of
implementation given a country's particular pressures.
We now return to the hypotheses raised at the beginning of this chapter.
Assessing the WTO's Experience Against the Hypotheses
Test Hypothesis 1: A rights-oriented surveillance process is likely to be more successful if universal,
periodic, and transparent.
When nations agree on a set of international rules, such as the WTO agreements, it is
expected that those nations will take whatever action is required to make the international rules
effective domestically. In the WTO, implementation is explicitly assessed in two ways: operating
committees for the various topical areas and the TPRM. Legal rights and obligations form the frame
of reference for both. Each country is obligated to report to committees on whether it has adopted
national legislation consistent with its obligations under each WTO agreement; further, in many
cases, it is obligated to notify the committees of any relevant measures in effect. If a country requires
technical assistance, this is available through the WTO and the Secretariat. This self-reporting
obligation is not controversial, yet notification noncompliance is endemic. Notwithstanding the
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universal, periodically prescribed, and transparent characteristics of this process, the surveillance
function is hampered by noncompliance.
The TPRM is organized by country rather than by topical issue. The trade policies of up to 16
countries are reviewed each year according to a prescribed procedure. The reviewed country prepares
an extensive report according to a specified outline that requires coordination among several
ministries. The TPR professional staff, who are economists by training, prepare a report as well. Both
the country and Secretariat reports are circulated to all WTO members, who are all invited to
participate in a two-day review session. The TPR Chairman's summary report of the review meeting
highlights findings that usually include both compliments on progress and recommendations on
sectoral issues and trade policies that bear improvement. The TPR process is explicitly prohibited
from exerting any enforcement action; it is intended to increase transparency of domestic trade
policies in order to facilitate adherence to the WTO rules. No country has refused to participate in its
review. In the review forum, which involves universal participation (in that all countries are subject to
review and all countries participate in reviews) and is a periodic and transparent process, sufficiently
detailed information is garnered in order to analyze the trade policies of the reviewed country in an
unbiased fashion.
Hypothesis appears to capture elements that are necessary, but not sufficient, for effective
surveillance. An additional quality of the surveillance process is that it be clearly targeted to each
individual country, such that the target country cannot easily evade its obligations without provoking
a publicly noticeable reaction. Further, the higher the value of the information-gathering and analysis
process to the target, the less likely is resistance. Therefore, the process should serve not only the
interests of the institution in ascertaining the progress of a country in implementing agreed-upon
rules, but should enable the reviewed country to better manage its trade policies.
Test Hypothesis 2: The resolution of implementation problems will be enhanced by a process that
allows for the exploration of a range of transitional options to bring the party into compliance.
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The mandates of the operating committees are certainly broad enough to contemplate formal
and informal consultations on implementation problems. Without a more detailed study of the
committee discussions through analysis of meeting minutes and participant interviews, however, this
research is inconclusive as to how well the committees could function to facilitate substantive and
procedural compliance. One committee did note a highly successful seminar on preparing notification
reports,6 7 so perhaps more individualized capacity-building efforts might be effective.
The TPR process has been reviewed in more detail, in both this and other studies. Evidence
from the summary reports, personal interviews, and the literature indicates that TPRs are quite
valuable in identifying implementation issues, but lack the structure and commitment to solve
identified problems. A country under review has an opportunity to explain barriers to implementing
WTO policy, but there is no designated time to propose and evaluate alternative strategies to
overcome such barriers, no options developed for transitional measures, nor any specific obligation to
report back on efforts made to act on recommended improvements. Hypothesis 2 is thus indirectly
confirmed: the absence of an opportunity to explore options for resolution and prescribe a follow-up
time appears correlated with the failure to resolve policy implementation disputes.
Second-Order Disputes and the Power-Interests-Rights Framework
Policy implementation disputes are identified through a hybrid rights and interests process that is
meant to brings the parties' behavior into the open for appropriate scrutiny. Rules (rights) dictate the
timing, scope, and terms of reference of the process, and members' behavior is measured against
existing rules. However, if there is a gap between a country's assessed and expected performance-
whether for political, economic, or social reasons-there is no structured process to sort out feasible
options for overcoming the deficit. Operating committees appear to offer a forum for education and
discussion at a general level. The Trade Policy Reviews provide a more individualized approach that
67 2003 Report of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, paragraph 10, WTO Doc.
G/L/65, November 4, 2003.
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involves extensive time and technical resource investment-and elicits a much more comprehensive
response. The operating committees are more rights-driven, but lack enforcement power, and so result
in only moderate compliance. The TPR process is motivated by rights as well, but also serves the
interests of the institution, the reviewed country, and its trading partners. By increasing the
transparency of a country's trade policies, the institution's mandate is advanced and countries are pre-
conditioned to compliance and discouraged from defection. The reviewed country participates in a
rigorous review of its own policies that contributes to coordination among its affected ministries, plus
the country can explain certain policies that may be provoking trading partners. Trading partners have
an opportunity to raise questions in a softer tone than filing a complaint directly against the country.
Assessment of Second-Order Dispute Resolution against Dispute Resolution Criteria
The existing WTO processes for dealing with second-order disputes are here preliminarily assessed
against the dispute resolution criteria introduced in Chapter 1: transaction costs, satisfaction with
outcome and with process, effect on relationships, and recurrence of disputed issues. A more detailed
analysis appears in Chapter 6, when the processes for first-, second-, and third-order dispute
resolution are compared.
Transaction Costs. Institutional theory points out the efficiency of reducing transaction costs
of interaction among members of a multilateral regime. The WTO has no central enforcement
authority; rather, the burden falls to individual countries to complain if they believe their rights under
the agreements have been impaired. Trading partners can complain formally, through the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), or more informally during operating committee meetings or the
TPR process. Generally, more informal processes are less costly in terms of bureaucratic costs (e.g.,
information-gathering and preparation), as well as legal, economic, diplomatic, and opportunity costs.
Over a continuum of formality and costliness, operating committees and the TPRM are significantly
less costly (in bureaucratic and diplomatic terms) than the DSU. Even so, the level of noncompliance
on notifications in the operating committees suggests that the cost of such notifications are not
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insignificant and the incentive to defect exists. In the TPR, trading partners criticize with care, in part
due to concern for reciprocal treatment, especially with regard to developing countries who are
dependent on their larger trading partners.
Satisfaction with Outcome. The operating committees enjoy moderate success in getting
countries to notify about their implementation efforts. Countries generally commend the TPR process
as a highly valuable exercise, especially for developing countries. If the process were modified to
address the resolution of implementation problems, it would likely benefit from increased
satisfaction. Recall that, as discussed in Chapter 3, the inability of many GATT members to
implement provisions of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds became a negotiating issue itself in
subsequent negotiations (Uruguay and Doha, respectively).
Satisfaction with Process. Both the operating committees and the TPRM provide for
universal participation, are routinized processes, and promote transparency of trade policy in a
nonadversarial way. Dissatisfaction is more directed at deficiencies in resolving the implementation
problems, not at their diagnosis.
Effect on Relationships. By virtue of the universal participation and ongoing nature of
committee operations, and the nonadversarial orientation of the TPRM, relationships are at least not
harmed in these processes. If the processes could be modified to develop feasible options for more
countries to implement their obligations, trading relationships would likely be improved.
Recurrence. The recurrence of policy implementation issues is a problem. The TPR is
excellent at eliciting enough information and engaging enough people to recognize what the
implementation problems are. Agriculture, antidumping, intellectual property, and government
procurement are among the issues that consistently surface as problems for large, medium, and small
countries, developed and developing, year after year. So parties know what the problems are, but they
have been unable to sort out how to remove the barriers to implementation.
The WTO, through its operating committees and TPR process, manages to diagnose a wide
range of policy implementation disputes, but has developed only limited capacity to resolve them.
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The consequence of this resolution void is that the burden shifts from a multilateral institutional
initiative to individual trading partners having to complain about perceived policy violations. While
there is a legitimate concern about the TPR veering into the enforcement realm, countries might
usefully explore the experience of other institutions on ways to improve.
Policy Implementation in Other Venues
The WTO might consider the experience of other institutions in facilitating the resolution of policy
implementation, including the Climate Change Convention, the International Monetary Fund, the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and the WTO's own Textile Monitoring Board.
Reporting provisions are a key part of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. The
Convention itself represented an international agreement that climate change was a significant issue
and that countries would negotiate the reduction of their anthropogenic emissions. As a first step in
achieving that aim, countries were required to communicate:
A) a detailed description of the policies and measures [they have] adopted to implement
[their] commitments...; and
B) A specific estimate of the effects that the policies and measures.. .will have on
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removal by sinks [by the end of the present
decade].68
Thus, the starting point was a transparency strategy to generate the reporting of actions taken and
contemplated, and their estimated effect to advance the purposes of the Convention. Key here was a
conscious reporting strategy to achieve transparency on various countries' contribution to resolving
the problem.
The IMF was established to promote international cooperation in monetary policy. Members
contribute to a pool of currencies, proportionately to their economic importance. Countries may seek
to draw against the pool during periods of adjustment. The IMF exercises "firm surveillance over the
68 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Articles 4 and 12.
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exchange rate policies of members" by conducting routine consultations with each member.69 The
review involves consultations by the IMF staff with the country's government officials. When a
country negotiates a draw, the conditions are set forth in a letter of intent. The Fund uses argument,
advice, influence, and persuasion to induce debtor governments to comply with those commitments
and preserve their drawing privileges. The IMF's success in influencing countries' fiscal policies is
due largely to its control over resources, but in some part to its managerial skill through policy
dialogue that is evidenced in concrete terms.70
A third example of monitoring policy implementation comes from an innovation of the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, called the "Ladder of Options," 71 which lays out a
series of steps to take in high-conflict situations. This approach seeks to establish an early warning
and prevention strategy in circumstances of refugee insecurity, using the human and physical
resources available from both international organs and a host country to take preventive actions and
monitor progress. One critic has said, the "ladder here is long on fact-finding and short on fact-
facing." Problems that emerged did not "lack of information; it was a lack of interest on the part of
those states with the capacity to stop the [refugee] manipulation."72 The notion of a "ladder of
options" is appealing, but requires a political willingness by partners to engage and act.
A final example comes from the Textile Monitoring Board. When the GATT was first
adopted in 1947, textiles and clothing were exempted from the trade rules. Even by the time the
Uruguay Round was launched, the textiles and clothing sector was still barely regulated by the
GATT. Included in the Uruguay Round was an Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) that
would phase this sector into the discipline of other products by January 1, 2005. The ATC established
69 IMF Agreement, Article IV.
7 0 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, p. 242.
71 The Security, Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and Settlements: Operationalizing the
'Ladder of Options', UN Doc. EC/50/SC/INF.4, June 27, 2000; and Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner,
eds., Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003), pp. 180-183.
72 Stedman and Tanner, Refugee Manipulation, p. 182.
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the Textile Monitoring Board (TMB) "in order to supervise the implementation of this Agreement."73
The TMB is to be balanced and broadly representative, with a chairman and 10 members who are
appointed by Members of the Council for Trade in Goods to serve in their personal capacity.74 Critics
note that the TMB is neither balanced nor representative, but it accepts the political reality of the
more powerful actors playing a dominant role. As the TMB has no adjudicatory role or enforcement
power, its recommendations are not binding. The TMB makes decisions by consensus and met 10
times during 2003 to review notifications and communications received from members relative to the
stages of integrating textiles into the GATT. The TMB issues recommendations to members who are
called upon to endeavor to accept them in full.75 Such recommendations are based on consultations
among the direct and affected parties to consider their capacity and interests to reach mutual
resolution if possible. Historians of the ATC's predecessor note that, "Practically all
recommendations made were accepted and acted upon by the participants concerned, even if at the
same time many rulings by GATT panels were being ignored by the 'losing side."'7 6 There remains a
tension over how to proceed when a member is unable to conform with a TMB recommendation:
should the "unresolved issue" be reviewed again by the TMB or moved to another forum (i.e., the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body)? Thus the TMB appears to sit unsteadily on the edge of
implementation surveillance and enforcement.
Points from each of these examples have been or could be incorporated into the WTO's
policy implementation process. The TPR reviews do generate a detailed assessment of the nature and
source of national implementation problems, which can be seen as good "fact-finding." A more
structured phase of "fact-facing" might be managed by a balanced and representative group of
implementation experts who could further assess the capacity and interests of the reviewed country,
73 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Article 8(1).
74 At the beginning of 2003, the following WTO members appointed individuals to serve on the TMB: Canada,
China, the European Communities, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, Turkey, and the United
States.
75 Marcelo Raffaelli and Tripti Jenkins, The Drafting History of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(Geneva: International Textiles and Clothing Bureau, 1995), p. 119.
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explore alternative strategies (a "ladder of options"), draft an undertaking of specific measures for the
country to pursue, and then monitor and reassess follow-up progress. The relationship between the
resolution of these second-order disputes and that of first- and third-order disputes will be discussed
further in Chapter 6.
76 Ibid., p. 119.
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CHAPTER 5: THIRD-ORDER DISPUTES: POLICY ENFORCEMENT
This chapter examines the WTO's processes for dealing with third-order disputes-those involving
the enforcement of policies agreed to by WTO members. As described in Chapter 2, third-order
disputes surface when a member country believes that its rights under the GATT/WTO agreements
have been nullified or impaired and gives formal notice to the offending country. As in our bipartite
analysis of disputes in which diagnosis precedes resolution, the complaining country diagnoses the
problem, and the WTO institution provides a range of processes to resolve the problem.
This chapter includes five sections. In the first I review the theory of dispute settlement
relative to these kinds of disputes, and in the second I pose three hypotheses. In the third section 
describe the mechanics of the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU) and the cases filed
from January 1995 through December 2003. The fourth section summarizes critiques of the DSU by
scholars and WTO members. The fifth and concluding section is a discussion of the data and critiques
relative to the hypotheses.
POLICY ENFORCEMENT: THEORIES OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The GATT's and WTO's practices for handing third-order disputes have been the most-utilized
international dispute settlement procedures in the world, and as such they have been extensively
studied and reviewed. Before reviewing various commentaries, however, it is important to consider
their underlying objectives. Third-order disputes at the WTO are those geared to enforce the
obligations agreed to by member countries as part of the overall rule orientation of the trading
institution. The choice in the 1947 GATT of a rule-based regime over a power-based one marked the
I Appendix I lists the dispute settlement provisions of the WTO agreements. Appendix II provides an overview
of the cases filed with the DSU.
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beginning of a trend that has continued over the past 50 years. Recall that GATT 1947 provided for
the following:
Article XXII: Consultation
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by
another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this
Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES 2 may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with
any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible
to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) the failure of another
contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement..., the contracting
party may...make written representation...to the other contracting party...which it
considers to be concerned....
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within
a reasonable time.. .the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES...[who] shall promptly investigate...and shall make appropriate
recommendations.. .or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate... [or if they] consider
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a
contracting party.. .to suspend the application to any other contracting party.. .of such
concessions.. under this Agreement.
Under these provisions, and without the planned-for International Trade Organization to
provide institutional support, the members of the GATT developed their own practices for resolving
disputes as they arose. Robert Hudec wrote that a "diplomat's jurisprudence" characterized the
procedures until the 1970s.3 Given limited procedural rules and a fairly homogenous group of parties,
2 Recall that the capitalized term "CONTRACTING PARTIES" means the contracting parties acting jointly as a
body pursuant to Article XXV.
3 Robert Hudec, "The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence," Journal of World Trade Law 4,
(1970): 615.
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disputes were handled by the Director-General, the working parties, and eventually by panels, in a
manner that wrapped law in diplomacy.
In the 1970s, however, several pressures surfaced. Nontariff barriers, which are more
complicated means than tariffs to impair trade benefits, called for more sophisticated legal rulings.
Also, the United States and the European Community more aggressively pursued claims, so that it
became harder to finesse the decisions. At the Tokyo Round, therefore, the evolving, de facto panel
process was reduced to written agreement.4 Hudec noted:
Although the procedure was not compulsory, defendant governments invariably decided to
cooperate with it, under the pressure of a strong community consensus that every GATT
member should have a right to have their legal claims heard by an impartial third-party
decision-maker.... Once the community arrived at a consensus that the ruling was correct, it
did not seem to matter greatly whether the defendant blocked formal approval.5
As important as enforceability, Hudec said, was the "political will of governments who wanted to
have a legal order in this area." He explained: "Governments wanted to have effective restraints on
every government's behavior, including their own.... The GATT's two largest superpowers-the
United States and the European Community-also wanted this kind of regulatory system."6
In the Uruguay Round in 1994, WTO members amended and memorialized these
adjudication procedures in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (the DSU). The key features of the DSU were several: the right to bring a complaint; a
binding ruling on the parties; appellate review; and the right to impose sanctions for noncompliance
with a ruling. Figure 5.1 lays out the sequence of the DSU's procedures.
4 GATT, The Agreed Description of Customary Practice and the Understanding on Dispute Settlement, Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Supplement 210-219, 1980. Most of the plurilateral agreements
signed at conclusion of the Tokyo Round had their own dispute settlement procedures.
5 Robert Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years,
1995-1998," Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 8 (1999): 1, 6.
6 Ibid., p. 7.
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedures7
Consultations (Article 4)
(Members may request panel if no solution is found within 60 days)
1ii
Good offices, conciliation, or mediation by Director-General (Article 5)
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establishes panel (Article 6)
(No later than at second DSB meeting after request)
11
Terms of Reference (Article 7)
(Standard terms unless special terms agreed within 20 days)
Composition of Panel (Article 8)
(To be agreed upon within 20 days or decided by Director-General)
14
Panel Examination (Articles 12, 13, and 14)
(In general, not to exceed 6 months; 3 months in cases of urgency)
14
Meetings with parties Meetings with third parties Expert Review Group
41
Panel submits reports to parties
Interim Review (Article 15)
Panel circulates report to DSB (Article 16)
DSB adopts panel report Appellate Review (Article 17)
(within 60 days unless appealed) (Not to exceed 90 days)
DSB adopts Appellate Report
(Within 30 days)
7 WTO Agreement, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
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1
DSB monitors implementation of adopted panel/Appellate Body recommendations (Article 21)
(To be implemented within defined "reasonable period of time")
Parties negotiate compensation pending full DSB authorizes retaliation pending full
implementation (Article 22) implementation (Article 22)
(60 days after expiration of
_ _ __ "reasonable period of time")
------II~-`' "" `I
I
Figure 5.1 reveals that the DSU procedures offer a very legalistic approach to resolving disputes,
which prompts one to assess the goals of the procedures and whether the shift from diplomatic to
legal means was effective. The DSU could aspire to a number of possible goals, which I have
categorized as pragmatic, institutional, and legal.
At a pragmatic level, the goal of the WTO's dispute settlement procedures may be simply to
solve problems raised by one country about another's behavior. To do this requires resources for
assessing the facts and a process for engaging the parties so that they can feasibly preserve their
underlying rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. Negotiation, conciliation, good offices,
and mediation are all processes by which parties can pursue agreement by probing their respective
interests and exploring options for resolution. Within the framework of rights, interests, and power,
these approaches would value diplomacy and compromise to accommodate essential interests, but
they are admittedly still shaped by the power balance between the parties.
If institutional integrity is the primary goal, then both quality of process and compliance with
rules-manifested as the changed behavior of governments-would be important. Compliance draws
upon issues of capacity, legal determination, and enforceability. Process concerns transparency,
perceptions of fairness, and an opportunity to assess evidence with adequate technical input, all of
which have to be managed in a way that reduces the transaction costs associated with enforcement.
The institution's interest is in preserving itself and in maintaining its raison d'etre: stable economic
relations among its members.
If the goal is legal legitimacy, then dispute settlement has both substantive and procedural
facets. Lawrence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter analyzed in detail the qualities of effective
supranational adjudication; they found that authoritative, impartial tribunals that issue final rulings
have the most legitimacy.8 Other aspects of adjudication-for example, the professionalism of the
panelist-adjudicators, the transparency of the decision-making process, and the access of affected
8 Lawrence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,"
Yale Law Journal 107 (1997).
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stakeholders to the process-have been discussed as well and will be considered in more detail
below. Critics appear to conclude that if the legal quality of the process is improved, the ensuing
decisions will have more legitimacy. Determining the lawfulness of a nation's behavior, decreasing
the ambiguity of the law, making application of the rules more consistent, and ensuring coherence
with international law are all legal issues that would benefit from an approach that is oriented to
answering legal questions. Here, then, the determination and preservation of rights dominates
individual interests and would appear to discipline overt power moves.
Thus the settlement of third-order disputes has multiple objectives that are weighted
differentially under varying circumstances. Three hypotheses are posed below.
HYPOTHESES
Test Hypothesis 1: Legal Legitimacy
I posit that the more transparent, authoritative, and explicit the legal procedures for resolving disputes
at the WTO, the more likely it is that member countries will perceive the institution as legitimate, and
thus the more likely it is that countries will comply with their obligations. Test Hypothesis 1: The
more explicit the legal procedures for enforcement, the more likely that countries will comply with
their obligations.
Test Hypothesis 2: Resource Capacity
A country is more likely to ensure that its rights under the WTO Agreement are protected if it has
access to adequate legal expertise and financial resources. Test Hypothesis 2: Increased access to
legal, financial, and technical resources will increase the ability of countries to enforce their rights.
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Test Hypothesis 3: Alternative Dispute Resolution
Research suggests that noncompliance occurs not only under conditions of legal uncertainty, but in
conditions of economic and political incapacity.9 If compliance is the objective, then legal
enforcement alone may not be sufficient to solve the problem. Alternate resolution processes that
consider individual and collective interests and generate options for achieving compliance are more
likely to be effective. Test Hypothesis 3: An array of direct andfacilitated resolution procedures will
increase the opportunityfor parties to resolve problems of noncompliance.
POLICY ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE UNDER THE DSU
From January 1995 through December 2003, 304 complaints were notified to the WTO.10 These
complaints are the "disputes" that are contemplated in dispute settlement studies. To analyze these
304 complaints, I have first analyzed the parties involved according to their proportion of world trade.
Countries in Tier include the top four trading nations: the European Union, United States, Canada,
and Japan; Tier 2 includes the next 16 largest trading nations (both developed and developing
countries); and Tier 3 includes the remaining 126 countries in the WTO. I have then analyzed the
issues in dispute according to GATT 1994 provisions and the 15 ancillary agreements. And I have
assessed to what stage each dispute progressed: mutual consultation, panel review, appellate review,
or decision implementation. The tables in this section summarize my analysis. Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
provide summary statistics on who filed complaints and against whom; Table 5.4 summarizes what
the disputes were about; and Table 5.5 summarizes how the disputes were resolved. The statistics
compiled for these tables are based on the total number of disputes filed and do not combine cases
that were considered together by a single panel. (Such combined cases are referred to "separate
distinct matters" in the DSU overview reports.)
9 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
10 The data in this section were compiled from the WTO's Dispute Settlement website
(www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes) and DSU annual reports. See Appendix _ for
detail on the 304 complaints.
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Table 5.1 reveals a significant variation over the years covered, with few obvious trends over
time. Developed countries do consistently bring more complaints: 60 percent overall, ranging from 18
percent to 83 percent each year, but with no particular trend over time. Developing countries initiated
action in 38 percent of cases overall, ranging from 17 percent to 74 percent of the cases each year. In
comparison, Hudec's landmark study of the GATT's early dispute settlement history-from 1947 to
1989-noted that 207 disputes were filed during that period. Four developed countries (Australia,
Canada, the European Community, and the United States) brought 73 percent of the disputes. Only 17
of the 207 disputes involved neither the United States nor Europe. Developing countries filed 19
percent of the complaints during that time. 13
On the respondent side, developed countries were respondents 61 percent of the time in the
recent period I studied, ranging from 37 to 82 percent each year; developing countries were
... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...
respondents in 39 percent of the cases, ranging from 18 to 63 percent. During the GATT period, four
developed countries (the United States, European Community, Canada, and Japan) were respondents
in 83 percent of the cases, and developing countries were respondents in only 13 percent of the cases.
The majority of GATT contracting parties (105) never participated in any dispute. 4
By combining the complainant and respondent profiles in my research, we see that 40 percent
of the disputes filed were between developed countries; 23 percent of the disputes involved developed
against developing countries; 22 percent involved developing against developed countries; and 16
percent were disputes by developing against other developing countries. The only noticeable trend
was a decreasing number of cases by developed countries against developing countries during the last
five years.
Hudec observed that larger countries are less concerned than small countries about retribution
that may be provoked by filing a claim. Further, a legal victory requires the prevailing party to exert
significant political and economic pressure to ensure that the respondent complies with the DSB
13 Robert E. Hudec, EnforcingInternational Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GA TLegal System
(Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), p. 295.
14 Ibid., p. 295.
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recommendation; larger countries can exert such pressure more easily. There is a high incidence of
"tit-for-tat litigation," and only countries that can handle the reciprocity tend to initiate complaints.
From the defendant perspective, however, larger countries offer the larger and more profitable
markets, thus making filing complaints more worthwhile. Additional criticisms and observations will
be discussed below.
Table 5.2 describes the disputes in terms of what tier of trade volume the parties represented.
Tier 1 countries were complainants in 56 percent of all cases and respondents in 51 percent of all
cases during the WTO period of 1995-2003. (Compare this to Hudec's GATT study, in which Tier 1
countries were complainants in 73 percent and respondents in 83 percent of the disputes.15) In the
WTO period, Tier 2 countries were complainants in 26 percent and respondents in 24 percent of the
disputes. Tier 3 countries were complainants in 18 percent of the cases, and this figure has been
increasing over the last five years. Tier 3 countries were respondents in 25 percent of the cases
overall.
Table 5.3 is interesting in that consistently about half of the disputes have involved requests
by other parties to join, suggesting a significant collective interest in the target measures, rather than
simply bilateral tensions.
We can see from these first three tables, then, that who files complaints against whom has
changed somewhat from the GATT period to the WTO period. In both cases, the Tier 1 countries
dominate both as complainants and respondents, but less so in the WTO period. During the WTO
period, about 40 percent of the disputes are brought by developed countries against other developed
countries. Cases of developed against developing, and developing against developed, are both more
than 20 percent. Cases involving developing against other developing countries are 16 percent. Thus,
the WTO period has witnessed a significant increase in involvement by smaller and developing
countries, both as complainants and respondents.
181
15 Ibid., p. 295.
Not only is participation more diverse in the dispute settlement procedures today, but the
incidence of usage has increased significantly as well. During the GATT period of 1948 to 1994, 277
disputes were filed. During the first nine years of the WTO period, 304 cases were filed. Hudec
updated his historical data to look at the first three years of the WTO period and considered several
. .
possible contributing factors for this increase in caseload. First, he noted that the increase was likely
generated by increased confidence in the dispute settlement procedure as a more effective mechanism
to discipline trade restrictions. Second, the Uruguay Round substantially increased members' legal
obligations, with services and intellectual property providing the bases for additional causes of action.
And third, developing countries' legal obligations were tightened, resulting in their more frequent
appearance as complainants and respondents.16
Table 5.4 reveals that most of the disputes (half to three-quarters) involved provisions of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Significant numbers of disputes were brought for violations
of the Antidumping Agreement (16 percent), the Agreement on Agriculture (18 percent), and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (17 percent). The next echelon of dispute
frequency includes the Import Licensing Agreement (9 percent), Safeguards Agreement (9 percent),
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (10 percent), Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) (7 percent), and Technical Barriers to Trade (8 percent).
Not surprisingly, these trade areas correlate precisely with the issues of concern highlighted
during the trade policy reviews discussed in Chapter 4. Since the topical areas could be anticipated
from policy implementation issues, the question is more the nature of a given dispute: Is it a matter of
legal interpretation or clarification? Is it a matter of technical expertise? Or is it a matter of political
or economic capacity? The DSU is a essentially a "one track system" 17 from which country-
complainants seek all of the above. The discussion section below will consider its strengths and
limitations in meeting those demands.
16 Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure," p. 1.
1 7 J.G. Merrills, InternationalDispute Settlement (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 217.
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Table 5.5 shows at what stage disputes were resolved. Of the 304 separate cases initiated from 1995
through 2003, 17 percent were resolved through mutual agreement. Panels were established for 46
percent of the cases and a panel report issued in 27 percent of the cases (i.e., in 58 percent of the cases
for which a panel was established). Of the 82 cases in which a panel report was issued, 52 cases
obtained appellate review, which represents 17 percent of the total cases and 63 percent of the cases
in which a panel report was issued.
Issues regarding the implementation of DSB decisions fall into three areas: reasonable period
of time for implementation; consistency of revised measures with the DSB's recommendations; and
the suspension of concessions. Six percent of the cases overall, or 23 percent of the cases for which a
panel report was adopted, pursued arbitration under Article 21.3 to determine the reasonable period of
time for implementation. Five percent of the cases overall, or 17 percent of the cases for which a
panel report was adopted, involved disagreements under Article 21.5 on compliance with a DSB
recommendation. Two percent of the cases overall, or 8 percent of the cases for which a panel report
was adopted, sought arbitration to authorize suspension of concessions under Article 22.6.
Hudec's recent analysis of GATT disputes in thel 980s and the early WTO period,2 ' and my
data for the WTO period to date, are compared in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Comparison with Hudec's Research
GATT 1980-89 WTO 1995-1997 WTO 1995-2003
Cases filed 110 84 304
Cases for which a 53% 38% 46%
panel was
established
Cases for which a 45% 23% 27%
panel report was
issued
21 Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure," p. 23.
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Hudec suggests two hypotheses concerning the lower rate of panel formation and report issuance in
recent years.22 First, he argues that the binding quality of the new procedure persuades more parties to
reform their practices voluntarily. And second, more governments may be using the filing of a
complaint as negotiating leverage.23 Testing Hudec's hypotheses will require more in-depth
interviews and analysis of panel and nonpanel cases, which is beyond the scope of this research.
CRITIQUES OF THE DSU
The WTO's DSU has been subject to intense scrutiny by its own members, other affected
stakeholders, and international trade scholars. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, for example,
Andreas Lowenfeld, a foremost international legal scholar, commented on the challenge facing the
GATT/WTO dispute settlement process.
While many believe that GATT dispute settlement should aim at lowering tensions, defusing
conflicts, and promoting compromise, others, notably American officials and writers, have
looked to the dispute mechanism of GATT as an opportunity to build a system of rules and
remedies.... It seems clear that the adjudicatory model prevailed in the Uruguay Round.... If it
turns out (1) that the panels operate within the prescribed time tables, (2) that their decisions
are respected not only by the parties to a given dispute but by other states considering
comparable measures, and (3) that decisions upholding complaints lead to termination of
offending measures rather than to retaliation-three sizable ifs-then the prediction will turn
out to have been true, and the commitment will continue to grow.24
Lowenfeld's concerns center on well-managed procedures, the enforceability of decisions, and
achieving a norm of compliance rather than retaliation. Other scholars' criticisms of the WTO's
22 Ibid., p. 22.
23 See Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes," Fordham International Law Journal 24 (November-December 2000): 1; and Marc
Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement," in Daniel Kennedy and James Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law:
Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 457. Busch and
Reinhardt observe that the cases that ended prior to a panel ruling (67 percent according to their data),
concluded with a much higher incidence of full or partial concessions by the defendant than those that
proceeded to a panel ruling.
2 4 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, "Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT," The
American Journal of International Law 88 (1994): 479,487.
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effectiveness sort into three dimensions: Lowenfeld's predicted issues of procedures and
enforcement, plus questions about who has access to the DSU process. Amending the DSU is one of
the topics on the Doha agenda, so the status of those negotiations will be reviewed first. I will then
review what the recent literature recommends, according to the three dimensions.
Negotiations to Amend the DSU
The Doha Ministerial Declaration included a commitment to negotiate improvements to and
clarification of the DSU by a target date of May 2003, in advance of the Cancun Ministerial
meeting. 25 The May 2003 deadline was extended to May 2004, then extended indefinitely in June
2004.26 In May 2003, Negotiating Committee Chair Ambassador Peter Balas (Hungary) circulated a
consolidated negotiating text that included a number of issues, including third-party rights,
consultation proceedings, sequencing, remand from the Appellate Body, compensation for litigation
costs, and special treatment for developing countries.27 Issues that had been proposed for but were not
included in the negotiating text included the formation of a permanent body of panelists, publication
of dissenting opinions from the Appellate Body, acceptance of amicus curiae briefs, opening dispute
settlement hearings and documents to the public, retroactive remedies, and collective retaliation.
Following the Cancun Ministerial in September 2003, at which little progress was made in
the overall Doha negotiations, Mexico prepared a study paper to help focus the discussion about DSU
reform and establish some priorities among the issues. 2 8 The Mexico study identified ten major
issues, categorized into three areas:
* Access to the system: developing country access, internal transparency, and external transparency
25 Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 30, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(0 I1)/DEC/I, November 20, 2001.
26 Special Session of the DSB, May 24, 2004, Report by the Chairman, WTO Doc. TN/DS/10, June 21, 2004.
27 Special Session of the DSB, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee, WTO Doc. TN/DS/9, June 6, 2003; and WTO Doc. JOB(03)69/Rev.2.
28 Diagnosis of the Problems Affecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Some Ideas by Mexico, paper
presented to the special negotiating session of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, November 13, 2003.
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* Procedural issues: professionalism in panelists, timeframes, ADR, control of disputes, and
miscellaneous
* Compliance: enhanced compliance, limits to the application of remedies
For each issue, the Mexico study identified the fundamental problem, considered specific
proposals to solve the problem, and described the significance of the problem in view of actual
experience. Of the ten identified issues, the study observed that some had only limited significance in
practice, but that "noncompliance (both a priori and a posteriori) is the most important problem of the
dispute settlement mechanism."29 The problem areas from the Mexico study are consistent with both
Lowenfeld's predictions and the literature. The following sections integrate these criticisms according
to the three dimensions mentioned previously: access to the DSU, procedures, and enforcement.
Access to the DSU
Three issues are of concern regarding access to the DSU process. First is the ability of developing
country members to raise complaints and obtain effective results. The other two are the ability of
other WTO members and interested nongovernmental parties to participate in the DSU process.
Developing countries face significant barriers to engaging in the WTO's dispute settlement
process. As indicated in the data summary above, the proportion of complaints filed by developing
countries has increased over the WTO's period of operation, but it still represents one-third fewer
cases than those initiated by developed countries. The Mexican study looked at WTO membership
participation in the DSU and found the following: Of the 29 developed countries,3 0 11 had initiated a
dispute; of the 72 developing countries, 28 had initiated a dispute; and of 30 least-developed countries
(LDCs), none had initiated a dispute.3 1 Despite developing countries' reliance on trade as a
significant proportion of their economies, they are not resorting to the DSU at a level commensurate
2 9 Ibid., p. 14.
30 The WTO includes 146 members, but for these figures the European Community is counted as one rather
than 15 separate members.
31 Some Ideas by Mexico, p. 4.
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to that of developed countries, and LDCs are not using it at all. The reasons for this are twofold: the
financial expense of litigation, and pressure from more powerful trading partners. Countries with
limited domestic legal expertise must retain counsel in Washington, DC, or Brussels. Moreover,
administrative resources for identifying and preparing the factual cases are scarce.3 2
The WTO has taken some steps to address these barriers. For example, the WTO established
an Advisory Centre on WTO Law to provide legal training, support, and advice on WTO law and
dispute settlement procedures to developing countries.3 3 The Centre has a sliding scale of legal fees
for handling a whole case (consultation, panel, and Appellate Body proceedings) that ranges from
$6,000 for 240 hours to $222,250 for up to 635 hours. Beatrice Chaytor wrote that, even as
developing countries gain confidence in the DSU and obtain financial and technical support from the
WTO, they:
will need to build the capacity to counteract trade barriers, primarily through education and
training, infrastructural and intellectual development for the missions in Geneva and
complementary action in key ministries in the capitals, because increasingly there will be a
need to monitor compliance with the WTO agreements, monitor trade flows, and other
actions of a very technical nature.3 4
The WTO's own infrastructure would benefit from increasing the number of professional
staff in the Secretariat and using more panelists from developing and LDC countries. One observer
has also suggested that the WTO establish regional resource centers to help members define their
priorities, coordinate trade strategies, build public-private networks, identify trade barriers, and
32 See, for example, Rajiv K. Gupta, "India and WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Analysis of Indian
Cases," February 2001 manuscript in possession of author; Beatrice Chaytor, "Developing Countries and
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement: A Profile of Enforcement in Agriculture and Textiles" in Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, ed., International Trade Law and the GA TT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (London: Kluwer
Law International, 1997), pp. 347-355; Alban Freneau and Asif Qureshi, "WTO Dispute Settlement System and
Implementation of Decisions: A Developing Country Perspective" (Thesis of Alban Freneau, University of
Manchester School of Law, 2001); Dukgeun Ahn, WTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia, (Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003); and Hyuck Choi, "WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanisms:
Korea's Experiences and Lessons Learned," speech given December 2001.
33 Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, signed at the Seattle Ministerial on December 1,
1999, and entered into force on July 15, 2001.
34 Chaytor, "Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement," p. 35.
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provide legal support.3 5 Related to participation in the DSU is a proposal to more explicitly consider
developing countries' particular problems and interests during consultations, the panel, the Appellate
Body, and the implementation process, pursuant to DSU Articles 4.10 and 12.10.36
A second issue of access is what the Mexico study has termed "internal transparency." 37
WTO disputes are essentially bilateral, and the final rulings are binding only on the parties directly
involved. However, the cases themselves create precedents that affect other members and panels in
the future. Third parties, who "have a substantial interest" in a dispute (from either the complainant or
the defendant point of view), may request to join. They have no right of participation at the
consultation stage, but a limited right to be heard during panel proceedings. Of the total number of
cases filed, roughly half have had third-party participants; of the cases in which a panel report has
been adopted, 90 percent have involved third parties. These third parties have limited access to
documents and meetings and to having their arguments considered by the panel or Appellate Body.
Chair Balas's draft negotiating text outlined ways to enhance third parties' rights.38
The third access problem concerns the rights of interested nongovernmental organizations.
Particularly since the Earth Summit in 1992, pressure has been building to allow broader
participation-beyond just government diplomats-in all international forums. The WTO is no
exception. Civil society groups have increasingly demanded to obtain WTO documents, attend WTO
meetings, and submit amicus curiae briefs in WTO cases.3 9 The WTO has hosted a series of meetings
3 5 Gregory Shaffer, "How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some
Proactive Developing Country Strategies," February 14, 2003, manuscript in possession of author.
36 See Joint Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, WTO Doc. TN/CTD/W/2; and Communication from
India, WTO Doc. TN/CTD/W/6.
37 Some Ideas by Mexico, p. 7.
38 Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, to the Trade Negotiation Committee, Annex: Chairman's
text, as of 28 May (the "Balas Draft"), WTO Doc. TN/DS/9, June 6, 2003, p. 5. See also Frieder Roessler,
"Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: An Inventory of Issues," draft manuscript of March 1998
in possession of author.
39 See Steve Charnovitz, "Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization,"
U. Penn. Journal of International Economic Law 17 (1996), p. 331.
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over the past few years to engage these stakeholders at a general policy level,40 but it has not as yet
opened its proceedings to the public. In a 1998 case, the Appellate Body determined that WTO panels
and the Appellate Body may accept amicus curiae briefs from nonmembers, but they have no
obligation to consider them in their proceedings.4 1 The Mexico study noted that amicus curiae briefs
had been submitted in fewer than 20 cases.4 2
Professor Richard Shell has proposed engaging nongovernmental stakeholders at an even
higher level, by employing a "trade stakeholder" model of dispute resolution. Shell recommends
democratizing the WTO dispute settlement process and granting much broader standing to nonstate
actors. He emphasizes that "direct participation in trade disputes not only by states and businesses,
but also by groups that are broadly representative of diverse citizen interest, will address critical
problems of distributive justice and procedural fairness." 43 His proposal has generated widespread
discussion.
Of the access problems raised, the lack of participation by developing countries seems the
most significant. If not all WTO members have effective access to dispute resolution procedures-
whether due to financial and technical constraints or power asymmetry with trading partners-the
legitimacy of the institution and its rules is called into question. Also, the satisfaction of the parties
(and potential parties) with outcomes and process is compromised, as are national and collective
interests. The issues of internal and external transparency are corollaries of that concern.
Improving the DSU's Procedures
A number of observers have recommended-given several years' experience with the system-
procedural improvements to the DSU process. These recommendations pertain to the staffing and
40 For example, the WTO has hosted annual public symposiums such as "Multilateralism at the Crossroads,"
held May 25-27, 2004 in Geneva and attended by 1,200 people.
41 United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R/58,
adopted November 6, 1998, para. 99-110.
42 Some Ideas by Mexico, p. 10.
43 G. Richard Shell, "The Trade Stakeholder Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade
Organization," Journal of International Economic Law 17, no. I (Spring 1996), pp. 359-382.
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operation of panels and the Appellate Body, the timeframes for various matters, and the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods.
The selection of panelists has become increasingly difficult, due to geography, expertise, and
strict ethical rules. The three-member panels are usually made up of diplomats from the trade
delegations of countries that are perceived to be neutral to the outcome of the dispute. While selected
for their judgment and trade policy experience, most do not have legal training, and so they rely upon
the Secretariat's legal staff on legal issues. Especially since the adoption of the WTO Agreement, the
complexity and range of international legal knowledge required suggests that nonlawyer diplomats
are unlikely to be as suitable as those trained in law. It has been proposed that the WTO appoint 15-
24 permanent panelists (with government experience and legal training) instead of using the current
method of choosing from a larger roster of experts who have other professional responsibilities.44
With more than 15 cases submitted to panels each year, and three members needed per panel, a
professional panel staff is likely to need at least five to ten full-time members.
With regard to timeframes, it has become clear that almost every DSU procedure deadline-
including deadlines for consultations, panel establishment, panel review, and Appellate Body
review-is consistently exceeded. Table 5.7 illustrates the Mexico study's findings regarding missed
deadlines.4 5
44 See Roessler, "Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures," pp. 18-19. Thailand has proposed that a
roster of panel chairs be formed. DSB, Special Session, Communication from Thailand, WTO Doc.
TN/DS/W/3 1, January 22, 2003. The European Community has proposed a body of permanent panelists. DSB,
Special Session, Contributions of the European Communities and Its Member States to the Improvement and
Clarification of the WTO DSU, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/38.
45 Some Ideas by Mexico, p. 17.
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Table 5.7: The Mexico Study's Findings regarding Deadlines
De jure De facto average Difference
Consultations 60 days 148 days 88 days
Panel establishment 10 days 41 days 31 days
Panel procedure 9 months 12 months 3 months
(from establishment to
circulation of report)
Appellate Body 60 days 86 days 26 days
procedure
(from notice of appeal
to circulation of
report)
From adoption to 90 days 135 days 46 days
circulation of 21.3
award
Matter referred and 90 days 159 days 69 days
final report
circulated in 21.5
panels
The WTO is now considering modifying these timelines and exploring means of increasing
institutional capacity. Supplementary procedures have been discussed as well, including a remand
procedure from the Appellate Body to the original panel when issues of fact need to be reviewed, and
the issuance of confidential interim reports to parties for review and revision prior to the distribution
of final reports.
As mentioned, ADR options have also been considered. The DSU obligates WTO members
to use its procedures to settle disputes arising under the WTO Agreement, and it makes available a
range of processes: consultation, good offices, conciliation, and mediation, as well as the panel and
Appellate Body process. The current Director-General has specifically expressed his readiness to
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assist members in the use of good offices, conciliation, and mediation,46 but these processes have
rarely been used. Two observers wrote:
[The] WTO system makes it easy to litigate a dispute and secure a legal ruling, it
unfortunately does not provide a structured way to achieve negotiated settlements....
[C]onsultations have all too often proven perfunctory and ineffectual. Negotiations would
become far more meaningful if the parties were assisted by an independent, professionally
trained facilitator. Mediation already exists as a concept in the WTO, but only in the form of
ad hoc intervention by the secretariat. It does not exist as a pre-hearing process conducted by
independent experts schooled in alternative dispute resolution. The current rules should thus
be amended to require mediation before a matter goes to full dispute settlement.47
The notion of ADR is appealing, but given its infrequent use to date, more thought needs to be
devoted to aligning incentives with the nature of disputes filed. If a respondent prefers to wait out the
process before having to reform its policies, an early settlement through ADR is not attractive unless
there is some incentive to do so (e.g., a transitional time to reform and a restored trade relationship).
Another process to consider is that of advisory opinions, which would require the services of an
expert legal body akin to the International Court of Justice. This option was contemplated in the
GATT's formation, but not implemented in practice.
The Enforceability of DSB Decisions
The Mexico study considered two kinds of compliance: a priori and a posteriori. The former concerns
what members do to bring their domestic laws, regulations, and administrative procedures into
conformity with their obligations under the WTO agreements, which this research has termed second-
order disputes. The latter concerns reforming or withdrawing measures that are found to be
inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements, which I have termed third-order
disputes and which are the subject of this chapter. Several issues have been raised in connection with
46 Article 5 of the DSU, Communication from the Director-General, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/25, July 17, 2001.
See also Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure," pp. 1, 31.
47 Susan Esserman and Robert Howse, "The WTO on Trial," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2003), pp. 130,
136, 137.
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the enforcement of third-order dispute decisions-in particular, the enforcement of panel and
Appellate Body decisions. These issues include implementation, sequencing, and remedies.
The implementation of panel and Appellate Body recommendations is monitored by the DSB.
DSU Article 21 provides that "Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is
essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members." After
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report, the member concerned must inform the DSB of its
intentions with regard to implementing the recommendations and rulings, with an obligation to do so
within a "reasonable period of time." That period can be mutually agreed by the parties, or
determined by binding arbitration under Article 21.3. Article 21.5 provides for handling
disagreements over whether the measures taken by the member concerned are consistent with the
DSB's recommendations. Article 22 provides for compensation and the suspension of concessions if
the DSB's recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable time. Sequencing pertains to
the order in which Articles 21.5 and 22 are addressed. The Balas draft provides for the clarification of
these procedures at the implementation stage.48
Enforcement includes both a determination of whether a violation has occurred, and, if one
has, the violator's reformation of its behavior or compensation of the injured party. The Mexico study
concludes that, of the 89 panel reports adopted, the respondent was found to have violated its WTO
obligations in 77 cases. The average period of time between the establishment of a panel and expiry
of the "reasonable period of time" was 775 days, or more than two years; counting from the original
request for consultations, the average period was more than four years. Of the cases in which a
violation was found, compliance was immediate in five cases. But the average time to comply was
292 days, and 28 cases exceeded the reasonable period of time for implementation. 4 9 Thus even
though the DSU's procedures are more stringent than previous GATT practice, implementation and
enforcement problems continue. Asif Qureshi argues:
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48 Balas Draft, pp. 11-16.
49 Some Ideas by Mexico, p. 13.
The most significant flaw from an enforcement perspective is that it is still reliant in
important respects on the consent and initiative of the parties to the dispute. Thus, whilst the
parties can no longer in most respects block the adoption of panel reports, there is still the
possibility of a creeping kind of blocking, particularly in the context of the implementation of
panel decisions. There is ambiguity in the affirmation of the role of law and a general absence
of availability of redress provisions independent of the parties to the dispute. 50r
These enforcement problems raise questions about whether the remedies are adequate to the
problem, and whether some steps can be taken to improve overall compliance.
The issue of remedies is complex and controversial. The use of the DSU is triggered when a
party believes that its negotiated benefits under the covered agreements have been nullified or
impaired. A panel and the Appellate Body will determine whether the challenged measure is
consistent with the respective agreement. If found inconsistent, the respondent party has a reasonable
period of time to bring the measure into compliance. If the respondent party fails to reform its policy
measure, then the complainant can seek compensation from the respondent. If the complainant and
respondent cannot agree on the amount of compensation, the complainant may request authorization
from the DSB to suspend concessions granted under the agreement.5 1 John Jackson notes that neither
compensation nor retaliation is equivalent to compliance. He argues that:
the treaty text imposes an international law obligation to perform and does not give a free
choice to prefer compensatory measures. Policy considerations, moreover, suggest that
performance is the more equitable requirement: to have a system under which wealthy
countries can buy their way out of obligations, particularly those with respect to small or less
powerful countries, raises an important asymmetry that could undermine the credibility of the
entire dispute settlement procedure. It also creates a climate of uncertainty for millions of
50 Asif Qureshi, The World Trade Organization: Implementing International Trade Norms (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 107.
51 Recall that, in the bananas case described in Chapter 1, the United States was authorized to retaliate against
the European Community in the amount of $191.4 million. Overview of the State-of-Play, WTO Doc.
WT/DS/OV3, p. 97. The United States was entitled to draw up a list of products exported by the European
Community to the United States on which the U.S. would raise tariffs above the level otherwise agreed in the
tariff schedules and equivalent in value to $191.4 million.
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independent entrepreneurs and traders, who depend upon the rule structure as formulated by
the treaty text. 52
Other remedy policies have been proposed, including: a refund of antidumping duties for
antidumping violations; provisional or retroactive remedies in which the time required for the DSU
procedures would cause significant harm to the complainant; an award to cover litigation costs if a
developing country complainant prevails; an award of monetary compensation for noncompliance;
and collective retaliation by multiple countries against a respondent found in violation.
Political economist and international trade scholar Robert Lawrence has examined the whole
notion of WTO remedies, and the ongoing retaliation between the United States and European
Community in particular. Lawrence is concerned that these cases could "undo the liberalization of
previous trade negotiations, poison the atmosphere for future agreements, raise serious questions
about the efficacy and legitimacy of the dispute resolution system, and strengthen the hand of those
who oppose the WTO as an unwarranted intrusion on national sovereignty." 53 The reciprocal
concessions embodied in the WTO agreements represent both commercial contracts and international
treaty commitments. Remedies are used to induce compliance, provide compensation, or permit legal
breach. Lawrence suggests reframining the purpose of the remedies to be one of rebalancing, and he
believes that the "system will operate best if it induces compliance where this is possible and limits
retaliation where it is not." 54 He proposes four reforms, the most intriguing of which is the idea of
liberalization security deposits (LSDs). Under this scheme, each WTO member would post an LSD
based on its primary trade sectors as security against its performance as determined by the DSB. This
approach is consistent with others who argue that an international regime would be more stable if it
"permit[s] countries to temporarily deviate from their obligations in periods of excessive, unexpected
52 John Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Washington, DC:
Brookings Trade Forum 2000), p. 194.
53 Robert Z. Lawrence, Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO (Washington,
D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 2004), p. 2 of manuscript.
54 Ibid., p. 11.
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political pressure at some pre-negotiated cost." 55 It would, of course, be important to set the level of
security so that it is neither too cheap nor too expensive to use.
DISCUSSION
Third-order disputes arise when a WTO member believes that the benefits for which it has contracted
in the various WTO agreements have been nullified or impaired. The WTO's dispute settlement
process, the DSU, is mandatory and binding, and provides for a progression of steps: consultations;
optional conciliation, good offices, or mediation with the aid of the Director-General; panel review;
and Appellate Body review. The use of the DSU has been steady, at more than 30 cases per year, and
participation is more diverse than in the past. WTO jurisprudence has been generally well received. 56
More serious criticisms have been generated over access to the process, the enforcement of the
decisions, and the adequacy of the remedies. This discussion will first briefly summarize the WTO's
DSU statistics and criticisms, reconsider the hypotheses raised at the beginning of this chapter, then
evaluate how well third-order disputes are being handled.
The chapter has described how the WTO's DSU has functioned according to its mandate to:
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations.... Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give
them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.5 7
The data available reveal that the DSU has been increasingly used over the past nine years, by an
increasingly diverse set of parties. The case load during the WTO period (1995-2003) is double that
of the late GATT period (1980-1994), with more than 30 cases now submitted each year. Developed
55 Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner, "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and
Escape," International Organization 55 (2001): 289.
56 Hudec, "The New GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure," p. 1; Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, p. 179; Jeffrey Waincymer, "World Trade Organization: A Guide to
the Jurisprudence" in Jeffrey Waincymer, ed. WTO Litigation (London: Cameron May, 2001).
57 DSU, Article 1.
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countries still use the process most, but both smaller and developing countries have participated as
complainants and respondents. The issues raised in these third-order disputes parallel those raised as
second-order disputes: provisions under the GATT, agriculture, antidumping, subsidies, and
countervailing measures. In terms of process, of the 304 cases submitted since 1995, less than 20
percent reach mutual agreement, and nearly half resulted in the establishment of a panel. Of those
cases submitted to a panel, more than half resulted in a report being issued, and more than two-thirds
of those with panel reports were subsequently reviewed by the Appellate Body. Implementation
problems (including determining a reasonable period of time for implementation, compensation, and
authorized suspension of concessions) were raised 40 times. (Multiple implementation issues were
raised in some cases.) In short, the DSU is used extensively.
With both the previous GATT period (1948-1994) and the WTO period (1995-2003) for
reference, practitioners and scholars have a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the dispute
settlement process. Criticisms of the DSU center on three areas: access to the process, procedures,
and compliance. Access is a concern with regard to three groups: developing countries, who lack the
financial and administrative resources and political and economic leverage to pursue cases; other
WTO members who have an interest in a given bilateral dispute and desire to join the process; and
nonstate actors who seek access to both documents and meeting participation. Regarding the access of
developing countries, certainly many more are participating in the DSU than in the past, and the
Advisory Centre offers significant legal and technical assistance. The WTO is considering procedural
reforms for third parties, but it is unlikely to expand participation for nonstate entities in the
immediate future. Other procedural improvements regarding panelist qualifications, extended or
accelerated timeframes, and ADR options have been proposed. The compliance problems relative to
the implementation of DSB recommendations and the adequacy of remedies are most troublesome,
and it is not clear what steps would engender the consensus support required to amend the DSU
process.
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Assessing the WTO's Experience with Third-Order Disputes against the Hypotheses
Based on the above overview of the DSU's current status, the three hypotheses are considered.
Test Hypothesis 1. The more explicit the legal procedures for enforcement, the more likely that
countries will comply with their obligations.
The advent of the DSU was lauded as one of the primary achievements of the Uruguay Round. The
negotiators attempted to deal with the frustrations experienced in GATT dispute settlement by
providing for a mandatory, binding process that set specific timelines for panel review, provided for
Appellate Review, and flipped the previous consensus-for-adoption rule that allowed an unhappy
respondent to block the adoption of a panel's recommendations. All in all, the new DSU was a
remarkable achievement that crystallized the transition from the more diplomatic approach of dispute
resolution to a rule-oriented arbitration by an impartial tribunal. The existence of an impartial,
respected tribunal, applicable substantive rules, and limited recourse to pursue alternative power-
oriented methods creates the foundation for adjudicatory legitimacy.58 The question is whether this
more legal approach is effective in causing countries to comply with their WTO obligations generally,
and with DSU decisions specifically.
International legal scholar Joseph Weiler pushes further on the diplomatic-to-adjudication
paradigm shift.
Juridification is a package deal: it includes both the Rule of Law and the Rule of Lawyers. It
does not simply (and very importantly) have an impact on the power relations between
Members, on the compliance pull of the Agreements, on the ability to have definitive
settlement of disputes, on the prospect of having authoritative interpretations of clumsy or
deliberate drafting of opaque provisions. It imports, willy-nilly, want it or not, the norms,
practices, habits-some noble some self-serving, some helpful some disastrous, some with a
concern for justice others with a concern for arcane points of process and procedure-of legal
58 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: Lessons for Strengthening
International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas," Journal of International Economic Law 2, no. 2
(June 1999), p. 198.
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culture.... Lawyers, practicing lawyers, will be involved early on in all stages of dispute
management by and within Members. 5 9
Weiler comments that with juridification comes a shift in power. The panel's target is less
about crafting a decision geared to the parties than one that is legally sound and will withstand
Appellate review. To the extent that panelists rely on the legal advice of the Secretariat, power is
focused there as well, but it lacks transparency.
Political institutions' legitimacy, of a more enduring nature [than politicians' concern with
results] will depend on inputs (process). The legitimacy of courts which is meant to transcend
specific results and to enjoy long endurance will depend on both the integrity of process but,
in addition and uniquely, on the quality both substantive and communicative of its
reasoning.... The legitimacy of courts rests in grand part on their capacity to listen to the
parties, to deliberate impartially favouring neither the powerful nor the meek, to have the
courage to decide and then, crucially, to motivate and explain the decisions.60
Overall, the tightening of legal procedures in the WTO appears to have advanced dispute
settlement, but it comes at the cost of adopting a legal culture and is not sufficient in itself. One
important pre-condition for legal procedure is the existence of applicable substantive legal rules
against which behavior can be measured-in other words, the resolution of first-order disputes. If the
rules-procedural and substantive-are sufficiently clear that an impartial tribunal can render a ruling
that is perceived as correctly drawn, then the number and sensitivity of cases brought manifest the
parties' confidence in the system-a measure of success. In fact, the number of cases brought at the
WTO and the complexity of the legal arguments made and decisions rendered suggest that such
confidence does exist. The remaining condition is the commitment and political willingness of parties
to abide by those decisions. The members have already agreed to subordinate sovereignty to the
DSU's review of third-order disputes. And parties have, in most cases, complied with the rulings,
albeit taking much longer to implement them than the rules require. Overall, then, the hypothesis is
59 J.H.H. Weiler, "The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement," Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/00 (2000), p. 6.
60 Ibid., p. 12.
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confirmed, but conditionally along with substantive rules of behavior and a common political
willingness to comply with the DSB's recommendations.
Test Hypothesis 2: Increased access to legal, financial, and technical resources will increase the
ability of countries to enforce their rights.
Developing country observers,61 scholars,62 and the DSU's own assessment make clear that limited
legal and financial resources severely constrain developing countries' ability to enforce their rights
under the WTO agreements. The formation of the Advisory Centre addresses this problem in part. A
significant aspect of the resource limitation, however, is a domestic ministry's ability to assess and
monitor national trade practices, to ascertain whether the country and its trading partners are
complying with WTO obligations. The development of regional WTO resource centers might
contribute to the necessary administrative capacity. What cannot be addressed directly is the limited
economic and political leverage that smaller and developing countries have in bringing a complaint
against a larger, more-powerful trading partner. A rule-based regime is an institutional attempt to
constrain the effects of power asymmetry. This hypothesis, too, is confirmed conditionally. Direct
support in the form of legal and financial assistance is critical for many countries to utilize the DSU;
however, additional domestic capacity with supplementary administrative support are necessary as
well.
Test Hypothesis 3: An array of direct andfacilitated resolution procedures will increase the
opportunity for parties to resolve problems of noncompliance.
The final question is whether the DSU procedures need to be improved, or whether there needs to be
differentiation among cases submitted to the DSU. For example, one practitioner-scholar notes:
61 Choi, "WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanisms."
62 Chaytor, "Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement," pp. 347-355; and Shaffer, "How to
Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work."
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A case may go forward because the outcome of the application of the rules to the facts of a
particular dispute is not clear in advance. Or it may go forward even though the outcome is
clear because a government may wish to show a domestic constituency that it did all that it
could, or because it may wish to show a parochial ministry the consequences of not
considering international commitments before acting.63
Should all of these instances be submitted to the same process? Can they be differentiated? A number
of commenters have proposed that the conciliation/good offices/mediation processes prescribed in the
DSU be activated. These processes have been available since the GATT 1947, but have rarely if ever
been used. The current Director-General has explicitly offered his services in this regard, but no
parties have accepted. The availability of the process is clearly insufficient. Thus, a more activist
approach may be warranted. Perhaps a pilot program could be introduced that creates some incentives
for the use of conciliation (for fact-finding) and mediation (with professionally trained mediators) on
certain kinds of cases. It could even be made mandatory for certain classes of disputes. Advisory
opinions could also be offered. The International Court of Justice has the power to give advisory
opinions on any legal questions. Within the WTO, only the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council have the power to adopt interpretations, and to do so requires a three-quarters majority
decision.6 4 If the decision were made to delegate interpretative authority to the Appellate Body, some
kind of advisory opinion process could be devised that links with the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, such that if an opinion were sought, there might also be a transitional process devised to
help overcome economic disincentives.
There exists little incentive for respondents to comply early with DSU decisions, as
evidenced by the nearly four-year lag time between a request for consultation and implementation.
Andrew Guzman has considered the political economy of disputes versus settlement at the WTO.65
He looked at the 262 cases from 1995 to mid-2002, of which 82 went to a panel. In 90 percent of the
63 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (London:
Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 175.
64 See Roessler, "Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures," p. 27.
65 Andrew Guzman, The Political Economy of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization,
Working paper 81 (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Olin Program in Law and Economics, 2003).
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cases, he noted that the respondent had violated its WTO obligations. While the
noneconomic/relationship costs are difficult to measure, it is clear that it may benefit both the
complainant and respondent to wait for a panel decision. The complainant gains a legal victory,
satisfies its constituents, and appears "tough" to other countries. The respondent benefits from
extending the amount of time it has to restructure an industry and protect it, pending the decision
being issued. The harm experienced by other (nonparty) countries, however, is not integrated into the
calculation. This serves as a reminder that the procedural incentives for settlement, including the use
of assisted negotiation and mediation, need to be explored carefully. Thus, hypothesis 3.3 is not
confirmed. A variety of ADR processes have been optionally available for decades, yet parties have
not pursued their use. While the experience with domestic legal systems, suggestions by scholars, and
the interest of diplomats validate making ADR processes available, they have in fact been available to
no avail.
Third-Order Disputes and the Power-Interests-Rights Framework
Recall the framework principle that was proposed at the outset: that processes that are primarily
motivated by the parties' interests (rather than rights and power) are more likely to be sustainable
over the long term. With third-order disputes, there has been a gradual shift from a more diplomatic
approach (shaped by power and interests) to a more adjudicatory one (guided by rights, but tempered
by power). One might ask whether the now more-legalistic processes come at the expense of the
institution's and parties' interests. The interests of a complainant are to obtain a remedy if its benefits
have been impaired and to maintain its trading relationships; the interests of the respondent are to
obtain a clear legal ruling, gain time to adapt as necessary, and maintain trading relationships. The
institution's interest is to maintain its status and build its legitimacy for effectively managing its
functions. Friedl Weiss, international scholar and currently head of the Advisory Centre, wrote:
Hitherto, adaptability not legal consistency, predictability, and certainty were the goals to be
achieved. The dominant aspects of disputes was that of "settlement" of accommodation of
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interests rather than of vindication of rights in a "victory versus defeat" pattern. An entirely
new philosophy derived from an inverted order of the mentioned goals. Thus, while the
policy option for flexibility in settlement still exists, it is now backed by an intricate two-
instance system of procedural rules providing for enhanced certainty in rule application. This
should generally benefit weaker Members, especially when confronted with market pressures
from more powerful ones.6 6
There may be a lingering difference of view on whether the legal stringency of the DSU is necessary
for its effectiveness-a difference that may be better evaluated after time.
Assessment of Third-Order Dispute Resolution against Dispute Resolution Criteria
In closing, I will touch on the five criteria for evaluating dispute settlement processes.
Transaction Costs: Clearly, the costs of litigation are high in financial, administrative,
opportunity, relationship, and diplomatic terms. So if a case is initiated, the harm to the complainant
must be high as well. Noting the high number of cases in which more than one country has a
substantial interest, the costs of bringing a complaint can more easily be borne by a developed
country; accordingly, developing countries may defer if a developed country is willing to do so. This
"piggybacking" may skew the impression of which countries are more likely to bring complaints in
the DSU, but reflect a more efficient allocation of costs. In terms of relative compliance costs, if a
respondent does not respond to informal or formal consultations, its incentives may lie with waiting
out the final decision and implementation period.6 7 The DSU provides a clear process to pursue one's
rights, but it is a lengthy one.
Satisfaction with Outcome: The Mexico study found that, in 77 percent of cases reviewed by
a panel, the respondent was determined to be out of compliance. Most cases have eventually resulted
in the implementation of changes, either through reformed target measures, compensation, or
66 Friedl Weiss, "WTO Dispute Settlement and the Economic Order of WTO Member States" in P. van Dijck
and G. Faber, eds., Challenges to the New World Trade Organization (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1996), pp. 77-94, 83.
67 See Guzman, The Political Economy of Litigation and Settlement.
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approved suspensions of concessions. The continued elevated use of the DSU suggests at least a
modicum of satisfaction with DSU rulings and implementation.
Satisfaction with Procedure: DSU reviews indicate that members believe the panel and
Appellate Body are generally satisfactory, but that more time and resources are needed. Even
developing countries use the procedures, but they have proposed reforms to ensure adequate legal
counsel and additional time to participate.
Effect on Relationships. For most countries, considerable effort is expended to avoid third-
order disputes. Periodic consultations with key trading partners reduces the likelihood that tensions
will progress to the filing of a complaint. Nevertheless, a significant number of disputes occur. Forty
percent of complaints filed are between developed and other developed countries, and most of those
cases involve the United States or the European Community. While the US-EC relationship can
withstand a certain level of reciprocal trade tension, it needs to be managed so as not to disrupt
critical trade flows. Twenty percent of the DSU cases are developed versus developing countries, and
another 20 percent are developing versus developed countries; these trading relationships are likely to
be more sensitive to disruption, as are the developing versus developing country disputes. If,
however, a problem is serious enough to warrant the filing of a complaint, and consultations are
unsuccessful, then a third-party decision may be necessary for both parties to satisfy their respective
constituencies. The question would be whether a less adjudicatory process could achieve satisfactory
outcomes and better maintain ongoing trading relationships.
Recurrence. The issues raised in the DSU as third-order disputes mirror those identified in
second-order disputes, and the DSU is not particularly effective at reducing the recurrence of these
problems. The presence of third parties joining the disputes demonstrates that the problems are more
systemic than bilateral. The transaction costs involved in multiple countries filing complaints against
a single violator, or a complainant filing complaints against multiple respondents, are cost-
prohibitive. We have already questioned whether there is a more efficient way to address these issues
and create some kind of feedback mechanisms among first-order, second-order and third-order
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disputes. Additional research would inform this assessment. For example, it would be very useful to
measure the compliance pull of sanctions and measure the short-term and longer-term effects on
respondent (and other similarly-situated) country behavior. These ideas will be discussed in Chapter
6.
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CHAPTER 6: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN
This research has described how the WTO identifies and resolves what I have termed first-order:
(policymaking), second-order (policy implementation), and third-order (policy enforcement) disputes.
The opening chapter described the three orders of disputes, the diagnosis and resolution processes
utilized, and the problems encountered. Drawing upon selected theoretical literature, hypotheses were
posed. The WTO's processes were characterized in terms of power, rights, and interests, then
assessed against five criteria: transaction costs; satisfaction with process; satisfaction with outcome;
effect on relationships; and recurrence of the substantive problem among the parties.
This final chapter has four sections. First, I synthesize the three dispute order analyses and the
hypothesis results. The next two sections compare the power-rights-interest characteristics, and the
effectiveness criteria, among the three dispute orders. The concluding section considers how these
existing processes might be integrated as a system to better diagnose and resolve the disputes that an
international system is called upon to manage.
THREE DISPUTE ORDERS: PROCESS SUMMARY
Recall that in the first chapter, the three dispute orders were laid out in terms of both diagnosis and
resolution processes. First-order disputes at the WTO concern differences among the membership on
what issues warrant common institutional policies. Member nations must decide to what extent their
national domestic trade policies will defer to a common global interest in stable, predictable
international trade. First-order disputes are diagnosed by all member countries, who decide by
consensus what issues of WTO policy will be included on the agenda for a given negotiating round.
Once the agenda is agreed upon, the negotiations continue until the member nations agree, again by
consensus, on a final agreement as to new or revised WTO policies. Chronic problems encountered
during both the agenda-setting and negotiation processes are threefold: negotiators have uneven
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access to essential information; countries that dominate the negotiations may not be representative of
the overall membership; and limited attention is paid to the parties' ability to implement the rules
once adopted.
Second-order disputes arise in the context of policy implementation-in other words, in the
adopting of national legislation and regulations to implement WTO policies. These disputes are
diagnosed when a nation (or nations, or members of the Secretariat) raises concerns about another
nation's trade policies during relevant WTO councils or committee meetings, and particularly in the
Council for the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Second-order dispute resolution takes the
form of comments and recommendations, but does not involve any binding action. One problem with
the handling of second-order disputes is that it does not involve any structured review of options by
which a target country could feasibly (economically, politically, and legally) bring its domestic policy
into consistency with the WTO's trade rules.
Third-order disputes are more in the nature of litigation. These disputes surface when one
nation makes a specific claim against another nation that the latter has abrogated ("nullified or
impaired") a benefit to which the complainant was entitled under the WTO Agreement. The WTO's
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU) prescribes a
sequential set of resolution processes. Bilateral or assisted consultations are attempted first, followed
if necessary by a decision by a three-expert panel, and finally in some cases the legal review of a
panel decision by the Appellate Body. The DSU process, adopted in 1994, was a culmination of
GATT dispute resolution experience from 1948 to 1994 and is significantly more legally binding than
the GATT procedures. The problems most often raised with the DSU are several: the process is often
too expensive (financially and diplomatically) for smaller countries to participate; the panel experts
are not as well-versed in law as a roster of professionals might be; the proceedings could be more
transparent to other interested countries and nonstate stakeholders; and the implementation of
panel/Appellate Body decisions is often significantly delayed.
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The literature in international negotiation and consensus building, implementation, and
dispute settlement was considered in developing hypotheses for each of the dispute order resolution
processes. Table 6.1 lays out the hypotheses and results.
Table 6.1: Preliminary Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis Hypothesis Result Comment
First-Order Disputes: H 1.1: More representative Confirmed The process by which
Policymaking participation (i.e., more in conditionally participants are
number and kind of selected is critical.
participants) contributes to
an agenda of interests that
will engage short-term and
long-term support of an
agreement
H 1.2: Broader Confirmed
participation in information
exchange (including
collection, analysis, and
dissemination) contributes
to sustainable commitments
H 1.3: A negotiation Confirmed The more parties and
process that includes a conditionally the more issues, the
skilled neutral and more transparent the
procedural rules to ensure process needs to be.
balanced participation,
information exchange, and
option generation will
increase the likelihood of
agreement
Second-Order H 2.1: A rights-oriented Confirmed Some concrete cost
Disputes: surveillance process is conditionally must be imposed on
Policy Implementation likely to be more successful the target for failure
if universal, periodic, and to actively pursue
transparent compliance; the
surveillance process
must be of value to
both the institution
and the target
H 2.2: The resolution of Indirectly No such process
implementation problems confirmed currently exists, but
will be enhanced by a member countries
process that allows for the expressed a desire and
exploration of a range of need for it.
transitional options to
bring the party into
compliance.
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The analysis of these processes is by necessity a qualitative one, with quantitative support for
some aspects. The hypotheses regarding first-order dispute processes focused on (1) representative
participation in the negotiations, (2) broad participation in information exchange (including
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information), and (3) characteristics of the negotiation
process.
H 1.1: More representative participation (i.e., more in number and kind ofparticipants) contributes
to an agenda of interests that will engage short-term and long-term support of an agreement.
Based on the experience of the last four international trade negotiations-the Kennedy, Tokyo,
Uruguay, and current Doha Rounds-this hypothesis was conditionally confirmed. As the institution
has grown from 23 to 146 member nations, it has wrestled with an increasing number of people and
an increasing complexity of issues. The inclusion of more participants is more representative, but also
more difficult to manage. Over the same period, the issues in contention have expanded from simple
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Third-Order H 3.1: The more explicit the Confirmed Clear substantive
Disputes: legal procedures for conditionally rules are also
Policy Enforcement enforcement, the more necessary. Ultimate
likely that countries will compliance may not
comply with their fall within prescribed
obligations time bounds.
H 3.2: Increased access to Confirmed Access to these
legal, financial, and conditionally resources is certainly
technical resources will necessary, but not
increase the ability of sufficient to enable
countries to enforce their countries to enforce
rights their rights.
H 3.3: An array of direct Not confirmed The availability of
andfacilitated resolution optional, varied
procedures will increase processes is
the opportunity for parties insufficient; ADR
to resolve problems of processes must either
noncompliance be mandatory, or
incentives for
compliance need to be
aligned with such
processes to make
them attractive.
tariff reduction to highly complex issues such as intellectual property and competition policy. With
more participants, more issues are submitted for consideration, which allows a greater degree of
flexibility for making tradeoffs, but the large number of participants also overtaxes the ability of
formal proceedings to function. Key actors with the secretariat are tempted to shrink the size of the
informal negotiating groups, but such moves risk generating suspicion among those not included. In
short, the greater number and kind of participants does contribute to a more balanced agenda and
potential agreement, but the process of selecting key participants needs to be transparent in order for
the process to retain credibility.
H 1.2: Broader participation in information exchange (including collection, analysis, and
dissemination) contributes to sustainable commitments.
This hypothesis is a corollary of the first. In the last three negotiating rounds, the investment of time
and effort into developing a consensual information base served to build joint understanding of the
issues and the basis on which negotiators could assess priorities and tradeoffs. Even if lead countries
like the European Communities and the United States take the initiative to begin the information
investigation, other countries need to be involved as well. Only in that way can they be sufficiently
informed to evaluate and negotiate tradeoffs between issues of importance to the EC and U.S. and
other issues of more significance to their own countries, and subsequently to implement any
agreement.
H 1.3: A negotiation process that includes a skilled neutral and procedural rules to ensure balanced
participation, information exchange, and option generation will increase the likelihood of agreement.
This hypothesis draws upon the extensive mutual gains negotiation literature in which interests form
the core of effective negotiation. The GATT and WTO have not utilized professional neutrals
precisely, but the skilled assistance of directors-general and talented committee chairs supports the
premise. As the number of parties and issues has increased, so has the importance of process.
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Contributing factors to "creating a transparent, democratic, all-inclusive and consultative decision-
making process"' include expert facilitation and mediation of the informal and formal meetings,
transparency of the process, the development and exchange of essential information, and an
opportunity for generating multiple options to craft an agreement.
H 2.1: A rights-oriented surveillance process is likely to be more successful if universal, periodic, and
transparent.
The work of the WTO's operating committees and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism has provided
a natural laboratory for this hypothesis. The operating committees, all of which are open to all
members of the WTO and focus on one of its agreements (e.g., intellectual property, agriculture,
subsidies), call for various self-reported notifications on countries' respective implementation.
However, in practice such notifications are conspicuously lagging. The TPRM provides for a periodic
review of each WTO member, according to a prescribed list of criteria. The institutional and country
reports are disseminated to all WTO members, who then have an opportunity to discuss the findings
with the target country. The TPRM does succeed in diagnosing a number of implementation issues,
but there is no consequence; the process results in recommendations, but there is no means for
helping the target country overcome its shortcomings. In short, the rights-based (rule-based),
universal, periodic, and transparent criteria are fulfilled, yet these processes are insufficient to resolve
the implementation disputes. The process should serve not only the interests of the institution in
ascertaining the progress of a country in implementing agreed-upon rules, but should enable the
reviewed country to better manage its trade policies consistent with its WTO obligations.
I Proposals for Improving the Decision-Making Process in the WTO, WTO Doc. WT/GC/510, August 14,
2003. For an illustrative strategy in the environmental context, see L. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy:
Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, (New York, NY: 1994), and more broadly, L. Susskind, S.
McKearnan and J. Thomas-Larmer, The Consensus Building Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 1999). On the role of an individual mediator, see L. Antrim and J. Sebenius, "Formal Individual
Mediation and the Negotiators' Dilemma: Tommy Koh at the Law of the Sea Conference," in J. Bercovitch and
J. Rubin, Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (London:
Macmillan, 1991).
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H2.2: The resolution of implementation problems will be enhanced by a process that allows for the
exploration of a range of transitional options to bring the party into compliance.
The previous hypothesis focused on the diagnostic aspects of the policy implementation processes;
this hypothesis focuses on resolution. Evidence indicates that TPRs are quite valuable in identifying
implementation issues, but lack the structure and commitment to solve identified problems. A country
under TPR review has an opportunity to explain the barriers to implementation, but there is no
designated time to propose and evaluate alternative strategies to overcome such barriers, no options
developed for transitional measures, nor any specific obligations to report back on progress over time.
Thus, it is largely left to injured trading partners to complain in the DSU in order to bring a country
into compliance. This hypothesis is thus indirectly confirmed: the absence of an opportunity to
explore options for resolution and prescribe a follow-up review appears correlated with the failure to
resolve policy implementation disputes.
H 3.1: The more explicit the legal procedures for enforcement, the more likely countries will comply
with their obligations.
The advent of the DSU crystallized a shift to a mandatory, binding process for resolving third-order
disputes. The tightening of legal procedure appears to have advanced dispute settlement, as measured
by the number of complaints, diversity of parties, and issues in dispute. Of the cases in which a
decision was rendered, approximately three-quarters found the respondent in some measure of
violation of WTO rules. Most violations are cured eventually, usually through reformed domestic
policies. More study to measure the direct and indirect effect of sanctions on country behavior would
inform this assessment. The commitment and political willingness to abide by panel and Appellate
Body decisions is soft. In sum, the procedures may facilitate compliance, but may also come at the
cost of discouraging alternative solutions. Use of the DSU procedure is steady, at a rate one-third
higher than the previous GATT process, with a more diverse group of complainants and respondents.
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Although the TPRM is expressly prohibited from engaging in enforcement activity, future research
may be able to more carefully correlate compliance measured at the policy implementation level with
compliance at the policy enforcement level.
H 3.2: Increased access to legal, financial, and technical resources will increase the ability of
countries to enforce their rights.
Prior to the DSU, smaller and developing countries infrequently filed complaints against their trading
partners, due mostly to a lack of legal, financial, and technical resources. The WTO Advisory Centre
was formed in response to that urgent need. The Centre is a concrete tool to enhance the participation
of developing countries and economies in transition to participate more fully in the WTO, and its
services are coordinated with the other technical and training assistance provided by the Secretariat.
As important is the need for the cultural, administrative, and legal infrastructure that would enable
domestic ministries to assess and monitor their national trade practices and determine whether they
and their trading partners are complying with WTO obligations. An additional point is that it may be
more efficient for developing countries to piggyback if a developed country is willing to take the lead
in enforcing compliance in a situation that affects a number of countries.
H 3.3: An array of direct andfacilitated resolution procedures will increase the opportunityfor
parties to resolve noncompliance with the agreed-upon rules.
The dispute settlement literature and international practice have long supported the use of various
direct and assisted negotiation processes. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and the DSU
suggest a "stepladder" of process options through which parties might resolve their differences:
negotiation, conciliation, good offices, mediation, and adjudication. The WTO's Director-General has
specifically offered his assistance in resolving disputes, but the recent absence of takers mirrors the
long-term general response. These alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes have been very
effective in domestic disputes, but it appears that availability is insufficient to prompt their use. Two
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reasons may be the unpredictability of these processes and countries' inexperience in using them.
Also, the incentives for early settlement may be misaligned. More than half of the cases submitted to
the DSU are settled short of a panel being established, and half of those assigned to a panel settle
before the panel issues a ruling. For those cases that await a panel ruling, both parties may prefer a
third party determination and the passage of time before implementation with any decision is
required. The availability of optional ADR processes may be helpful, but effective use will require
more, such as mandatory use in certain circumstances, incentives for early compliance, and the
compilation of a professional roster of neutrals.
These hypotheses do not provide a precise recipe, but can serve as a guide to direction for
improving the three orders of dispute resolution processes. The next section briefly refers to the
relative weight given to power, rights, and interests in these processes.
THE POWER-RIGHTS-INTERESTS FRAMEWORK
The power-rights-interests framework posits that processes that are primarily oriented to the parties'
interests are more likely to lead to results with long-term sustainability. Interests encompass whatever
the parties care about, including economic, political, and social values. Disputes resolved according to
interests take time, and it is exceedingly cumbersome to balance the myriad interests of nearly 150
countries. Resolving disputes on the basis of rights calls for the application of agreed-upon rules to a
given circumstance in order to determine who prevails. Rights-based processes value procedural
justice, but may not address the more qualitative underlying interests. Disputes resolved according to
power weight the outcome to the party with more leverage and status, but may do so at the expense of
relationships. Table 6.2 summarizes the factors-power, rights, or interests-in each of the three
orders of dispute handling at the WTO.
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Table 6.2: Summary of Dispute Resolution Processes within Power-Rights-Interests Framework
Power Rights Interests
First-Order Disputes Diagnosis X x
Resolution X x
Second-Order Disputes Diagnosis x X x
Resolution
Third-Order Disputes Diagnosis x X x
Resolution x X x
X = primary determinant; x = contributing factor
First-order disputes tend to be diagnosed and resolved in favor of those countries with more
power, where power is seen chiefly in terms of world trading volume. The United States and the
European Communities have long taken the lead in identifying issues to be negotiated. With the rule
of consensus decision-making, countries are able to express their interests as well, but it takes a
substantial coalition of medium, smaller, and developing countries to counter the pressure of the more
powerful first-tier countries.
Second-order disputes are identified through a hybrid rights and interests process that serves
to scrutinize and guide the parties' behavior relative to existing rules. If a gap exists between assessed
and expected performance-whether for political, economic or social reasons-there is no specific
process for bridging it. A target country has an opportunity to explain its interests, but no mechanism
to synchronize those interests with the rules in question. Power is indirectly felt as countries use care
in their critical comments during council sessions. There is no formal resolution process, partly due to
the TPR's explicit prohibition against enforcement activity.
Third-order disputes are handled through the DSU's judicialized process. In earlier times, the
smaller and more homogenous membership and more limited scope of rules made it easier to consider
how to accommodate both complainants' and respondents' interests within the rules. That approach
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has since given way to a more important institutional interest in having a predictable, legally
legitimate procedure.
By considering these processes as an integrated whole, rather than separately, one might
better take advantage of the qualities each offers. The last section will examine that balance.
The next section compares the three orders of dispute resolution processes against the five criteria.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CRITERIA AND THE WTO
Through a more practical lens, how does the WTO's resolution of the various disputes fare if we
compare across dispute orders? Transaction costs include time, financial and human resources
expended, opportunity costs, and stress on relationships. The benefits of a process all tend to correlate
positively with countries' satisfaction with the process and outcome, the maintenance of good
working relationships among trading partners, and decreased recurrence of the same problem issues.
While this research lacks absolute quantitative measures on these criteria, relative assessments are
possible. Table 6.3 summarizes the comparisons.
The costs are high to very high in both first- and third-order disputes for all parties, but
relatively moderate for a particular country and the institution in second-order disputes. Satisfaction
with outcome and process in each order is moderate on average-higher for some, much lower for
others. Relationships are at least not damaged in first- and second-order disputes, but are negatively
affected in third-order disputes. The measure of problem recurrence is moderate in first-order
disputes, as issues are subsequently renegotiated if insufficiently clear on the first try; problems
identified in the policy implementation processes tend to recur, as there seems to be no means to
remedy what is found. Third-order disputes have a high incidence of recurrence; half of the disputes
have interested third parties, and many are filed by and against multiple parties.
As noted in the opening chapter, the same issues tend to arise in all three dispute orders in
some variant form. Many critics focus on fixing the faults of each process. Some faults can be
corrected, but perhaps it would be useful to consider what form of the problem is more tractable and
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less costly to resolve, and steer those problems into the more effective processes-in other words, not
only modify the processes, but more carefully distinguish among the disputes that are directed to
those processes. Both policymaking (legislative) and policy enforcement processes are necessary in
any institution, and a number of proposals are being considered to improve them at the WTO. What is
striking is the potential advantage of second-order dispute resolution: The transaction cost is
moderate, the satisfaction with outcome and process is moderate to high, and the effect on
relationships is neutral to positive. Relative to the alternative processes of multilateral negotiation and
litigation, it would be useful to seek ways to take greater advantage of policy implementation
resolution. The next section considers a number of ideas and how they might help to integrate the
first-, second-, and third-order dispute processes.
Table 6.3: Dispute Resolution Criteria and the WTO Processes
First-Order Disputes: Second-Order Third-Order
Policymaking Disputes: Disputes:
Policy Implementation Policy Enforcement
Transaction Costs High costs for all Moderate costs for High costs for all
(time, financial and countries countries and for the parties; too high for
human resources institution in time and many potential
expended, administrative support complainants to
opportunity costs, engage
and reputation)
Satisfaction with Low to moderate Moderate to high Moderate
Outcome:
Interests met, or at
least not
compromised
Satisfaction with Low Moderate to high Moderate
Process:
Fair and transparent
process
Effect on Moderate Moderate to positive Negative
Relationships
Problem Recurrence Moderate High High
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INTEGRATING PROCESSES AND SYSTEM DESIGN
Policy analysis begins with articulating the objective, then considering what strategies will best
achieve that goal. This section considers the goal, inputs, process, and outputs for each dispute order,
and the linkage points among them. I conclude by corresponding this modified WTO process schema
with the concept of an integrated conflict management system.
First-Order Disputes
The WTO was formed to provide a common institutional framework that would promote security and
predictability in multilateral trade relations. The organization provides a forum for negotiations
among its members to do so. In current practice, all parties have an opportunity to propose topics for
consideration in a given negotiation round. Hundreds of proposals from nearly 150 countries may be
submitted; these proposals may include old rules that need revision and new topics that require
research to understand. The proposals are the inputs to the first-order dispute resolution process. The
parties work to categorize and winnow down these proposals into a more tractable package of topics
for consideration. Using informal and formal meetings, some of which some are open and others
exclusive, it can take many years to reach consensus; this is the process. We have noted above that as
the number of members and complexity of the issues increases, the demand for a more transparent
process increases as well.2 Once an agenda is agreed upon,3 the negotiation process continues until
consensus is achieved on an agreement: this is the output. The agreement is likely to include explicit
provisions where possible, and more ambiguous provisions where there is less agreement or less
2 Interestingly, the WTO institution (as distinguished from process) has been cited as one of the most
transparent and accountable, primarily based on its online information access. "WTO gets high marks for
accountability, transparency," WTO News, February 11, 2003.
3 Note, notwithstanding how long it can take to agree upon an agenda, it is not cast in stone. As described in
Chapter 3, the pending Doha agenda included a number of issue areas when issued in 2000. The negotiation
proved too difficult and the most recent draft agreement contemplates only five areas: agriculture, non-
agriculture market access, development, trade facilitation (movement, release, and clearance of goods), and
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knowledge to support more precise language. A number of reforms have been suggested to help
"unblock the political decision-making process,"4 including more representative participation,5
greater access to essential information, amended decision-making rules, and the use of professional
neutrals. Another approach might be to improve the quality of the information development phase.
A key link between second- and first-order disputes is the extent to which policymaking
anticipates and establishes the basis for parties' implementation of the agreed-upon provisions. Any
steps taken to ensure that all parties are informed on the negotiated issues sufficiently to understand
the consequences for their own constituencies will reap benefits. The question is whether these
process reforms would improve the quality of the output (agreement), and better achieve the goal of
more stable, predictable trade relations. Third-order disputes link to first-order disputes by
highlighting the ambiguity and need for clarification in a rule applied to a concrete circumstance. In
the GATT days, an unadopted panel report could function as a signal that the members needed a rule
to be clarified. In some circumstances, it may be preferred to resolve an issue as a legal point through
dispute settlement, rather than try to negotiate consensus for a specific agreement provision.6
Second-Order Disputes
Once members agree to specific trade policies, the goal is for governments to adopt domestic trade
measures that are consistent with the policies. One measure of institutional effectiveness is its ability
services. "WTO: July Framework Agreement at Eleventh Hour," Bridges Weekly Trade Digest 8, August 3,
2004, p. 2.
4 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Tensions between the dispute settlement process and the diplomatic and treaty-
making activities of the WTO," World Trade Review 1 (2002), pp. 301-308.
5 Ironically, WTO members have expressed mixed opinions on the recent advance in the Doha negotiations; on
the one hand, countries are relieved and encouraged that progress is being made on a draft framework
agreement. On the other hand, countries are highly frustrated that the agreement was reached by an exclusive
group, the "Five Interested Parties" (US, EC, India, Brazil, and Australia). Staff, "WTO: July Framework
Agreed at Eleventh Hour," Bridges Weekly Trade Digest 8, August 3, 2004, p. 2 . The shrinking of the agenda is
reminiscent of the "negotiation arithmetic" described in David Lax and James Sebenius, "Thinking
Coalitionally: Party Arithmetic, Process Opportunism, and Strategic Sequencing," in Peyton Young, ed.,
Negotiation Analysis (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p. 153.
6 For example, negotiating an amendment to the DSU would have required a three-quarters vote support by the
WTO membership in order to accept amicus briefs. This issue was dealt directly by the Appellate Body in the
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to influence the behavior of its member governments. Existing practice provides countries with
opportunities for informal and formal consultations on the extent to which countries have taken the
necessary domestic steps to implement their WTO obligations. Specifically, the TPR's purpose is to
"contribute to the adherence by all Members to the rules, disciplines, and commitments" made under
the trade agreements "by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies
and practices of Members."7 The input is a country's own prepared report, the Secretariat's report,
and trading partners' comments. The process is periodic and transparent and happens to each country.
The output is a report that points out areas for improvement. It has been suggested that the process
and output be modified to more explicitly provide for the dissemination of reports to its ministries and
follow-up consultations within a specific timeframe that emphasize devising implementation options
tailored to a country's circumstances.8
The capacity of a country to implement WTO policies links clearly to first- and third-order
disputes. Policymaking should anticipate the capacity of nations to implement new WTO obligations.
Concerns raised during TPR reviews are signals to trading partners that, if unaddressed, can escalate
into DSU complaints. In turn, DSU complaints include both willful and incapacity-based violations,
both of which could likely be ameliorated by early intervention.
Third-Order Disputes
Shrimp-Turtle case. United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/R158, adopted November 6, 1998, para. 99-110.
7 TPRM, Paragraph A(i).
8 See, for example, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes on managerial compliance, The New
Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); complaint-based monitoring in John H. Knox,
"A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedure of the
NAFTA Environmental commission," Ecology Law Quarterly 28 (2001). See also Alec Stone-Sweet,
"Judicialization and the Construction of Governance," CCOP Working Paper # 1999-04, January 1999. Sweet
conceives of the continuous resolution of dyadic conflicts by a third party, using continuous discourse about the
rulefulness of behavior, which is gradually absorbed into political behavior, thus judicializing political behavior.
Sungjoon Cho describes a broad, long-term approach to domestic behavior changes in "Reconciling a Clash
between Free Markets and State Regulation: Toward a New International Economic Law," (Diss., Harvard Law
School, 2002) p. 364.
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The DSU is a central element of the WTO that serves "to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law."9 Inputs to the DSU
take the form of complaints by one (or more) countries against another that the benefits expected
under the WTO agreement have been nullified or impaired. 10 The process is carefully prescribed to
include a period of consultation, optional conciliation/good offices/mediation, submission to an
expert panel, and optional review by the Appellate Body. While adjudication doesn't ensure
compliance, most states do comply with the DSB's recommendations. The process provides a
legitimate basis for seeking the cessation of an improper trade practice or the award of compensation
or retaliation rights (which are costly to both the complainant and the target), and it increases the
detennrminacy of law. The output is a decision by a panel or Appellate Body that is formally adopted
and recommends action by the respondent if a violation is found. Both the process and output
components could bear improvement, as already raised in Chapter 5. Such improvements could
include the formation of a professional panelist roster, more active use of ADR processes, and
modified remedies.
Again, these third-order disputes link back to both policymaking and policy implementation,
and can have serious consequences. A former U.S. official warned: "We have an increasingly difficult
economic relationship that's threatening to spill over into our political and even our security
relationship.... Trade disputes are piling up without an effective ability to deal with them." 1 The
notion of problem-solving courts "extends the role of the legal system beyond fact-finding and
imposition of sanctions...to restore the well-being of communities."12 On the other hand, it may be
more efficient to use dispute settlement procedures to resolve a particular issue, rather than look to the
9 DSU, Article 3.2.
10 However, "Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under these
procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanisms is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute." DSU, Article 3.7.
1 U.S. Commerce Undersecretary David Aaron in Michael Smith, "Disputes put political links at risk, says
US," Financial Times, March 15, 2000.
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full-membership to negotiate a specific legal provision. Open issues that would inform a deeper
study of this order include an evaluation of what happens after dispute settlement concludes: how and
when does the respondent (and other similarly-situated countries) change its trading behavior. Does the
compliance pull of a panel and Appellate Body decision establish a precedent for measuring behavior and are
subsequent trade negotiations facilitated by reference to a particular case experience.
Integrating the Orders
This research has described three domains to facilitate analysis, but in fact the borders are porous.
The overview of each dispute order's inputs, process, and outputs allows us to examine how the
pieces fit together. Chayes and Chayes's work highlighted the importance of bringing all compliance
measures and instruments into a single coherent compliance strategy. 13 One Geneva diplomat
describes three kinds of players in the trade world who are only minimally coordinated in their
activities: negotiators who have particular political sense, administrators who are technically
proficient, and litigators/lawyers. These actors roughly correlate to first-, second-, and third-order
activities. A system design should consider not only what each order of activity aims to achieve, but
who performs the function.
An emerging field is that of integrated conflict management systems. 14 While geared to
organizations in a domestic context, the principles are portable. An optimal system needs to prevent
unnecessary conflict as well as manage conflict when it does arise. Lynch states that a system is likely
to be more effective if it integrates power-, interest-, and rights-based processes, provides different
options for resolution, and includes a support structure with independent neutrals and feedback
opportunities. All of these elements have been touched upon in this research.
12 Jeffrey A. Butts, "Introduction: Problem-Solving Courts," Law & Policy 23,.no. 2 (April 2001), p. 121.
13 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, p. 249.
14 Jennifer F. Lynch, Q.C., "Beyond ADR: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management," Negotiation
Journal (July 2001), p. 207; and Jennifer Lynch, "Integrated Conflict Management Programs Emerge as an
Organization Development Strategy," CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 21, no. 5 (May 2003), p. 99.
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I conclude that some conflicts might be prevented and others might be more effectively
resolved by recognizing where the process costs and benefits are more advantageous. The most
underutilized dispute handling process seems to be that of second-order disputes. These processes,
which are concerned with policy implementation, are focused on translating international rules into
domestic practice. Surveillance mechanisms (e.g., notifications, trade policy reviews) are in place to
diagnose the barriers countries experience in fulfilling their obligations. An ongoing review of those
barriers, and a structured discussion in which to develop options for short-, medium-, and long-term
action, would likely decrease the number of second-order disputes that ripen into third-order, DSU
complaints and avoid costs in resources and trading relationships. Implementation experience can
feed back to policymaking and enable negotiators to draft agreements with more specificity; more
success at the implementation phase will also diminish the number of cases that go to the DSU. Of
course, there are always cases of countries in which constituent pressure is so great that they have no
incentive to comply before a tribunal so requires.15 If, however, there were some transitional
implementation allowance made for countries willing to pursue compliance sooner, then the
incentives for governments to change their policies could shift. For example, if a target country can
articulate the barriers to compliance, and does so after a request for consultation, but before a panel is
established, some kind of mediated process might trigger access too financial and technical
assistance, as well as an extended time to phase in full compliance. The DSU represents a highly
judicialized process that is unlikely to revert to a more diplomatic one. However, the DSU could
usefully be supplemented with an enhanced second-order dispute process, as well as with the
mandatory use of other processes already contemplated, such as conciliation and mediation using
professional neutrals.
These ideas are preliminary. This research closes with some guidelines for thinking about
dispute settlement within a system of processes, based on the WTO's experience, and some
15 For an interesting discussion of compliance constituencies (e.g., import-competing industries, exporters,
lawyers) from the political scientists' perspective, see Miles Kahler, "Conclusion: The Causes and
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recommendations for further research. The guidelines start with what the WTO is and requires. The
WTO system manages highly complex issues according to an intricate structure of rules, involves
ongoing relationships among most of the worlds nations, and uses a nested set of policy making,
policy implementation and policy enforcement processes. When representative decision making is
critical, when maintaining relationships is paramount, or transaction costs are prohibitive, then first-
order or second-order processes will be much more effective. If, however, building consensus among
150 nations is too hard, or premature, then addressing the issue in more concrete terms within the
context of a specific case in the DSU may be preferable. When pursuing a legal process will carry
more legitimacy, then third-order processes should dominate. However, when facilitating compliance
in a less-costly, more deliberative and low-profile manner is important, then second-order processes
will be most valuable.
Three recommendations for future research are suggested. First is to organize a working
group to consider more deeply the issues I have raised among the first-order, second-order, and third-
order phases, and the links among them. The working group should involve representatives not only
of diverse countries, but of diverse professional experience: negotiator-diplomats, in-country
administrators and technocrats, and lawyers from the public, nongovernmental, and private sectors. 16
With breadth of experience and scope of reference, the group could issue a series of proposals to
make the existing trade institution more efficient and effective, and serve as a pilot for other
institutions aiming to emulate the successes of the WTO. Two specific points to explore would be to
evaluate the extent to which sanctions have effectively modified country behavior to be more
consistent with the WTO policies. Secondly, it would help to probe what makes the hard cases, e.g.,
bananas and beef hormones, hard, and what processes could more effectively resolve future hard
cases, such as trade involving genetically-modified organisms and agricultural subsidies. A second
Consequences of Legalization," International Organization 54 (Summer 2000) pp. 661-683, 692.
16 A new approach to analyzing the interaction of process and substance is found in James Sebenius, "A 3-D
View of Negotiation Theory and Practice," in D. Lax and J. Sebenius, 3-D Negotiation: Creating and Claiming
Value for the Long Term [forthcoming].
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area of research would be to examine country behaviors after conclusion of the DSU processes, both
when complainants prevail, and when respondents prevail. With the input provided by the first two
research areas, a third could more carefully compare the WTO experience with that of other
international institutions, e.g., the OECD and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and
extend the findings for application to newer institutions, such as contemplated by the more recent
global environmental treaties.
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